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Abstract 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The pork industry in Australia accounts for 2.1% of all agricultural production with a gross 
value of AU $865 million. It is comprised of approximately 1,350 pork producers and 2.3 
million pigs. Pigs in Australia, similar to most other developed countries, are raised in 
three different production systems: traditional intensive production, ecoshelters and free-
range. Each of these production systems provide opportunities for pathogen introduction 
and spread by wild animals. Wild animal species, both introduced and native to Australia, 
pose a disease threat to domestic animals and humans in relation to the introduction, 
maintenance and spread of emerging, exotic and endemic pathogens. Australia has had few 
outbreaks of emerging infectious diseases and is well protected from transboundary animal 
diseases due to stringent quarantine procedures, which protect Australia’s livestock 
industries. As such, the main threat to domestic pig health in Australia posed by wildlife is 
transmission of infectious pathogens currently endemic in wild animal populations. 
 
Eighty five percent of the pig producing members of Australian Pork Limited that 
responded to a postal survey experienced wild animal incursions on their piggery. The wild 
animals presenting the greatest risk to commercial piggeries, determined by the number of 
pig producers reporting an observation of the species and the frequency of observations, 
included the European starling (Sturnus vulgarus), rodents (black rat Rattus rattus, brown 
rat Rattus norvegicus, and the house mouse Mus musculus) and feral cats (Felis catus). The 
species-specific pathogen transmission potential from feral pigs (Sus scrofa) also presented 
a high risk. 
  
The role of the cat in the transmission of Toxoplasma gondii to domestic pigs in piggeries 
has been thoroughly studied and consequently has not been examined further in this study. 
Pig pathogens were detected in European starlings, rats and feral pigs. These pathogens 
could be transmitted to pigs through direct and indirect pathways, via contaminated food, 
water and air.  
 
The current study detected Escherichia coli, Salmonella spp. and Campylobacter spp. in 
European starling populations around four large-scale commercial piggeries in South 
Australia. Escherichia coli was detected in starlings on all four piggeries, while Salmonella 
spp. and Campylobacter spp. were only detected on one piggery. Salmonella spp. and 
 xviii
Lawsonia intracellularis were detected in rats on three large-scale commercial piggeries, 
two of which were located in Victoria, and one in South Australia. Brachyspira 
hyodysenteriae and Brachyspira pilosicoli were not detected in rats in the current study. 
Lawsonia intracellularis, Brucella suis, Leptospira spp. and Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae 
were all detected in feral pigs within 10 km of two large-scale commercial piggeries in 
southern Queensland. Results from six collared feral pigs showed that for 5 pigs the 
majority of their movement was within 5 km of the piggeries. One individual, a large male 
boar, moved to within 100 m of a free-range piggery. 
 
Based on the results of an exposure assessment, rats presented the highest probability of 
exposure of pathogens to domestic pigs, and Lawsonia intracellularis (median 0.13, 5% 
and 95% CI 0.05–0.23) and Brachyspira hyodysenteriae (median 0.10, 5% and 95% CI 
0.05–0.19; based on the prevalence in rats obtained from literature) were the most likely 
pathogens to be transmitted. The probability of exposure of domestic pigs to pathogens 
from European starlings was estimated to be lower than the exposure from rats. However, 
pathogenic Escherichia coli had a 0.03 (5% and 95% CI 0.02–0.04) median probability of 
exposure, which was the highest probability among the three pathogens studied in 
starlings. The probability of pathogen exposure from feral to domestic pigs was found to 
be lower than rats and starlings for some pathogens. The highest probability of domestic 
pig exposure to feral pig pathogens was found to be for Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae 
(median 0.01, 5% and 95% CI 0.004–0.02) and Lawsonia intracellularis (median 0.01, 5% 
and 95% CI 0.005–0.03) for pigs in free-range piggeries in a region with a high number of 
feral pigs. The models developed in this thesis identified the presence and number of wild 
animals around piggeries, their access to piggeries and pig food and water, and their 
proximity to piggeries, as critical points to mitigate the risk of pathogen exposure. 
 
Findings from this thesis indicate that the estimated probability of exposure of domestic 
pigs to pathogens from wild animals is not negligible. As such, the implementation of 
mitigation strategies should be further investigated, considering also the magnitude of the 
impacts of this exposure, the costs involved with the mitigation measures and the practical 
implications. This would support decision-making to determine the need for and benefits 
of these mitigation strategies.   
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1 General Introduction 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Domestic pig production in Australia is a relatively small but important industry in 
agricultural terms. The pig industry comprises 2.1% of total domestic agricultural 
production in Australia, with a gross value of AU $865 million (APL 2010), while 
Australian pork production comprises 0.4% of world pork production (APL 2010). Due to 
the very small size of the Australian pork industry, an outbreak of the exotic virus foot-
and-mouth disease in the naïve pig population would have a significant effect on the 
industry. Not only pigs, but all cloven hoofed animals are susceptible to this devastating 
disease. The Productivity Commission (2002) estimated that a foot-and-mouth disease 
outbreak in Australia lasting 3 months would cost $5.5 billion to livestock industries and a 
loss of $8 billion in gross domestic product. Animal welfare is also a major concern in any 
infectious disease outbreak. An epidemic of the emerging disease Nipah virus in Malaysia 
during 1999 led to a cull of over one million pigs (Chua et al. 2000). 
 
At present, Australia has substantial advantages in livestock production and trade due to 
being free of 71% of World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) listed terrestrial animal 
diseases, 32% of which infect pigs (WAHID 2010). Australia’s continuing disease free 
status is attributable to its remote location and stringent quarantine procedures which 
protect its livestock industry. However, livestock health is threatened by infectious 
pathogens currently emerging and endemic in wild animal populations in this country. The 
role that wild animal populations could play in the event of exotic disease introduction also 
requires investigation to underpin approaches to farm biosecurity practice and more 
broadly to disease preparedness and response planning. This thesis investigates two 
principle modes for pathogen introduction onto livestock farms from wild native and non-
native animals: direct transmission through contact between animals; and indirect 
transmission through infected air, food and water (Frölich et al. 2002; Coetzer and Tustin 
2004; Kyriazakis and Whittemore 2006). The transmission of infectious pathogens from 
wild animals to domestic pigs is the focus of this thesis. 
 
In order to determine which wild animals are the most important sources for infectious 
pathogen transmission to pigs in Australian piggeries, a questionnaire was distributed 
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amongst members of Australian Pork Limited who worked on commercial piggeries. The 
procedure, rationale, and outcomes of this survey of commercial pig producers are 
presented in detail in Chapter 2. The animals identified were: European starlings (Sturnus 
vulgarus), rodents (rats: Rattus rattus and Rattus norvegicus; house mouse: Mus musculus) 
and feral pigs (Sus scrofa). Once identified, these wild animal species were subjected to 
further investigation in order to detect the presence of specific pig pathogens in naturally 
occurring populations of each species in close proximity to commercial piggeries.  
 
European starlings are associated with more than 20 pathogens of animals and humans 
(Weber 1979). Consequently, starlings have been deemed a possible source of pathogens 
with economic and animal welfare impact to livestock industries (Kirk et al. 2002; Gaukler 
et al. 2009; Carlson et al. 2011a). In the present study, the starling was one of the most 
frequently reported birds on piggeries in Australia (Chapter 2). The three bacterial 
enteropathogens Salmonella spp., Escherichia coli and Campylobacter spp. have been 
previously isolated from starlings (Morishita et al. 1999; Craven et al. 2000; Tizard 2004). 
Salmonella and Campylobacter alone are responsible for 90% of bacterial enteritis 
infections in humans derived from food sources world-wide (Thorns 2000). Despite this 
evidence, the extent of the contribution of starlings to the transmission of pathogens to 
livestock remains unclear.  
 
Rodents have been shown to be reservoirs of a large number of pathogens, including 
bacteria, viruses and parasites (Le Moine et al. 1987; Amass and Clark 1999; Henderson 
2009). Some diseases that involve transmission from rodents, such as the Bubonic Plague 
and Leptospirosis, are zoonotic in nature, being transmissible to humans, and can also be 
transmitted to other animals (Twigg 1975; Alderton 1996; Singleton et al. 1999). 
Consequently, rodents have been identified as a likely vehicle for transmission of 
pathogens to and between domestic animals (Le Moine et al. 1987; Hampson et al. 1991; 
Drummond 2001). The carrier status of rodents for many pathogens that can infect pigs has 
been well documented. Arguably the two most important endemic pathogens in Australian 
piggeries in terms of cost of production and animal welfare are Brachyspira 
hyodysenteriae and Lawsonia intracellularis (Hampson 1997; Straw et al. 2006; Holyoake 
et al. 2010a). These pathogens have been isolated from rodents captured in piggeries 
(Hampson et al. 1991; Friedman et al. 2008; Collins et al. 2011). However, transmission of 
these pathogens from rodents to livestock has not been investigated in detail. 
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Feral pigs have been considered responsible for a number of significant disease outbreaks 
in livestock. Classical swine fever, African swine fever and pseudorabies are some 
international examples where feral pig populations that harbour disease have contributed to 
outbreaks in livestock. Among 93 primary outbreaks of classical swine fever in domestic 
pigs in Germany during 1993-1998, 59% were proven to be caused by transmission of the 
virus from feral pigs (Fritzemeier et al. 2000). Feral pigs in Australia are known reservoirs 
of 21 different pathogenic species of bacteria, many of which are transmissible to other 
animals and humans, and all of which are transmissible to domestic pigs (Bensink et al. 
1991; Pavlov et al. 1992; Godfroid 2002; Phillips et al. 2009). Similar to starlings and 
rodents, limited information is available on the role played by feral pigs in the transmission 
of endemic pathogens to domestic pigs and other livestock.    
 
The cat (Felis catus) was also identified as an important wild animal source for infectious 
pathogen transmission to pigs in the survey described in Chapter 2. Perhaps the most 
significant zoonotic pathogen associated with cats is the protozoan parasite Toxoplasma 
gondii. Cats are the definitive host of Toxoplasma gondii and are the only animal to excrete 
Toxoplasma gondii oocysts (Elmore et al. 2010). Toxoplasma gondii can infect the 
majority of birds and mammals, including humans. Consumption of undercooked pork 
meat is considered to be one of the main sources of Toxoplasma gondii infection in 
humans (Dubey et al. 1986; Lehmann et al. 2003). Infection in pigs is considered to come 
predominantly from a feline source, through infection with excreted oocysts (Lehmann et 
al. 2003). The role of the cat in the transmission of this protozoan to domestic pigs in 
piggeries has been thoroughly studied by the above authors, and as such was not examined 
further in this study.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to characterise the role of European starlings, rats and feral pigs in 
the transmission of specific pathogens to domestic pigs on commercial piggeries in 
Australia. While other wild animal species may also pose a risk for pathogen introduction, 
this study is limited to the characterisation of these three wild animal species. Chapter 3 of 
this thesis presents a review of the literature associated with each of these species and the 
transmission characteristics for each species is presented in separate chapters (Chapters 4, 
5 and 6).  
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The outcomes of the studies characterising the role of the three wild animal species are 
used to determine the probability of exposure of domestic pigs to specific pathogens 
carried by each species. Following a risk analysis approach, an exposure assessment is 
conducted to estimate this probability. The assessment incorporates prevalence data on the 
specific pathogens as well as the biosecurity practices of the piggeries included in the 
studies presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. This measure of the risk of pathogen transmission 
to domestic pigs will enable the provision of informed recommendations to the Australian 
pork industry that aim to minimise this biosecurity hazard to domestic pigs in Australia. 
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2 Producer reported wildlife incursions on commercial piggeries  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
Progress in minimising the potential for cross-species transmission of disease is impeded 
by lack of knowledge on which wild animal species are likely to exchange pathogens, and 
indeed, which species are routinely coming into contact with animals in our agricultural 
industries. While there is good evidence of interactions between wildlife and domestic pigs 
(Amass and Clark 1999; Bengis et al. 2002; Lapidge et al. 2006), and well established 
cases of pathogen transmission between them (Fritzemeier et al. 2000; Lehmann et al. 
2003; Breed et al. 2006), there are currently few well documented studies that have 
identified the range of wildlife species, their distributions and numbers on and around 
piggeries. 
 
The objectives of this study were to obtain baseline data on the following: first, the 
proportion and geographical distribution of commercial piggeries experiencing wildlife 
incursions/presence in Australia; secondly, the control techniques in use on piggeries for 
wildlife intruders and the producer reported effectiveness of those techniques; and, thirdly, 
the proportion of piggery producers concerned about the occurrence of specific diseases 
that are carried by wildlife hosts. 
 
2.2 Materials and Methods 
 
 2.2.1 Overview 
A nation wide survey of commercial pig producers who were members of Australian Pork 
Limited (APL; n=444) was conducted. APL is a producer owned registered company that 
supports and promotes the Australian pork industry. Commercial piggeries included in the 
current study were identified through the APL confidential members list. A self-
administered questionnaire was distributed through APL to protect the privacy of the 
organisations members. Two subsequent mailings were sent to non-respondents. 
Procedures involving contact with and collection of information from pig producers were 
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approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee of the University of Sydney, Australia 
(Reference number: 08-2007/10271). 
 
 2.2.2 Questionnaire design, distribution and processing 
The one-page questionnaire (Appendix 1) was designed for return postage with a postage-
paid code and return address on the reverse side. A cover letter and a participant 
information statement were included in the envelope describing the purpose of the survey, 
instructions on survey completion and a statement to reassure recipients of the 
confidentiality of the results. 
 
The questionnaire contained open questions regarding piggery location and sow herd size. 
Closed-ended questions established the piggery housing type and whether the piggeries 
experienced any wild animal incursions. Remaining questions pertaining to the wild animal 
types observed, the frequency of these observations, the methods for controlling wild 
animals, the wildlife related diseases of concern to pork producers, their sources of 
information about these diseases and areas for future research related to wildlife were 
open-ended with space for further comments. The questionnaire was piloted on three 
respondents who had been piggery managers during their career and questions then 
modified to improve clarity and ease of administration.  
 
The first mailing of the questionnaire was distributed to all commercial piggery owners 
and managers who were members of APL via the ‘Pork It Up’ newsletter distributed by 
APL on the 18th of September, 2007. This was followed up with two subsequent repeat 
mail-outs to non-respondents administered by APL at six and nine weeks following a 
modified version of the Dillman protocol for postal surveys (Dillman 2000).  
 
Data from returned questionnaires was entered into Microsoft Excel (PC/Windows XP, 
2003) and checked for data entry errors. Each respondent reported on one piggery; each 
piggery was assigned a piggery identification number and the postal area code listed by the 
respondent was the only identifying information from each questionnaire maintained in the 
database. Some responses were coded to create dichotomous variables (Yes=1, No=0). 
Other questions, such as sow herd size and the number of animals per wildlife species 
observed each week provided numerical data. Responses for the rest of the questions 
(piggery type, wildlife control method, information regarding pig producers’ diseases of 
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concern, sources of information and future research needs) were categorical. Not all survey 
participants responded to every question, this is indicated in the results. 
 
 2.2.3 Analysis 
The overall response rate and proportions were calculated using all responses. 
Insufficiently completed questionnaires with more than 50% of the information missing 
were excluded from further analysis. The geographic distribution of all respondents was 
mapped using ArcGIS (Professional 9.2. MapInfo Corporation, USA) based on postal 
codes.  
 
Some animal species were grouped into the following categories for analytical 
convenience:  
- Marsupials: kangaroos, wallabies, possums, wombats, koalas, sugar gliders 
- Passeriformes: crows, magpies, butcher birds, swallows, martins 
- Psittaciformes: cockatoos, galahs, parrots 
- Anseriformes: ducks, geese 
- Reptiles and Amphibians: reptiles (snakes and lizards), amphibians (toads) 
- Lagomorpha: rabbits, hares 
- Rodents: rats and mice 
- Wild Canids: foxes, dingoes, wild dogs. 
- Non-specific wild birds: used when specific bird species were not named 
 
Some producers did not specify species of wild bird observed; therefore, all of these birds 
were grouped under the category of Non-specific wild birds. Other piggeries specified 
native bird species that were observed, and these were categorised by bird group. 
 
Descriptive analysis of the questionnaire data variables was performed using Microsoft 
Excel (PC/Windows XP, 2003), and data was then exported to Genstat 10th edition (release 
10.2, VSN International Ltd., United Kingdom) for further statistical analysis. Differences 
in the proportion of piggery producers in each state that responded to the survey compared 
to APL members were assessed by a Fisher’s exact test. Significant differences between 
the proportion of animal group observations on piggeries, as well as the proportion of 
control techniques used for each individual animal or animal group were assessed using a 
z-test.  Statistically significant differences were considered when P-value ≤0.05. 
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Association between the outcome variable, presence or absence (1/0) of wildlife or of 
specified individual animal or animal group observed on a piggery, and the explanatory 
variables was investigated in separate binomial multivariate logistic regression models for 
each outcome variable. The explanatory variables included in the models as fixed effects 
were the state where the piggery was located (based on postal code), sow herd size (no 
sows - grower herd, 1–150 sows, 151–1000 sows and >1000 sows) and piggery type 
(intensive, ecoshelter, free-range, intensive and ecoshelter, or other mixed types). Other 
mixed piggery types for a piggery reported by respondents in this study included intensive 
and free-range production; ecoshelter and free-range production; and all three forms of 
production. Significant variables with a P-value ≤0.05 in the multivariable model were 
retained in the final model. 
 
2.3 Results 
 
 2.3.1 Description of study population 
Of the 444 APL members invited to complete the questionnaire, 171 (38.5%) responded. 
The first mailing resulted in 50 responses, representing a response rate of 11.3%, the 
second mailing gained a further 71 responses, with a mailing response rate of 18.0%, and 
the third mailing gained a final 50 responses with a mailing response rate of 15.5%. Data 
from one respondent was omitted from the analysis due to a recent piggery closure. In 
addition, another respondent had 2 piggeries, but answered the questionnaire only for the 
largest piggery. There was no statistically significant difference in geographic distribution 
by state between survey respondents and the 444 APL members who received the 
questionnaire. The geographic distribution of respondents within states of Australia is 
illustrated in Figure 2.1.  
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Figure 2.1. Map of the geographic distribution of 171 respondents to a postal survey on 
domestic pig-wildlife interactions on commercial piggeries in Australia conducted in 2007. 
Size of the points indicates the number of commercial piggeries in a particular postal code.  
 
 
Of the 170 piggeries, nine were grower herds with no sows and the remainder ranged in 
size from 5 to 6,000 breeding sows (mean 418, median 180). Intensive production was 
reported for 87 (51.2%) of the 170 piggeries and was the most common single piggery 
type, followed by free-range production for 19 (11.2%) piggeries and ecoshelter 
production for 6 (3.5%) piggeries. However, 58 piggeries were engaged in more than one 
production type, with intensive and ecoshelter production reported for 46 piggeries 
(27.0%), intensive and free-range production reported for 7 piggeries (4.1%), ecoshelter 
and free-range production for 3 piggeries (2.0%), and all three forms of production for 2 
piggeries (1.0%). 
 
 2.3.2 Wildlife incursions 
Some level of wild animal incursion was reported by 145 of the 170 respondents (85.3%), 
either into buildings used to house pigs or within 5 m of pig housing facilities.  
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Birds were statistically the most common animals observed intruding on piggeries with 
114 (78.6%) pork producers reporting bird observations (Figure 2.2). The most common 
individual species were the House sparrow, reported by 29 (Passer domesticus, 25.4%) of 
the pork producers and the European starling by 24 (21.1%) (Figure 2.3). Feral cats were 
the most common single species observed intruding on piggeries, being reported by 88 
(60.7%) of the 145 responders.  
 
 
Figure 2.2. Proportion of all wild animals and animal groups observed on commercial 
piggeries by 145 pig producers in Australia during 2007. Different letters represent 
significant differences (P<0.05) between animal group observations. For example, a is 
significantly different to b, but ab is not significantly different to either a or b. 
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Figure 2.3. Proportion of all bird groups observed on commercial piggeries by 114 pig 
producers in Australia during 2007. Different letters represent significant differences 
(P<0.05) between bird group observations. 
 
 
Despite feral cats being the most commonly reported species, the average count of these 
animals seen in a piggery varied from 1 per year to 30 per week. Feral pigs (n = 20 
producers, 13.8%) were observed in the lowest numbers, ranging from an average of 1 per 
year to 5 per week, with European starlings observed in the greatest numbers, ranging from 
30 to 10,000 animals per week.  
 
Results from the logistic regression analysis suggest that the presence or absence of 
wildlife on commercial piggeries in Australia did not differ according to location (state) of 
the piggery, piggery type or piggery size. However, significant differences were observed 
for the presence of some individual wildlife species (Table 2.1). The presence of feral cats 
and wild canids on commercial piggeries in Australia was significantly different (P<0.05) 
according to piggery type and piggery size; however, no differences were observed 
according to the location (state) of the piggery. For feral cats, the highest number of 
observations was recorded by piggeries using mixed production systems (83.3%), which 
did not differ from intensive/ecoshelter piggeries (65.2%). More feral cats were observed 
on piggeries with >1000 sows (68.8%) and with 151 to 1000 sows (63.8%). Wild canids 
were observed in more piggeries using mixed (66.7%) production systems that any other 
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production system, except for ecoshelters. A higher proportion of piggeries with >1000 
sows (56.3%) recorded wild canid incursions than other piggery types, except for grower 
herds.  
 
Observations of marsupials on piggeries differed according to piggery location and piggery 
size (P<0.05). Tasmania was the only state which differed from the other states on the 
reported marsupial observations. The presence of marsupials in large piggeries (>1000 
sows) was higher (50.0%) than in piggeries with 1 to 150 sows (12.3%), 151 to 1000 sows 
(14.5%) and grower herds (11.1%), which were not different to each other. The proportion 
of piggeries observing feral pigs on or around the piggery differed between locations (P < 
0.001), being greater in Queensland (37.1%) compared to the other states, with the 
exception of Western Australia. No feral pigs were observed in Tasmania or South 
Australia. 
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Table 2.1. Observations of wild mammals on 145 commercial piggeries in Australia 
during 2007, according to location by state, piggery type and piggery size. 
Parameter Number of 
piggeries 
Number (percentage) of piggeries with species reported 
  Feral Cats Rodents  Wild Canids  Marsupials Feral Pigs 
State 
 
 NS NS NS * ** 
    NSW  46 22 (47.8) 20 (42.5) 12 (26.1) 5 (10.9)b 3 (6.5)b
    Queensland 35 18 (51.4) 13 (37.1) 8 (22.9) 6 (17.1)b 13 (37.1)a
    Victoria  28 12 (42.9) 13 (46.6) 8 (28.6) 6 (21.4)b 1 (3.6)b
    South Australia  33 20 (60.6) 13 (39.4) 10 (30.3) 4 (12.1)b 0
    Tasmania  4 1 (25.0) 0 0 4 (100)a 0
    Western Australia 20 14 (70.0) 6 (30.0) 8 (40.0) 3 (15.0)b 3 (15.0)ab 
Piggery Type 
 
 * NS * NS NS 
    Intensive  87 40 (46.0)b 41 (47.1) 19 (21.8)b 14 (16.1) 10 (11.5)
    Ecoshelter  6 2 (33.3)b 1 (16.7) 3 (50.0)ab 1 (16.7) 0
    Free-range  19 6 (31.6)b 3 (15.8) 5 (26.3)b 4 (21.1) 4 (21.1)
    Intensive / Ecoshelter 46 30 (65.2)ab 17 (37.0) 12 (26.1)b 8 (17.4) 4 (8.7)
    Mix  12 10 (83.3)a 4 (33.3) 8 (66.7)a 1 (8.3) 2 (16.7)
Sow Herd Size 
 
 * NS * * NS 
    No Sows - Grower herd 9 2 (22.2)a 2 (22.2) 4 (44.4)ab 1 (11.1)b 0
    1–150 Sows  73 30 (41.1)a 24 (32.9) 15 (20.5)b 9 (12.3)b 10 (13.7)
    151–1000 Sows  69 44 (63.8)b 33 (47.8) 19 (27.5)b 10 (14.5)b 6 (8.7)
    >1000 Sows  16 11 (68.8)b 6 (37.5) 9 (56.3)a 8 (50.0)a 4 (25.0)
*P<0.05; ** P<0.001; NS= not significant 
a,b,c Different superscripts within a column and parameter (location, piggery type and 
piggery size) (P<0.05)  
Data from four respondents was excluded from the State parameter due to the absence of 
piggery location information on their completed questionnaire. Data from three 
respondents was excluded from the Sow Herd Size parameter due to the absence of 
piggery size information on their completed questionnaire. 
 
 
Table 2.2 shows the number of observations of different species of wild birds according to 
piggery location, piggery type and sow herd size. Non-specific wild bird observations 
differed (P<0.05) according to piggery type. Ecoshelter (66.7%) and mixed (58.3%) 
piggeries reported more incursions than intensive (27.6%) and free-range (26.3%) 
piggeries. Intensive/ecoshelter farm systems (34.8%) did not differ from the other piggery 
types. Proportion of farms where sparrows were observed differed according to farm 
location (P<0.001), with fewer observations in Queensland than in other states. No 
observations were reported in Western Australia. Ecoshelter and free-range piggeries did 
not report any sparrow observations. Observations of starlings were significantly different 
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(P<0.05) according to piggery location, with higher observations in New South Wales 
(23.9%) and South Australia (21.2%) than in Queensland (2.9%).  
 
 
Table 2.2. Observations of wild birds on 145 commercial piggeries in Australia during 
2007, according to location by state, piggery type and piggery size. 
Parameter Number of 
piggeries 
Number (percentage) of piggeries with species reported 
  Non-
specific 
wild birds 
Sparrows Passeriformes Starlings Anseriformes
State 
 
 NS ** NS * NS 
    NSW  46 15 (32.6) 9 (19.6)a 7 (15.2) 11 (23.9)a 3 (6.5)
    Queensland 35 14 (40.0) 1 (2.9)b 7 (20.0) 1 (2.9)b 3 (8.6)
    Victoria  28 10 (35.7) 6 (21.4)a 3 (10.7) 4 (14.3)ab 1 (3.6)
    South Australia  33 12 (36.4) 10 (30.3)a 3 (9.1) 7 (21.2)a 2 (6.1)
    Tasmania  4 0 2 (50.0)a 0 0 0
    Western Australia 20 5 (25.0) 0 7 (35.0) 0 1 (5.0) 
Piggery Type 
 
 * NS NS NS NS 
    Intensive  87 24 (27.6)b 16 (18.4) 13 (14.9) 12 (13.8) 7 (8.0)
    Ecoshelter  6 4 (66.7)a 0 0 2 (33.3) 0
    Free-range  19 5 (26.3)b 0 3 (15.8) 2 (10.5) 1 (5.3)
    Intensive / Ecoshelter 46 16 (34.8)ab 12 (26.1) 6 (13.0) 8 (17.4) 2 (4.3)
    Mix  12 7 (58.3)a 1 (8.3) 5 (41.7) 0 0
Sow Herd Size 
 
 NS NS NS NS NS 
    No Sows - Grower herd  9 3 (33.3) 1 (11.1) 1 (11.1) 3 (33.3) 1 (11.1)
    1–150 Sows  73 21 (28.8) 14 (19.2) 15 (20.5) 5 (6.8) 5 (6.8)
    151–1000 Sows  69 24 (34.8) 12 (17.4) 9 (13.0) 13 (18.8) 2 (2.9)
    >1000 Sows  16 7 (43.8) 2 (12.5) 2 (12.5) 3 (18.8) 2 (12.5)
*P<0.05; ** P<0.001; NS= not significant 
a,b,c Different superscripts within a column and parameter (location, piggery type and 
piggery size) (P<0.05) 
Data from four respondents was excluded from the State parameter due to the absence of 
piggery location information on their completed questionnaire. Data from three 
respondents was excluded from the Sow Herd Size parameter due to the absence of 
piggery size information on their completed questionnaire.  
 
 
 2.3.3 Control measures for wildlife 
A total of 26 producers (17.9%) did not implement any control measures for the wild 
animals visiting their piggery, with the main lack of control measure implementation for 
birds and native species (including marsupials, reptiles and amphibians) (Figure 2.4). 
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When a control measure was applied, the most common techniques included shooting, 
baiting and trapping. Baiting was used predominantly for rodents, being reported alone by 
57 (86.4%) of 61 respondents who implemented rodent control, and in combination with 
trapping or shooting by the remainder. Of the control techniques used for bird control, 
shooting was the most common (Figure 2.4). There was no significant difference (P>0.05) 
between trapping, shooting, other techniques and no control use for feral cats. This was 
similar to wild canids except baiting was used in place of trapping. Other control 
techniques for feral pigs were the use of fences and a single producer who used a 
combination of baiting, shooting and trapping. 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Proportion of the main control techniques used for the control of wild animals 
intruding on 145 commercial piggeries in Australia during 2007. Control techniques 
included in the ‘Other’ heading were combinations of ‘baiting, trapping and shooting’, 
fencing, and environmental alterations. Different letters represent significant differences 
(P<0.05) between control techniques used for each individual animal or animal group. 
Absence of letters indicates no significant difference. 
 
 
Respondents using control measures to combat wildlife incursions were also asked to 
evaluate the effectiveness of these measures. Of those pork producers, 77% found their 
control measures effective for feral cats and 88% for rodents. The less effective control 
measures were those applied for European starlings, with only one of the 10 pork 
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producers who implemented control for these birds reporting their control techniques to be 
effective. 
 
 2.3.4 Wildlife diseases 
Of the 87 respondents that reported the sources used when seeking information regarding 
diseases carried by wildlife, 60 consulted veterinarians (69%) followed by 30 consulting 
industry (34% – people and publications from the Department of Primary Industries and 
Australian Pork Limited), 13 from literature (15%) and 8 consulted friends (9%). In the 
opinion of 86 pig producers, the most important focus for future research was the European 
starling (39.5%), followed by the Indian mynah (29.0%) and the House sparrow (29.0%).  
Other topics of interest mentioned by producers were other wildlife species, diseases and 
wildlife control measures.  
 
In terms of diseases, salmonella (24%), toxoplasmosis (21%) and leptospirosis (20%) were 
the 3 diseases most commonly of concern to pork producers (Table 2.3). Salmonella was 
considered by pork producers to be associated with birds (57%; House sparrows, 
Passeriformes, non-specific wild birds, European starlings, Ibis and pigeon) with House 
sparrows being the most commonly listed. Leptospirosis was reported to be mainly 
associated with rodents (66%) and feral pigs (20%), and toxoplasmosis was associated 
with cats (86%) (Table 2.3). Avian influenza was only reported in birds, with 
Passeriformes and pigeons being equally of concern, followed by Indian mynahs and 
European starlings. Escherichia coli was reportedly associated with birds (40%; 
Passeriformes, pigeons, Indian mynahs and European starlings) followed by rodents 
(30%). Rodents (40%) were also the main animal of concern associated with swine 
dysentery. 
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Table 2.3. Opinions of survey respondents regarding diseases associated with wild animals intruding on commercial piggeries based on a 
survey of 170 pig producers in Australia during 2007. 
 Disease 
Total number of 
respondents that 
listed disease Number of respondents that associated disease with species (%) 
  n (%) Feral cats Rodents Wild canids Feral pigs Marsupials Birds 
Salmonella 42 (24%) 6 (14) 9 (21) 1 (2) 1 (2) 1 (2) 24 (57) 
Toxoplasmosis 36 (21%) 31 (86) 2 (6) 1 (3)   2 (6) 
Leptospirosis 35 (20%) 1 (3) 23 (66) 2 (6) 7 (20)  2 (6) 
Escherichia Coli 10 (6%) 2 (20) 3 (30) 1 (10)   4 (40) 
Swine Dysentery 10 (6%) 1 (10) 4 (40)  3 (30)  2 (20) 
Mange 9 (5%) 1 (11) 1 (11) 5 (56) 1 (11) 1 (11)  
Erysipelas 7 (4%)  3 (43)  1 (14)  3 (43) 
Avian influenza 6 (3%)      6 (100) 
Lice 5 (3%)    2 (40)  3 (60) 
Worms  4 (2%) 1 (25)   2 (50)  1 (25) 
Coccidiosis 3 (2%)    1 (33)  2 (67) 
Parvovirus 3 (2%) 1 (33)   1 (33)  1 (33) 
Enzootic pneumonia 3 (2%)    1 (33)  2 (67) 
Encephalomyocarditis  3 (2%)  3 (100)     
 
 
 
 
 18
2.4 Discussion 
 
The aims of this work were to identify the wildlife species that intrude on commercial 
piggeries in Australia, and the extent of their intrusion. It also aimed to identify control 
techniques for these wildlife intruders and the associated diseases of concern to pork 
producers. Eighty-five percent of producers that responded to the questionnaire 
experienced wild animal incursion, illustrating that there are multiple pathways involving 
wild animals by which domestic pigs may be exposed to potential pathogen hazards. In 
total, 37 wild animal species were reported entering piggery buildings or coming within 5 
m of areas where domestic pigs were housed. It is uncertain whether the 61% of non-
responders did not experience wildlife incursions, or did not respond to this questionnaire 
due to other concerns. Direct follow-up was not possible for confidentiality reasons.  
 
Birds were the most reported wildlife on Australian commercial piggeries. Birds are 
known to be common on commercial piggeries in Australia and will enter piggery 
buildings and sheds. Farming practices such as open windows for cooling purposes and air 
circulation facilitate bird access to piggeries. As pig feed and water sources are usually 
accessible and exposed to wild birds, contamination with faecal matter can easily occur. A 
postal survey conducted in 2005 in Australia reported that almost three quarters of 
commercial pork producers experience bird impacts to their enterprise (Lapidge et al. 
2006). These perceived impacts included damage to buildings, crops, vegetation and 
infrastructure; fouling of exposed sources of food and water being fed to pigs with 
droppings; direct feed loss; and increased pathogen spread (Lapidge et al. 2006). Despite 
the evidence of producer concern about bird presence, this study found that birds are still 
present in particularly large numbers on piggeries. Ten pork producers reported 
observations of starling flock sizes of one thousand birds or more; one pork producer noted 
starling flock sizes approximating 10,000 birds. 
 
Registered baiting techniques to assist with control are not available for birds in Australia. 
Most pork producers did not control birds, and of those who did, using methods such as 
exclusion techniques and shooting, only 10% were satisfied with their effectiveness. In 
comparison, control strategies used for rodents, which focused on specifically developed 
baits, had a reported effectiveness of 88%. This could be one reason why European 
starlings were stated by respondents as the preferred area for future research. 
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Cats were the species most observed by survey respondents (61%). They are most likely 
found in the vicinity of piggeries due to a number of interrelated factors, including relative 
proximity to urban centres, readily available water and food sources (such as rodents, 
birds, and young piglets), and sufficient shelter for den sites. Cats were observed in 
numbers up to 30 per week on two piggeries. These numbers of cats are of concern due to 
the status of feral cats as the definitive host species for the Toxoplasma gondii parasite 
(Dubey et al. 1995 Dubey 2006; Dubey 2008). Infected cats shed oocyst in their faeces, 
which are resistant to decomposition in the environment (Elmore et al. 2010; Hutchison 
1965). Feed and water contaminated by feline faecal material may be consumed by pigs or 
other animals, such as mice, opening up a wide variety of potential transmission modes 
(Dubey 2006). This parasite causes mortality in pigs, particularly neonatal piglets (Dubey 
2009). Reducing the contact between feral cats and domestic pigs either via restricting 
direct entry to cats and the intermediate hosts, rats and mice, or through prevention of feed 
contamination, significantly reduces risk of infection (Weigel et al. 1995). 
 
Rodents are also an important source of pig pathogens on piggeries. Their size and high 
reproductive capacity makes them a difficult animal to eradicate and exclude from farms 
and farming areas that house pigs. Contact and proximity of rodents with pigs may result 
in the increased likelihood of co-transmission of infections (Le Moine et al. 1987). Rats 
and mice have been shown to be carriers of a number of significant pig and human related 
pathogens, including Leptospira spp., Salmonella spp. and Escherichia coli, while others 
including Brachyspira hyodysenteriae and Lawsonia intracellularis not only cause illness 
in pigs, but also pose a significant economic burden to the pig industry in prevention and 
control (Smythe et al. 2000).  
 
Reported control methods for rodents on piggeries were not focused on exclusion, but 
more on population management; the most popular was the use of rat baits in piggeries. 
The efficiency of baits to control rat populations can be highly variable. In some cases, 
where alternative food sources are constantly available, there may be no impact at all on rat 
populations (Leung and Clark 2005). 
 
Feral pigs were only observed by a relatively small number of respondents (13.8%) when 
compared to birds, cats and rodents. A greater number of these observational reports were 
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from piggeries in Queensland; the population density of wild pigs is known to be larger in 
Queensland than in other states (West 2008). Seventy-nine percent of those pork producers 
reporting feral pig observations used a control technique and were satisfied with its 
effectiveness. However, there were several reports in the ‘Other Comments’ section of the 
questionnaire which suggested that feral pigs were not deterred by physical barriers to 
piggeries, with one case mentioning feral pigs digging under fences to gain access to 
commercial herds.  
 
Bats and flying foxes have been identified as the reservoir for several emerging pathogens 
affecting humans and livestock including Menangle virus, which was transferred from 
flying foxes to commercial pigs in Australia on one occasion in 1997 (Halpin et al. 1999). 
It is therefore of interest that no producers in this survey reported observations of bats or 
flying foxes in or around their piggeries. If bats are present on piggeries surveyed they 
must be present in low numbers, or only visit piggeries seasonally or at night in periods of 
human absence.  
 
Pork producers expressed particular concern about three main pathogens: Salmonella spp., 
Toxoplasma gondii and Leptospira spp. in wildlife on piggeries. As previously mentioned 
these pathogens can be carried by a multitude of wildlife hosts (birds, rodents, cats, feral 
pigs), and many of these hosts are wild animals that were reported entering the piggeries 
participating in this study on regular occasions and in large numbers. Thus, exposure of 
pigs to these pathogens is a justified concern of pig producers, both due to losses in pig 
production and the zoonotic potential of the pathogens. 
 
Birds, rodents, feral cats and feral pigs emerge as animals presenting a greater risk of 
pathogen transmission to commercial pigs. For birds, rodents and feral cats this risk arises 
predominantly from their more regular occurrence on piggeries, their high numbers, and in 
turn their greater rate of contact. In the case of feral pigs, the species-specific pathogen 
transmission potential heightens risk although piggeries reporting feral pigs were more 
geographically limited. The reported effectiveness of control methods used by pork 
producers was not 100%, suggesting that control measures need to be improved to satisfy 
the biosecurity requirements necessary to mitigate the occurrence of disease.  
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Observations of some animals were more frequent in particular locations, such as feral pigs 
in Queensland, starlings in New South Wales and South Australia compared to 
Queensland, and sparrows were observed less frequently in Queensland. This was most 
likely due to climate and habitat preferences of the animals. Animals were also observed 
more often on particular piggery types, such as feral cats and wild canids on mixed 
piggeries. Similarly, non-specific wild birds were also observed more frequently on mixed 
piggeries and ecoshelters. Some possible reasons may have to do with easier access to 
food, or greater sources of food, as well as possible den sites or places of concealment. 
Greater food sources and accessibility may also be the reason behind more observations of 
some animals on larger piggeries, as was the case with feral cats, wild canids and 
marsupials. All of these results can be used to direct managerial approaches to minimise 
the biosecurity risk posed by these species. 
 
The study design presented a potential bias in the response to some questions. The 
opinions on diseases of importance may have been influenced by the introductory letter 
distributed with the questionnaire, where previous cases of Toxoplasma gondii in cats and 
Leptospira spp. in rats were stated. This could have also influenced respondents to 
consider the presence of these particular animals on their piggeries, as well as encouraged 
producers with these animals to respond to the survey. However, bats were also mentioned 
in the introductory letter and no reports of this animal were observed among respondents. 
A comparison of the geographic distribution by state of survey respondents and the 444 
APL members who received the questionnaire indicated that the survey captured a 
representative population of registered pig producers in Australia. However, the 
questionnaire distribution was limited to APL members, who represent only a proportion 
(n = 444) of the total number of piggeries in Australia (n = 1,350; APL 2010). This 
estimation of total piggeries is based on the Australian Bureau of Statistics and may be an 
under estimate (Personal communication, Holyoake 2012). Respondents were not specific 
to a single group of producers, evidenced by the piggery types covering all available 
methods (intensive, ecoshelter and free-range) and all sow herd sizes (range from 0 to 
6,000 breeding sows, including nine grower herds). 
 
Literature provides numerous examples of pathogens of importance to humans and 
livestock that are carried by wild animals. However, little is known about the mechanisms 
and necessary conditions for introduction and reintroduction of pathogens to commercial 
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livestock. This study provides information on the range of wild animal species, their 
distributions and numbers that are routinely coming into contact with domestic pigs in the 
Australian domestic pig producing industry. This information will provide the foundation 
to further examine the risk of pathogen transmission from the most common wildlife 
intruders to commercial pigs in Australia. Animals to be targeted for future pathogen risk 
assessments on piggeries include the European starling, rodents and feral pigs. Cats will 
not be a focus for this thesis due to the existence of comprehensive research into the 
involvement of the cat in transmission of Toxoplasma gondii to domestic pigs, as well as 
other animals and humans. 
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3 Literature review 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.1 The Australian Pork Industry 
 
The pork industry in Australia accounts for 2.1% of all agricultural production, with a 
gross value of AU $865 million (APL 2010). On an international scale, Australian pork 
production accounts for 0.4% of world pork production (APL 2010). The Australian pork 
industry is thus relatively small when compared to the top two producing countries, China 
and the United States (with 51% and 9%, respectively, of the total world pork production; 
APL 2010).  
 
The Australian pork industry is comprised of approximately 1,350 pork producers and 2.3 
million pigs (APL 2010), with the majority of pork being produced along the East, South 
and South Western coasts of Australia in the grain growing regions of each state (Figure 
3.1) (ABARE and MAF 2006; APL 2010). New South Wales has the largest proportion of 
pig herds, followed by Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and 
Tasmania (Figure 3.2) (APL 2010). The Northern Territory and Australian Capital 
Territory do not have any commercial pig herds.  
 
Piggeries in Australia can be separated in to small and large-scale production units. The 
Australian pork industry quality assurance program (APIQ™), defines small-scale pig 
producers as those with 20 or fewer sows who sell or send to slaughter 400 or less pigs per 
year (APIQ 2010). Approximately 40% of pig producers have less than 50 sows (APL 
2010). All remaining producers with greater than 20 sows can be defined as large-scale. 
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Figure 3.1. Distribution of domestic pigs throughout Australia in 2009 (APL 2010).  
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Figure 3.2. Distribution of pig herds and breeding sows by state throughout Australia in 
2009 (adapted from APL 2010). 
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Pigs in Australia are mainly raised in three different production systems: traditional 
intensive production, ecoshelters and free-range (Primary Industries Standing Committee 
2008). The majority of commercial pigs in Australia are produced in intensive piggeries 
(Chapter 2). Intensive piggeries house pigs in enclosed buildings with adjustable windows 
for ventilation and temperature control. Pigs are kept in pens and farrowing crates are used 
for sows during late pregnancy and lactation. This type of housing enables high animal 
density and an all-in all-out method or a continuous animal throughput process. An all-in 
all-out method is also implemented in ecoshelters, which are stand alone sheds with pigs of 
the same age group moving unconfined within a shed. Free-range piggeries house pigs 
almost entirely outdoors in paddocks, with the provision of limited housing, such as arcs or 
huts, for protection from climatic elements (Primary Industries Standing Committee 2008). 
Free-range piggeries can only be located in temperate areas with no severe cold season 
(FAO 2010). Each of these production systems provides opportunities for pathogen 
introduction and spread. 
 
Although pork production in Australia is small on an international scale, it has a 
competitive advantage in terms of the health status of the nation’s pig herd. Australia is 
free of 71% of World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) listed terrestrial animal 
pathogens, and 32% of the listed pathogens that infect pigs (WAHID 2010). This list 
includes the more devastating pig diseases that have impacted most other pork producing 
countries over the past 5 to 10 years, such as post-weaning multi-systemic wasting 
syndrome (PMWS) and porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRS), both of 
which result in high mortality and reduced productivity (APL 2009). Australia is also free 
of foot-and-mouth disease and classical swine fever, which have a devastating effect on 
livestock industries in regard to mortality, production losses, animal slaughter for disease 
control and international meat export restrictions (APL 2009). 
 
3.2 Biosecurity in Australian piggeries 
 
Biosecurity is: “The implementation of measures that reduce the risk of the introduction 
and spread of disease agents” (FAO 2010, p 3). There are standard biosecurity practices 
utilised and recommended in the livestock industry to minimise pathogen introduction and 
spread. These practices are based on reducing the chance of pathogen introduction to farms 
while considering the modes of pathogen transmission. Pathogens can be transmitted 
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through either direct contact with an infected individual or through indirect contact by 
exposure to contaminated air, water, food, fomites, vectors and biological products 
(Frölich et al. 2002; Coetzer and Tustin 2004). APIQ™ outlines the recommended 
standards and procedures to follow to attain a high standard of management, food safety, 
traceability, animal welfare and biosecurity (APIQ 2010). The four protocols are: 
1. On-farm systems are in place to minimise the risk of contamination or disease 
spread 
2. The risk of disease introduction from new stock and semen is controlled 
3. Staff are trained in emergency animal disease awareness and follow biosecurity 
procedures 
4. Pest control procedures are in place. 
 
Pig producer adherence to the APIQ™ guidelines is used by the Australian Quarantine 
Inspection Service to verify that pork products meet international market requirements. 
Similarly, a quality assurance program is required by the State Food Authorities for pigs 
destined to the domestic market (Hernandez-Jover et al. 2009). Without this quality 
assurance, pig producers are not permitted to sell their stock to these markets. Many small-
scale pig producers tend to have a reduced level of quality assurance implementation on 
their piggeries and as such a lower biosecurity standard than large-scale commercial pig 
producers (Hernandez-Jover et al. 2011). 
 
The main source of pathogen entry into Australian piggeries is through new or replacement 
stock, or semen for artificial insemination (Kyriazakis and Whittemore 2006). As such, it is 
recommended that new animals or semen are obtained from reliable sources such as 
breeding companies, which can demonstrate freedom from diseases (APIQ 2010). Any 
new stock that arrives on a piggery should, if possible, be quarantined away from the main 
herd for a recommended period of three weeks (Kyriazakis and Whittemore 2006; APIQ 
2010).   
 
Other modes of pathogen entry include vehicles, infected individuals, equipment, feed, 
water and wild animals (APIQ 2010; OIE 2010). Visitors to piggeries may be carrying 
pathogens on their vehicles, clothing or equipment. As such, to minimise the risk of 
contamination or pathogen spread on farm, clothing and footwear is generally provided to 
visitors, with showers before and after entry also recommended (APIQ 2010). Most 
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piggeries also require visitors to have a three day period of no contact with other pigs 
before entering their piggery. Equipment, food, water and ecoshelter bedding materials, 
such as straw, can all be contaminated with pathogens. The source of each product used 
must be identified and the cleanliness of vehicle and equipment maintained when 
transporting products to many different livestock enterprises (APIQ 2010). Piggery 
location in relation to other piggeries and farms is another factor to be considered due to 
the possibility of aerosol transmission.  
 
Further pathogen entry can occur through wild animals coming into the vicinity of 
piggeries. The structure of pig housing facilities used in each of the three piggery types, 
previously explained, allows many different species of animals to enter buildings and come 
into contact with pigs and their feed or water sources. The biosecurity measures that must 
be implemented to meet the APIQ™ standards include prevention of feral pig access to 
domestic pigs, as well as pest control programs to prevent rodents and other pests 
accessing pigs, feed stores and bedding (APIQ 2010). Entry of pathogens via a feed and 
water source can be minimised through the use of fully enclosed feed silos to prevent 
contamination by wild animals, as well as perimeter fencing to restrict entry of larger 
animals. However these measures are not effective in preventing piggery access for many 
pest and native animals, which is demonstrated by the vast array of wild animals observed 
in and around piggery facilities by pig producers in Australia (Chapter 2). 
 
3.3 Wildlife and pathogen transmission to humans and domestic animals 
 
Wild animals have been associated with outbreaks of novel and transboundary pathogens 
around the world. Around 60% of the emerging infectious disease events recorded in 
literature between 1940 and 2004 in humans were caused by zoonotic pathogens, which are 
transmissible between animals and humans. Approximately 72% of these zoonotic 
emerging infectious pathogens were from a wild animal source (Jones et al. 2008).  
 
Recent emerging infectious disease outbreaks in Australia affecting domestic animals 
include Hendra virus and Menangle virus. Hendra virus is transmitted from fruit bats 
(Pteropus spp.) to horses and on to humans and is a continuing problem (Breed et al. 2006; 
Playford et al. 2010). Menangle virus was transmitted from fruit bats to pigs at one piggery 
in 1997 (Philbey et al. 2008). Impacts of these viruses are described in Section 3.8.2. Based 
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on these disease outbreaks and others internationally, wild animal species, both introduced 
and native to Australia, pose a disease threat to domestic animals and humans in relation to 
introduction, maintenance and spread of emerging, exotic and endemic pathogens.   
 
Australia has had few outbreaks of emerging infectious diseases and is well protected from 
transboundary animal diseases due to stringent quarantine procedures, which protect 
Australia’s livestock industry. As such the main threat to human and domestic animal 
health in Australia posed by wildlife is transmission of infectious pathogens currently 
endemic in wild animal populations. Wild animals are reservoirs, hosts and definitive hosts 
of many endemic infections in Australia. The cat (Felis catus) is the definitive host of 
Toxoplasma gondii, and is essential to the lifecycle of the parasite (Elmore et al. 2010). 
Dogs, including Canis lupus familiaris and Canis lupus dingo, are definitive hosts for 
Neospora caninum, a parasite causing significant reproductive disease and abortion in 
cattle (King et al. 2010). Wild canids are also definitive hosts for Echinococcus 
granulosus, a tape worm causing hydatidosis in animals and humans in Australia and 
around the world (Jenkins 2006).  
 
Pathogens can be transmitted in a number of different ways, including direct and indirect 
transmission methods. Biosecurity practices on piggeries are developed to minimise 
transmission and spread of pathogens via these routes. Chapter 2 of this thesis identified 
the wild animal species that are frequently observed on piggeries in Australia and, as such, 
may pose a risk of pathogen transmission to domestic pigs. Those wild animal species 
providing the greatest risk, due to the number of pig producers reporting an observation of 
the species and the frequency of observations, included the European starling (Sturnus 
vulgarus), rodents (black rat Rattus rattus; brown rat Rattus norvegicus; and the house 
mouse Mus musculus) and feral cats. The species-specific pathogen transmission potential 
from feral pigs (Sus scrofa) also presents a high risk. 
 
3.4 Birds and pathogen transmission 
 
Some wild birds have readily adapted to human urbanised settings, which has resulted in 
severe epidemiologic and economic consequences, and their subsequent classification as 
pests (Pimentel et al. 2001). The three greatest bird pests include the European starling, the 
house sparrow (Passer domesticus) and the common pigeon (Columba livia) (Pimentel et 
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al. 2001). Some of the most obvious problems associated with close interactions of these 
birds and urban environments are damage to infrastructure and losses to agricultural 
operations, particularly crops, orchards and intensive livestock production facilities 
(Bomford and Sinclair 2002; Lapidge et al. 2006). In addition to these detrimental impacts 
is the possibility of interaction between wild birds and domestic animals (as identified in 
Chapter 2).  
 
Weber (1979) reported that many pathogens can be carried by birds, with a list of 40 
pathogens being associated with starlings, sparrows and pigeons prior to 1979. This list of 
pathogens has since been expanded. Wild and pet birds have been associated with 
outbreaks of common and exotic diseases in humans, domestic animals and wildlife 
(Mackenzie 1988; Daszak et al. 2000; Gaukler et al. 2009). Thus, it is important to 
determine what pathogens may be carried by birds and have the potential to be transmitted 
to domestic animals. There are two well known and significant pathogens associated with 
wild birds that have had large health and economic consequences in birds, mammals and 
humans on an international scale. Highly pathogenic avian influenza, specifically H5N1, 
and West Nile virus, for which birds are the primary hosts, have been associated with 
epidemics in livestock and humans during the last decade.  
 
Highly pathogenic avian influenza, H5N1, has had significant economic and health 
consequences associated with infections in poultry and zoonotic transmission to humans 
(Peiris et al. 2007), with a case fatality rate of 59% for human cases (WHO 2012a). Wild 
birds are considered reservoirs of low pathogenic avian influenza and can be infected with 
highly pathogenic avian influenza. The predominant wild bird reservoirs are water and 
shore birds with a migratory capacity (Rappole and Hubálek 2006). As such, the potential 
involvement of wild birds in the spread of this virus to humans and other animals has been 
identified. However, the respective contributions of wild birds and of legal and illegal 
movements and trade of domestic poultry and birds to the spread of avian influenza are 
still being investigated (Kilpatrick et al 2006; van den Berg 2009). Infection of pigs with 
avian influenza based on antibody detection has been previously confirmed in Asia (Choi 
et al. 2005). Experimental exposure of pigs has resulted in infection, but pig-to-pig 
transmission has not been detected (Choi et al. 2005). The main concern about infection of 
pigs with avian influenza viruses is the potential for re-assortment of the virus in a pig 
host, which could result in a pandemic disease (Peiris et al. 2007).  
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Avian influenza H5N1 has not become a worldwide disease in humans despite the 
infection of migratory birds. However, the consequences of the disease have been 
considerable, particularly in domestic poultry and humans. In Hong Kong in 1997 there 
were 18 human cases, 6 resulting in fatalities, and 1.5 million poultry were culled (Chen et 
al. 2004). Human cases of avian influenza H5N1 reported to the World Health 
Organisation (2012a) total 583 with 344 fatalities, from 2003 to 2012.   
 
West Nile virus is also an important public health concern as evidenced by its introduction 
to the United States in 1999. The virus was introduced in New York, where the first bird, 
human and horse cases were detected, and it subsequently spread to other parts of the 
United States and to Canada. The outbreak has resulted in the death of thousands of 
domestic horses and more than 12,000 human cases, causing over 1,100 human fatalities 
from 1999 to 2010 (Murray et al. 2010; Hofmeister 2011). West Nile virus is transmitted to 
humans, birds and other mammals by mosquitoes, with birds being the main introductory 
and amplifying hosts (Rappole et al. 2000).  
 
Large surveillance programs for West Nile virus, among other vector-borne pathogens, 
have incorporated testing of wild birds. In the New York district alone, 430 birds were 
caught at the beginning of the outbreak and 33% of birds were infected with West Nile 
virus (Komar et al. 2001). Large mortalities of wild birds occurred concurrently with 
human infections. The pathogen is now established endemically in the United States and 
will continue to require rising financial inputs to control the disease in humans and horses 
(vaccination for horses only) and for ongoing surveillance (Murray et al. 2010). 
 
A more common endemic pathogen with zoonotic potential and a worldwide distribution 
associated with wild birds is Salmonella spp. The presence of Salmonella spp. in wild birds 
has been recognised for over a hundred years. However, its prevalence has been increasing 
over the past 40 years, with the most significant upsurge of Salmonella spp. infections in 
the Passerines (Tizard 2004). Not only has this pathogen rapidly spread among birds, but it 
has been transmitted from birds to other animals and humans. Instances of human infection 
have occurred from direct handling of birds, and contact with domesticated animals 
infected by birds (Cizek et al. 1994; Tauni and Österlund 2000; Alley et al. 2002). 
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3.5 European starlings 
 
3.5.1 Origin and spread of starlings 
The starling is a bird from the Sturnidae family in the order Passeriform. It has a natural 
origin which includes Europe, Asia and North Africa (Feare and Craig 1999). However, 
the starling population and distribution expanded through the introduction of this bird into 
other countries including Iceland, the United States, South Africa, New Zealand, Australia, 
New Habrides, Fikian Group and Tonga (Long 1981). Some countries introduced starlings 
as an insect pest control measure, while others did so for historical reasons. An example 
was in New York, where starlings were introduced by an Acclimatisation Society in order 
to have all birds mentioned in Shakespeare's plays present in the city (Feare 1984).  
 
Three separate introductions of European starlings into Australia occurred in 1856, 1857 
and 1858 for private collections (Long 1981). It is unknown whether the wild population 
was established at this point in time. Regardless, local Acclimatisation Societies were 
responsible for introductions into the wild of a large number of starlings in Victoria, 
Queensland, South Australia, New South Wales, and Phillip Island in the mid-19th century 
(Long 1981). Due to the highly adaptable nature of the starling, it was able to rapidly 
colonise and spread throughout the settled areas of those states (Feare 1984; Feare and 
Craig 1999). The starling was not introduced into Western Australia, and despite regular 
incursions from South Australia into this state, the population has not been able to 
successfully establish due to continuing eradication programs (Rollins et al. 2009).  
 
3.5.2 Starlings as a pest to humans and agriculture 
Starlings live in high density populations and communal roosts, with some roosts 
containing tens of thousands of individuals, or even over a million birds (Campbell and 
Lack 1985). They not only roost in dense populations but also tend to feed as large 
aggregations, sometimes with other bird species. This proves to be a significant burden to 
their chosen feeding locations, as well as providing the opportunity for pathogen 
transmission between the birds (Morishita et al. 1999). Starlings are selective, omnivorous 
eaters and tend to feed on the more valuable agricultural products, such as grains from 
poultry, cattle and pig feed, as well as cherries, apples, wheat, barley and grapes (Feare 
1984; Tracey and Saunders 2003).   
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Large wintering populations of starlings are supported by feed at livestock operations in 
the United States (Weber 1979). Consumption of feed at these operations is substantial; 
one starling has been estimated to consume around 28.3 grams of animal feed per day 
(Besser et al. 1968). As well as feed consumption, feed contamination can result in 
additional negative impacts. A study in Scotland reported 25 bird droppings per metre 
squared of stored feed on four different cattle farms (Daniels et al. 2003). There are a 
significant number of organisms, some of which could be pathogenic for livestock that can 
be transferred from the bird excrement into the animal feed and water (Weber 1979).  
 
Initial figures of the bird pest problem in relation to feedlots and piggeries in Australia 
were documented by Lapidge et al. (2006). Almost three quarters of respondents of a 
survey among 310 piggery producing members of Australian Pork Limited and 545 cattle 
feedlot producers in Australia reported negative impacts of birds on their enterprises. 
These perceived impacts included damage to infrastructure, crops and vegetation, fouling 
of feed and water, feed loss and increased pathogen spread.  
 
3.5.3 Starlings and the biosecurity threat to piggeries 
The very few overseas studies looking at pathogens in wild birds on piggeries, most of 
which did not consider starlings, have shown low prevalence levels for the pathogens 
included in the current study. In the United States, Mycobacterium avium was isolated 
from seven of 127 starlings on an infected piggery (Bickford et al. 1966). However, recent 
evidence has shown that Mycobacterium avium does not infect pigs via infected birds 
(Norwegian School of Veterinary Science 2010). Transmissible gastroenteritis virus was 
shown to be transmitted from starlings to pigs in experimental conditions (Pilchard 1965). 
More recently, Salmonella spp. were identified in wild bird faeces on a piggery in Illinois 
(Barber et al. 2002). In Europe, Escherichia coli was identified in a single starling on a 
piggery in Denmark (Nielsen et al. 2004), and in the same country Salmonella spp. were 
found in wild birds, including one starling (Skov et al. 2008). 
 
Starlings have been identified as carriers of numerous pathogens on other livestock 
enterprises, such as cattle feedlots, dairy and poultry farms. Salmonella spp., Escherichia 
coli and Mycobacterium avium sub species paratuberculosis have been isolated from 
starlings on cattle feedlots and dairy farms in the United States (Kirk et al 2002; Corn et al. 
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2005; LeJeune et al. 2008; Gaulker et al. 2009; Carlson et al. 2011), and Campylobacter 
jejuni was identified in starlings on poultry farms in England (Colles et al. 2003). 
 
As starlings are a particularly big problem on piggeries in Australia, as evidenced in 
Chapter 2 and the survey by Lapidge et al. (2006), and are known to carry zoonotic 
pathogens from studies documented above, they potentially pose a high risk for pathogen 
transmission to pigs. Of those pathogens that have been identified in wild birds and 
starlings, Escherichia coli, Campylobacter spp. and Salmonella spp. are the main bacterial 
pathogens isolated (Morishita et al. 1999; Benskin et al. 2009). These pathogens, 
particularly Escherichia coli, are considered to be endemic on piggeries, and in their 
pathogenic forms are responsible for causing illness, loss of condition and occasional 
mortality in pigs, with animal welfare and economic implications for piggeries.  
 
As birds are potential vectors of pathogens to pigs in commercial piggeries, further 
knowledge about the pathogens carried by starlings present on piggeries would provide an 
informed assessment of the biosecurity risk posed by these birds. Such knowledge would 
benefit the pig industry and government agencies responsible for surveillance of animal 
and human health. It is essential that the pig industry has a solid understanding of the 
ability of wild birds to transfer pathogens of production-limiting diseases to better inform 
disease control and eradication procedures.   
 
3.5.3.1 Escherichia coli  
Escherichia coli are common bacteria of the intestinal flora. However, there are pathogenic 
strains which can cause illness when pigs are exposed. Pigs can be exposed via direct 
invasion of the respiratory tract or the anterior of the small intestine via the faecal-oral 
route to cause septicaemia in non-immune piglets (Taylor 2006).  
 
Escherichia coli can cause diarrhoea in young pigs, including neonatal and post weaning 
pigs, as well as infections such as septicaemia in young pigs, and cystitis and mastitis in 
adult sows (Straw et al. 2006). Diarrhoea is one of the most common diseases of suckling 
and post-weaned pigs (Alexander 1994). In a study of preweaning disease in pig herds in 
the United States, diarrhoea resulted in the highest morbidity in piglets and accounted for 
10.8% of preweaning mortality (Tubbs et al. 1993). Escherichia coli has been reported as 
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responsible for over 50% of all pig enteritis (intestinal inflammation often resulting in 
diarrhoea) in the United Kingdom (Taylor 2006). 
 
Escherichia coli can also produce illness in young pigs, via attachment of the bacteria to 
mucous overlying the epithelium, or to brush borders of the mucosal epithelium due to the 
bacteria’s specific adhesive antigens (Taylor 2006). Escherichia coli can also multiply in 
the small and large intestine, destroying epithelial cells and causing diarrhoea. Some 
Escherichia coli strains (Enterotoxigenic Escherichia coli) produce enterotoxins which 
affect cell membrane receptors, instigating the secretion of chloride ions in the lumen 
which is passively followed by water and sodium ions (Taylor 2006). This leads to 
diarrhoea and results in metabolic acidosis and dehydration and eventual circulatory 
collapse and death (Taylor 2006). 
 
Genetic factors as well as physiological factors (such as stomach acidity, infection with 
other agents and gut flora changes) within piglets and adults can affect the multiplication 
of Escherichia coli bacteria and immune response effectiveness in individuals (Taylor 
2006). Symptoms of neonatal septicaemia due to Escherichia coli include standing alone, 
drooping tails, unconsciousness, and are generally exhibited within 12 hours of birth, with 
mortality occurring within 48 hours (Straw et al. 2006). Antimicrobial treatments can be 
provided to individual pigs to treat the condition with varied success. Depopulation of 
piggeries and repopulation with new stock is the only way to eradicate large-scale herd 
infections. 
 
3.5.3.2 Campylobacter jejuni 
Campylobacter jejuni is another bacterial pathogen that mainly causes diarrhoea in piglets. 
Infection of piglets occurs via the faecal-oral route from infected faeces or contaminated 
water usually from 3 days to 3 weeks of age (Taylor 2006). In addition, Campylobacter 
jejuni is a public health concern as it is the main food-borne pathogen causing human 
bacterial enteritis in Australia (Blumer et al. 2003).  
 
Symptoms in piglets usually include a high temperature lasting a few days, as well as 
watery or creamy diarrhoea that may contain mucous and streaks of blood (Taylor 2006). 
Loss of condition usually occurs but mortality is rare. While the prevalence of the serotype 
Campylobacter coli is similar to that of Escherichia coli, in that it may be present in 100% 
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of pigs (Taylor 2006), the level of the significant illness-causing serotype, Campylobacter 
jejuni, is much lower. The reported incidence of this bacterium in pig production facilities 
was 4.6% in Japan and 5% in Denmark (Taylor 2006).  
 
3.5.3.3 Salmonella spp. 
Salmonella spp. bacteria cause septicaemia and diarrhoea in pigs. Salmonella spp. are also 
a food-borne pathogen, being the second most likely food-borne pathogen causing enteritis 
in humans after Campylobacter jejuni (Todd 1995; Blumer et al. 2003). Pork meat is an 
important source of infection of both of these pathogens (Beran 1995).  
 
Infection in pigs usually occurs via ingestion of the organism, but can also occur via the 
respiratory route (Straw et al. 2006). Three forms of Salmonella spp. infection have been 
described in pigs: septicaemia, acute enteric (enteritis with some local invasion) and 
chronic enteric (colonisation of intestinal mucosa) (Taylor 2006). The septicaemic form 
usually results in death within 24 to 48 hours of infection with animals appearing dull, 
weak and depressed prior to death (Taylor 2006). Animals with the acute enteric form have 
watery, yellowish diarrhoea and a fever (Taylor 2006). Pigs with the chronic form have 
persistent diarrhoea, intermittent fever and become emaciated (Taylor 2006).  
 
3.5.4 Starling control 
There are a number of methods available for the control of starling populations. The 
availability of these methods depends on the regulations and laws in the region in which 
the starling population is to be controlled. The available methods include: exclusion 
techniques; scaring; population reduction through shooting, trapping and poisoning; 
repellents and toxicants (Johnson and Glahn 1994; Bomford and Sinclair 2002).  
 
Exclusion techniques include closing off all openings to food and buildings, and erecting 
netting to prevent roosting. All openings greater than 2.5cm need to be closed to increase 
effectiveness (Johnson and Glahn 1994). Additionally, for birds that are nesting or roosting 
at pig facilities, removal of nests and placement of wire mesh barriers or spikes on roosting 
surfaces may reduce their presence on piggeries. Frightening techniques such as loud 
noises, bright lights and recorded alarm calls have been reported to have little to no effect 
on birds (Bomford and Sinclair 2002).  
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Shooting has also been found to be largely ineffective as a means to control bird 
populations (Bomford and Sinclair 2002). Fleming (1990) found the use of shooting to 
control bird damage to be the “most universally practiced and most ineffective bird control 
technique used in Australia”. Trapping can be equally ineffective against a large 
population, and is also not species specific, requiring frequent checking and maintenance 
to minimise non-target bird losses and animal cruelty. Additionally, the fate of translocated 
birds is unknown and hence the humane nature of this technique as an alternative to direct 
killing is unknown (Bomford and Sinclair 2002). Repellents do not cause pain and 
suffering to the birds; however, they do require constant maintenance and replacement. 
Repellents used in the United States are polybutenes which are soft and sticky and are 
applied to ledges (Johnson and Glahn 1994).  
 
Toxicants for starlings are also available, with the avicide DRC-1339 (3-chloro-4-
methylbenzenamine hydrochloride) poison being the most common toxicant used (Carlson 
et al. 2011b). The avicide DRC-1339 was effectively used in a cattle feedlot in Texas (US), 
to minimise the starling population (Carlson et al. 2011b). The reduction in the starling 
population reportedly had a corresponding reduction in the presence of Salmonella 
enterica in cattle feed and water (Carlson et al. 2011b). This toxicant is not registered for 
use in Australia. 
 
Most of these methods could be used on livestock enterprises, such as piggeries, to 
minimise starling population size and corresponding impacts in Australia. However, a 
combination of techniques may need to be used to achieve a sufficient level of 
effectiveness for population control. 
 
3.6 Rodents 
 
Wild rat species and the house mouse are an economic and health concern in locations 
where food is readily accessible. Intensive farming practices, such as those of piggeries, 
provide an ideal environment for rodents to live and reproduce. Wherever rodents are 
found there are associated damages, such as destruction of infrastructure, financial losses 
through food consumption and contamination, and increased disease incidence, which 
results in livestock production losses due to reduced growth rates, reduced feed conversion 
efficiency and increased treatment costs.  
 37
 
It has been estimated that rats eat 10% of their body weight per day and produce a daily 
average of 50 droppings as well as millilitres of urine (Drummond 2001). In a study of 
rodent faecal contamination in stored animal feed in Scotland, there was an average of 80 
rodent droppings per metre squared of feed (Daniels et al. 2003). This contamination of 
food and the environment is of concern due to the presence of disease-causing organisms 
in rodent excrement (Twigg 1975). 
 
3.6.1 Origin and spread of rodents 
The rodent species that have become worldwide pests of human environments are just 
three of approximately 1,500 different known rodent species (Alderton 1996): the house 
mouse (Mus musculus), the black rat (Rattus rattus) and the brown rat (Rattus norvegicus). 
All three of these rodent species originated from Asia: the house mouse originating in the 
north of the continent in the dry steppelands of Russia, and the two rats originating in south 
eastern Asia, in the vicinity of China (Twigg 1975; Alderton 1996). Human activities, such 
as improvements to agriculture and transportation, have enabled the ranges of these rodents 
to expand to all continents of the world, even including Antarctica for the house mouse 
(Alderton 1996). The house mouse started its expansion outside of Asia many thousands of 
years before the rats, reaching the United Kingdom by 1200 B.C. (Alderton 1996). The 
black rat reached the United Kingdom in the late 12th century A.D., followed by the brown 
rat around 1720 A.D. (Twigg 1975). The spread of the black rat has been linked to bubonic 
plague outbreaks throughout history around the world.   
 
The house mouse and the black rat are believed to have arrived in Australia with infested 
settlement ships in 1788 (Caughley et al. 1998). The brown rat is also present in Australia, 
although its time of arrival is not as clear. It could have arrived with the house mouse and 
black rat with the first settlers, or on subsequent settlement or trading ships (Twigg 1975). 
 
3.6.2 Rodents as a pest to humans and agriculture 
“The rate of propagation of field mice in country places, and the destruction they cause, is 
beyond all telling.” Aristotle (384–322 BC). 
 
Since their spread, these three rodents have been a significant pest to humans, and the 
increase in their populations with expansion of agricultural production has added to their 
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impact. There is a significant economic toll on human populations due to damage to crops 
and stored food, buildings, insulation, electrical wiring, water plumbing, irrigation lines 
and undermining foundations. The costs associated with control and disease transmission 
are also significant (Singleton et al. 1999). 
 
In recent times, a large mouse plague in Australia during 1993 cost an estimated AU $100 
million in production losses and infrastructural damage in South Australia alone (CSIRO 
1997). This plague had an impact on all agricultural industries. In plague-affected areas 
feed costs for piggeries increased by approximately 50% and production indicators such as 
litter size, conception rates and growth rates all decreased, in some of the worst cases by up 
to 50%, reportedly due to stress from constant harassment and physical injury (Caughley et 
al. 1998). These impacts were also accompanied by the possibility of pathogen 
transmission (CSIRO 1997). 
 
3.6.3 Rodents and pathogen transmission 
Rats and mice have been shown to be reservoirs of a large number of pathogens and 
parasites (Le Moine et al. 1987; Amass 1999; Henderson 2009). The most well known 
disease carried by the black rat is the bubonic plague. The black rat enabled and 
perpetuated the spread of fleas and transmission of this disease (causative bacteria Yersinia 
pestis) from fleas to millions of people throughout the world, causing, for example, 
approximately 120 million deaths worldwide between 1900 and 1903 A.D. (Alderton 
1996). A proposed additional vector of the plague was body lice, allowing human to 
human transmission (McLean and Fall 2010). Cases of the plague in humans involving 
fatalities are still occurring at the present time, with recent occurrences in Peru in 2010, 
China in 2009 and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2005 and 2006 (WHO 2012b). 
 
Rodent species are a potential vehicle for transmission of pathogens to and between 
domestic animals and humans. Some of the most important zoonotic pathogens that have 
been found in rodents include bacteria, such as Leptospira spp., Yersinia spp., Listeria 
spp., Pasturella spp. and Salmonella spp.; viruses, such as Hantavirus; and protozoa, such 
as Cryptosporidium parvum and Toxoplasma gondii (Twigg 1975; Alderton 1996; 
Singleton et al. 1999). 
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3.6.4 Rodents and the biosecurity threat to piggeries 
The biosecurity threat to Australian piggeries posed by rodents for the introduction, 
maintenance, and reintroduction of a number of pathogens has not been confirmed. 
However, the carrier status of rodents for many pathogens that can infect pigs has been 
well documented. A review of biosecurity considerations for pork producing units by 
Amass and Clark (1999) documents some of the pathogens that have been isolated from 
rodents captured on piggeries. These pathogens include the following: Bordetella 
bronchiseptica, Salmonella spp., Escherichia coli, Brachyspira hyodysenteriae, 
Toxoplasma gondii, Leptospira spp., rotavirus, and encephalomyocarditis virus. Two other 
pathogens which were not included in the review by Amass and Clark (1999), but have 
been isolated from rodents, include Trichinella spiralis (Leiby et al. 1990) and Lawsonia 
intracellularis (Friedman et al. 2008). 
 
Rats are often passive carriers of pathogenic bacteria. They are able to harbour bacteria, 
such as Leptospira spp., and excrete it into the environment without having any clinical 
signs (Twigg 1975). Rats also seem to experience less severe clinical disease when 
infected with some gastrointestinal pathogens (such as Lawsonia intracellularis) compared 
to pigs. Collins et al. (2011) challenged rats with Lawsonia intracellularis, resulting in 
infection and faecal shedding, but the infected rats did not develop diarrhoea. Only one rat 
developed lesions in the intestine typical of proliferative enteropathy. The same strain and 
dose of this bacteria resulted in clinical signs such as diarrhoea and extensive proliferative 
enteropathy lesions in the intestines of pigs. Pathogens of importance to the pig industry in 
Australia due to their extensive negative health and economic impacts that have been 
isolated from rats include Brachyspira hyodysenteriae, Lawsonia intracellularis and 
Salmonella spp. Brachyspira pilosicoli has not been previously isolated from rodents. 
However, given this pathogen is related to Brachyspira hyodysenteriae and has similar, 
though less severe implications, its presence in rat populations on piggeries is also 
important to ascertain. 
 
3.6.4.1 Brachyspira hyodysenteriae 
Swine dysentery is an acute or chronic diarrhoea disease caused by the bacteria 
Brachyspira hyodysenteriae (Straw et al. 2006). Swine dysentery was present on 33% of 
106 Western Australian piggeries sampled in a serological survey between 1988 and 1990, 
with a herd prevalence ranging from 2.5 to 47.5% (Mhoma et al. 1992). Swine dysentery 
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can have a severely detrimental effect on enterprise profitability due to costs associated 
with pig deaths, reduced growth rate and diminished feed conversion efficiency. In 
addition, the costs of disease control through in-feed medication, or eradication by 
disinfection and total depopulation or partial Swiss-depopulation of pig facilities, are also 
significant (Hampson 1997; Straw et al. 2006).  
 
Swine dysentery significantly reduces the profit margin on finishing pigs. While there have 
been no recent evaluations of the cost, Polson et al. (1992) showed the profit margin for 
100 kg live weight was close to US $7.44 for pigs on a swine dysentery-free piggery, 
compared to US $1.67 on a swine dysentery-infected piggery. In Australia, swine 
dysentery is still generally considered to be one of the most costly endemic diseases of pig 
production.  
 
Infection with this bacterium in pigs occurs via the oral route, through ingestion of faeces 
from affected animals (Jackson and Cockcroft 2007). Invasion of the mucosa and crypts of 
the large intestine occurs within two hours of exposure. Multiplication of the bacteria 
ensues, followed by invasion of the goblet and epithelial cells, resulting in damage or 
disruption to these cells (Taylor 2006). The incubation period of the disease is between 7 
and 60 days, and faecal shedding continues for a period of around 90 days after clinical 
recovery (Taylor 2006).  
 
Research has shown that experimentally inoculated mice shed Brachyspira hyodysenteriae 
in their faeces for over 180 days after initial infection (Joens 1980). This indicates that 
mice on infected piggeries could be a reservoir for swine dysentery, and as such impede 
control and eradication of this disease in the pig population. Rats should also be considered 
as a possible source of re-infection of destocked facilities due to their wider movement 
range and their potential carrier status (Joens et al. 1982; Hampson et al. 1991). The 
involvement of rodents in the transmission of this pathogen in pigs needs to be better 
understood to gauge their possible role in infection and re-infection of piggeries. 
 
3.6.4.2 Lawsonia intracellularis 
Lawsonia intracellularis causes intestinal haemorrhage and the wasting disease 
proliferative enteropathy in pigs (Lawson and Gebhart 2000). Holyoake et al. (2010b) 
reported that 100% of a sample of 63 finisher piggeries in Australia had antibodies against 
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Lawsonia intracellularis, with a within-herd prevalence ranging from 31.3 to 100%. The 
cost of a subclinical infection of Lawsonia intracellularis on net revenue was estimated to 
be AU $8.33 per pig, while a clinical infection reduced net revenue by AU $13.00 per pig 
(Holyoake et al. 2010a). 
 
Infection with Lawsonia intracellularis also occurs via the faecal-oral route (Jackson and 
Cockcroft 2007). The organism invades the epithelial cells of the crypts of the small 
intestine and causes increased cell division, resulting in abnormal proliferation of cells and 
reduced absorption of feed (Taylor 2006). The incubation period of the disease is between 
3 to 6 weeks, and clinical disease lasts for about 6 weeks (Taylor 2006). Disease is most 
common in recently weaned pigs, leading to weight loss or failure to gain weight, 
vomiting, and distinctive faeces which may be black or similar to the colour and 
consistency of wet cement (Straw et al. 2006). Lawsonia intracellularis has been found in 
mice and rats trapped on commercial piggeries (Friedman et al. 2008). Experimentally 
inoculated laboratory rats and mice shed the bacteria in their faeces for two weeks (Collins 
et al. 2011).  
 
3.6.4.3 Salmonella spp. 
Salmonella spp. has previously been discussed in the context of European starlings in 
Section 3.5.3.3. Previous studies reported that rodents on different livestock enterprises 
were infected with Salmonella spp. Skov et al. (2008) found infected rodents on 
Salmonella spp. infected cattle and pig farms in Denmark. Similarly, Letellier et al. (1999) 
and Meerburg et al. (2006) reported infected rodents on a piggery in Québec and on an 
organic piggery in the Netherlands, respectively. One of the most commonly isolated 
Salmonella spp. serotypes in the world from humans, domestic animals and wild animals is 
Salmonella typhimurium (Davis 1948; Jones and Twigg 1976; Le Moine et al. 1987). This 
serotype alone was associated with 36.2 food-borne disease outbreaks per 100,000 people 
in 2001 in Australia (Page 18; Blumer et al. 2003). Salmonella spp. in general were 
responsible for between 33.2 and 90.7 salmonellosis disease outbreaks per 100,000 people 
in 2011 in Australia (DHA 2012c).  
 
3.6.4.4 Brachyspira pilosicoli 
Infection of pigs with Brachyspira pilosicoli can result in diarrhoea, intermittent dysentery 
and reduced weight gain (Taylor 2006). The prevalence of this pathogen on two Western 
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Australian piggeries was estimated to be 2.4% on the first piggery and 12.2% on the 
second (Oxberry and Hampson 2003). Infection of the host occurs via the oral route, as for 
Brachyspira hyodysenteriae (Taylor 2006). Organisms densely colonise the colonic 
mucosa in the large intestine, resulting in reduction and failure of absorption (Taylor 
2006). The organism infects a number of different hosts apart from the pig, including 
humans, dogs and birds (Oxberry et al. 1998). Brachyspira pilosicoli has not been isolated 
from rodents. 
 
3.6.5 Rodent control 
Methods available to control rodent pests are similar to those used for birds and have 
varying effectiveness. The two most common methods for rodent control on piggeries 
include poisoning and trapping (Chapter 2). Other methods include shooting and habitat 
modification.   
 
Poisoning through the use of anticoagulant rodenticides is the control method 
recommended for use in piggeries (CSIRO 1997). Pre-feeding should be used prior to 
baiting to encourage rodents to use a particular feeding site. Leung and Clark (2005) 
recommend the placement of baits within 17 metres of each other to account for the 
minimum home range of rats in the studied population, and to place baits inside the 
piggery building to reduce non-target species bait consumption.  
 
Live traps, which capture rats alive and without injury, and mortality-causing traps are 
available (CSIRO 1997). A pre-feeding phase is recommended for traps as for baiting, to 
habituate rodents to the traps’ presence, increasing effectiveness. Shooting is not as 
effective on a large-scale as poisoning and trapping. Habitat modification, such as reducing 
ground cover vegetation around sheds or paddock, rodent-proofing feed and water sources 
and removal of spilt grain and standing water, should be implemented along with any other 
techniques for active rodent population reduction (Cowan et al. 2002). 
 
The best techniques for rodent control involve integration of a number of the previously 
mentioned control methods (Singleton et al. 2002). Continual maintenance and evaluation 
of effectiveness are necessary, through the monitoring of rodent numbers, bait uptake and 
trapping numbers. Reinvasion of rodents from surrounding areas can occur, so rodent 
management must be integrated with neighbouring agricultural enterprises (CSIRO 1997).  
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3.7 Feral pigs 
 
Feral pigs (Sus scrofa) are the wild ancestors of many different breeds of domesticated pigs 
(Auty 2003). They adapt to and live in many different climatic conditions, with the result 
that they are one of the most widely distributed mammals in the world (Massei and Genov 
2004). Being a large omnivorous mammal, feral pigs cause damage to natural ecosystems 
and extensive damage to agricultural cropping and grazing lands, with associated damage 
to infrastructure (Choquenot et al.1996; DEH 2005).  
 
Additional to these impacts, the pathogens that feral pigs may harbour and transmit are 
also a cause for concern. Feral pigs and their relatives are reservoirs for significant pig 
diseases, such as classical swine fever and African swine fever; diseases of cloven-hoof 
animals, such as foot-and-mouth disease; as well as reservoirs of zoonotic diseases, such as 
brucellosis and leptospirosis. In Australia, feral pigs are known reservoirs of Brucella spp. 
and Leptospira spp., transmissible to livestock and humans. To date, feral pigs have also 
been identified as reservoirs of 21 bacterial species and six viral pathogens in Australia 
(Henderson 2009). 
 
3.7.1 Origin and spread of feral pigs 
Feral pigs have been introduced to many continents of the world through human 
exploration and colonisation. In Australia, the time period when pigs established in 
sufficient numbers to produce a self-maintained population of feral animals is not known, 
though it is assumed that feral pig numbers would have begun growing after the arrival of 
the first fleet when pigs were introduced as a source of food (Rolls 1969). The feral pig 
population was estimated to be 13.5 million (95% confidence interval 3.5 to 23.5 million) 
in the late 1980s (Hone 1990), with a present inhabitation of approximately 45% of 
Australia, including Queensland, the Northern Territory, New South Wales, and the 
Australian Capital Territory (West 2008). Isolated populations occur in Victoria, Kangaroo 
Island in South Australia, Western Australia, and Tasmania (Wilson 1992; West 2008). 
The feral pig population in regions of abundant water and food can reach levels as high as 
20 pigs per square kilometre (Dexter 1990; Choquenot et al. 1996). 
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3.7.2 Feral pigs as a pest to humans and agriculture 
The sayings “eats like a pig” or “as greedy as a pig” are due to the eating and foraging 
behaviour of pigs (Seward et al. 2004). They are omnivorous generalists that are constantly 
foraging for food due to their stomachs’ relative inefficiency at digestion compared to 
ruminants (Seward et al. 2004). Their habitat often overlaps with agricultural enterprises, 
and as a result, crops and livestock are included in their diet (Massei and Genov 2004).  
 
Feral pigs damage crops, including grain, sugar cane and tropical fruits, and reduce their 
yields; predate livestock, mainly lambs; damage fences and destroy dams (Benson 1980; 
Caley 1993a; Choquenot et al. 1996). Their impact on agriculture alone in New South 
Wales and Queensland has been estimated to be around AU $100 million annually (DEH 
2005). Their agricultural impacts are not the only source of damage. Feral pigs are also 
considered an important threat to biodiversity in Australia due to adverse impacts on the 
survival of at least 18 nationally listed threatened species, including mammals, frogs, birds, 
fish, turtles and plants (Braysher and Moore 2003; DEH 2005). Feral pigs are also a source 
of disease in many parts of the world, including Australia.  
 
3.7.3 Feral pigs and pathogen transmission 
Pathogens carried by pigs have been a source of infection for humans and livestock for 
centuries. There is historical evidence from 1918 of an influenza-like illness in pigs at the 
same time as the Spanish flu pandemic in humans (Easterday 2003; Weingartl et al. 2009), 
and pigs were considered a possible source of this infection. Feral pigs specifically have 
been deemed responsible for pathogen infection in humans in Australia. The nationally 
notifiable disease Brucellosis has been isolated from humans in all states and territories of 
Australia, with the greatest frequency occurring in Queensland (DHA 2012a). The number 
of human cases per year ranged from 16 to 54 between 1991 and 2011 (DHA 2012a). Of 
the 32 human cases of Brucellosis retrospectively studied by Eales et al. (2010) and 
reported between 1996 and 2009 in Townsville, 30 had been feral pig hunting. Feral pig 
hunting is the greatest risk for Brucellosis infection in Queensland (Eales et al. 2010).   
 
Some highly contagious and financially damaging disease outbreaks in livestock have been 
spread by feral pigs. Some examples are classical swine fever, African swine fever and 
pseudorabies virus. Feral pigs were determined to be responsible for 59% of the primary 
domestic pig classical swine fever outbreaks in Germany between 1993 and 1998 
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(Fritzemeier et al. 2000). The consequences of classical swine fever epidemics on the pork 
industry are extreme, with an outbreak in the Netherlands in 1997/1998 costing an 
estimated US $2.3 billion (Meuwissen et al. 1999). Costs included in this figure related to 
the depopulation and slaughter of pigs; lost opportunity costs due to idle time prior to 
piggery repopulation; and related industry financial losses, such as slaughter houses, feed 
suppliers and replacement pig breeders. The disease results in haemorrhagic fever with a 
mortality rate up to 90% when infected with high virulence strains (Artois et al. 2002; 
Penrith et al. 2011).  
 
African swine fever was identified as a novel disease, distinct from classical swine fever, 
in Kenya in 1928 (Penrith and Vosloo 2009). It is highly contagious in pigs and results in 
mortality up to 100% in naïve domestic pigs (Penrith 2009). The disease is also very 
costly, with an outbreak in Lagos Nigeria in 1998 costing farmers US $8.4 million in just 
six months (Babalobi et al. 2007). Contact between domestic pigs, warthogs 
(Phacochoerus spp.) and bush pigs has been identified as the key factor in infection and 
spread of the disease in southern and eastern Africa (Penrith and Vosloo 2009). The 
sylvatic cycle of the virus between warthogs and argasid ticks (Ornithodoros moubata 
complex) allows for the transmission of the virus to domestic pigs from time-to-time. An 
outbreak in Brazil between 1978 and 1984 cost an estimated US $14.5 million, including 
direct and indirect costs of the disease and eradication, as well as compensation to farmers 
for the cull of 67,000 domestic pigs (Lyra 2006).  
 
Pseudorabies virus causes almost 100% total mortality in infected newborn piglets, 40 to 
60% mortality in four week old pigs and up to 15% mortality in one to five month old pigs 
(Taylor 2006). Infection in adult pigs is often exhibited through abortions, stillbirths and 
decreased growth and production (Taylor 2006). These major impacts have led to 
eradication programs for this virus in domestic pigs in many countries, including the 
United Kingdom and the United States. Eradication was successful in both of these 
countries; however, isolated outbreaks in the United States have identified feral pigs as a 
source of residual infection and transmission to domestic pigs (Hahn et al. 2010). In 
various regions of the United States, pseudorabies has been detected in feral pigs at 
prevalence levels of 8 to 38% (Pirtle et al. 1989; Corn et al. 2004; Wyckoff et al. 2009). 
Infection of feral and domestic pigs has been determined to occur mainly by direct 
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oronasal and venereal contact (Romero et al. 2001; Hahn et al. 2010), and less commonly 
via cannibalism of infected carcasses (Hahn et al. 1997). 
 
While Australia remains free of these devastating livestock diseases, there is ongoing 
substantial investment in biosecurity and emergency animal disease surveillance and 
response at pre-border, border and post-border points, due to the severe consequences of 
incursions for our livestock industries. An outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in Australia 
lasting just 3 months has been estimated to cost AU $5.5 billion for the livestock industries 
and a loss of AU $8 billion in gross domestic product (Productivity Commission 2002). 
These figures primarily consist of the cost of control and eradication for the government 
and livestock industries, as well as a loss of revenue due to a reduction in domestic and 
export sales. The greatest revenue loss would be for the beef industry, followed by the pig 
industry. In the event of a foot-and-mouth disease incursion in Australia, feral pigs would 
likely become one of the main reservoir hosts and constitute the greatest wild animal threat 
to foot-and-mouth disease control and eradication (Productivity Commission 2002).  
 
Henderson (2009) summarised the list of pathogens isolated from feral pigs in Australia, 
which includes 21 different pathogenic species of bacteria (Bensink et al. 1991; Pavlov et 
al. 1992; Godfroid 2002; Phillips et al. 2009), six viruses (Pavlov et al. 1992; Choquenot et 
al. 1996; Johansen et al. 2005), three parasites, nine worms and three protozoa.  
 
3.7.4 Feral pigs and the biosecurity threat to piggeries 
Due to the species-specific nature of several infectious diseases affecting pigs, domestic 
pigs are at greater risk of contracting diseases from feral pigs than other animal species. 
Outdoor pig production systems are at particularly high risk of pathogen transmission from 
feral pigs due to the opportunity for direct contact to occur (FAO 2010). Prevention of 
contact requires fencing with a double fence, a practice not routinely implemented and not 
always possible due to cost or geographic factors (FAO 2010). Additional to the risk of 
direct contact, is the possibility of domestic pigs contacting surface waters or streams that 
are not secured from access by wild animals (FAO 2010). The biosecurity standards 
defined by the Australian pork industry quality assurance program require piggeries to 
have a system to prevent feral pigs contacting domestic pigs, using well-fenced paddocks. 
However, the standards do not mention the need to restrict domestic pig access to a surface 
water runoff source from outside their paddocks (APIQ 2010). Further, there is no 
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description of the most effective fence or fencing systems. Fences that physically prevent 
feral pig movement have been proven to be ineffective over the long term due to damage 
and poor maintenance (Choquenot 1996). Additionally, electric wires on fences are not 
100% pig-proof (Reidy et al. 2008). Free-range and indoor piggeries are also both 
susceptible to aerosol transmission of pathogens. 
 
Surveillance testing in feral pigs for pathogens in Australia in the past focused on zoonotic 
pathogens. The exception to this is a recent study by Phillips et al. (2009), which 
determined the presence of the endemic production-limiting pathogens Brachyspira 
hyodysenteriae, Lawsonia intracellularis and Brachyspira pilosicoli in feral pigs in 
Western Australia. Although these pathogens can infect some other mammalian species, 
the health and financial consequences of diseases caused are most felt by the domestic pig 
industry.  
 
The two most common bacteria looked at and isolated from feral pigs in Australia are 
Brucella spp. and Leptospira spp. (Choquenot et al. 1996). The zoonotic implications and 
the major consequences for livestock of these pathogens might explain why most of the 
studies in feral pigs have focused on these pathogens. In addition, these pathogens are 
subject to control strategies in livestock, such as quarantine and for Leptospira spp., 
vaccination programs. As the focus of pathogen surveys of feral pigs in Australia has been 
on detection of pathogens transmissible and harmful to multiple species, some of the most 
important pathogens that pose a risk of transmission to domestic pigs, and have the most 
significant impacts on the pig industry, have been neglected.  
 
The two pneumonia-causing bacteria, Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae and Actinobacillus 
pleuropneumoniae, are capable of being transmitted via the air. They have not been 
investigated in feral pigs in Australia. These pathogens have been isolated from wild pigs 
in Slovenia (Vengust et al. 2006), while Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae has also been 
isolated from wild pigs in the United States (Baker et al. 2011). However, neither study 
specifically selected feral pigs in close proximity to piggeries.  
 
3.7.4.1 Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae  
Enzootic pneumonia is an economically important respiratory disease caused by infection 
with the bacteria Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae, resulting in high morbidity and an adverse 
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impact on food conversion efficiency and weight gain (Jackson and Cockcroft 2007). 
Enzootic pneumonia was present in 86.5% of Australian piggeries prior to 2001 and was 
determined to be a disease eradicable from pig herds (Cutler 2001). Chronic infection, the 
most common form of the disease, causes fever, dry barking cough and diarrhoea in all age 
groups, lasting for about 50 days (Taylor 2006). Growth rate and feed conversion ratio can 
be reduced by as much as 15.9% and 13.8%, respectively, in 5 to 85 kilogram pigs (Taylor 
2006). In the less common acute form, clinical symptoms include anorexia, fever and 
coughing, and may result in up to 50% of piglet deaths and reduced reproductive 
performance in breeding stock (Taylor 2006).  
 
Infection with Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae occurs through the inhalation of infected 
aerosols or direct contact with infected pigs, and attachment of the pathogen to the ciliated 
cells of the trachea, bronchi and bronchioles (Jackson and Cockcroft 2007). The bacteria 
compromises epithelial function by causing cilia to clump together, which are subsequently 
shed, resulting in impaired clearance of normal secretory products from the respiratory 
tract (Taylor 2006). 
 
As previously mentioned, feral pig infection with Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae has not 
been studied in Australia, with only some studies conducted overseas. The prevalence of 
this pathogen in the feral pig population in Slovenia (Vengust et al. 2006) and the United 
States (Baker et al. 2011) was estimated to be 21% and 32%, respectively.  An accurate 
determination of the presence of this pathogen in feral pigs in the vicinity of piggeries in 
Australia is essential to determine the risk of transmission to domestic pigs. This pathogen 
may be transmitted in aerosols over a distance of 5 km (Cutler 2001; Dee et al. 2009); thus, 
infection of isolated piggeries may be the result of transmission from feral pigs. 
Determining this risk will identify the need for management procedures to reduce the 
likelihood of infected aerosols entering the piggery building. Some measures that would 
reduce this likelihood would be enclosed buildings with temperature control and 
ventilation through purification systems, though this may not be economically feasible, as 
well as feral pig population control in proximity to piggeries. 
 
3.7.4.2 Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae 
Pleuropneumonia is caused by the bacteria Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae. The clinical 
disease may be peracute, acute or chronic in pigs (Straw et al. 2006). Death in the peracute 
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form of the disease normally occurs within 24 to 36 hours after the onset of the symptoms. 
The common symptoms in this form are fever, apathy, anorexia, diarrhoea, vomiting and 
bluish tinge of the extremities such as the ears, nose and feet (Straw et al. 2006). The acute 
form also results in fever, depression, apathy and skin reddening, as well as respiratory 
symptoms such as coughing. Chronic disease develops in animals surviving the acute form, 
and is exhibited as coughing, reduced appetite, exercise intolerance and hairy appearance 
(Taylor 2006; Straw et al. 2006).  
 
Prior to 2001, pleuropneumonia was estimated to be present at a similar herd prevalence in 
Australian piggeries (approximately 85%) to that of enzootic pneumonia (Cutler 2001). 
When Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae serovar 1 is present in a piggery, the subsequent 
problems with growth performance and mortality cost were estimated to be in excess of 
AU $100/sow/year (Cutler and Gardner 1988). Mortality rates as a result of acute disease 
are variable but may reach up to 50% of affected pigs (Taylor 2006).  
 
Infection occurs via the same routes as Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae, though the pathogen 
colonises tonsillar epithelium and adheres to alveolar epithelium (Straw et al. 2006). The 
Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae bacteria produce toxins to reduce the host 
immunological response against the pathogen; as a consequence, these toxins exert 
cytotoxic effects on different cell types, resulting in many of the symptoms of disease 
(Straw et al. 2006). Alveolar walls also become damaged due to capillary congestion, and 
bacteria can enter the blood and colonise other sites in the body, such as joints (Taylor 
2006).  
 
Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae has only been investigated in feral pigs in a single study 
in Slovenia, where a prevalence of 52% was reported for the 178 wild pigs shot and tested 
throughout the country (Vengust et al. 2006). Further investigation in feral pigs is crucial 
to determine the presence of this pathogen among feral pigs and estimate the level or 
infection in feral pig populations in proximity to piggeries. As Actinobacillus 
pleuropneumoniae can also be transmitted through aerosols over a distance anecdotally 
estimated at approximately 500 m (Cutler 2001), infected feral pigs pose a potential risk of 
transmission of the pathogen to piggeries. This has great implications on feral pig control 
in the vicinity of piggeries. 
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3.7.4.3. Brucella suis  
Brucella suis infection in the majority of pigs does not present with recognisable 
symptoms; the main indicator of infection is infertility, abortions and stillbirths (Straw et 
al. 2006). Any symptoms, if exhibited, include lameness due to swollen tendons, joints and 
bursa and paralysis (Nielsen and Duncan 1990). Infected animals can remain infected and 
infectious for up to 64 months and boars can be infected for life (Taylor 2006). Brucella 
suis is considered rare in domestic pigs and has been maintained at very low levels in 
domestic pig herds in Australia by depopulating entire herds when infection has been 
identified (Nielsen and Duncan 1990). Past surveys among commercial pigs reported 3 
positive results from 4,814 domestic pigs in Queensland in the early 1980s (QDPI 1983), 
and 15 positive results from 20,000 pigs sampled in Queensland between 1991 and 1996, 
14 of which were negative when re-tested (AHSQ 1997). At the present time, there have 
been no cases of Brucella suis in domestic pigs reported in any state of Australia with the 
exception of Queensland, where a free-range piggery was found to have positive cases of 
the pathogen towards the end of 2010 (AHA 2010). 
 
Infection with Brucella suis occurs by direct contact via the oral or venereal route, 
resulting in direct infection of the lymphatic system (Taylor 2006). The bacteria reproduce 
in lymph nodes for 1 to 7 weeks, and remain in lymph nodes, bone marrow, joints and the 
genital tract (Taylor 2006).  
 
Brucella suis has been detected in feral pigs in international studies as well as in Australia. 
Studies in Queensland detected the pathogen in feral pigs, with a prevalence of 8.8% in 
Cape York (Pavlov 1988), and from 1.9% to 4.1% in Central Queensland (Pavlov 1991; 
Mason and Fleming 1999). Brucella suis has also been detected in the Northern Territory 
(Pavlov 1992). In addition, feral pigs have been deemed responsible for infection of 
humans with Brucella suis in Australia: refer to Section 3.7.3. 
 
3.7.4.4. Leptospira spp. 
Leptospira spp. can cause leptospirosis in acute or chronic forms in pigs of all ages. Acute 
leptospirosis exhibits as listlessness, loss of appetite, irritability, fever, red eyes, 
convulsions, and sometimes diarrhoea and jaundice (Faine 1994). Abortions, still birth and 
neonatal disease are also common symptoms of Leptospira spp. infection (Straw et al. 
2006). Infected animals can continue to harbour, grow and excrete leptospires in urine and 
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genital fluids from days to years after infection (Faine 1994). In Queensland from 1972 to 
1976, the proportion of pig herds infected with Leptospira pomona was 29.8%, with 18.5% 
of all pigs tested found to be positive (Elder and Ward 1978). A vaccine has since been 
developed against Leptospira pomona and is now incorporated into general practice on 
piggeries. The national pig herd prevalence was last estimated (in the late 1990s) to be less 
than 6% (Cutler 2001). 
  
Infection with Leptospira spp. occurs via abrasions or breaches of the skin, the mucous 
membrane of the eye, nose and mouth, the vaginal route and inhalation of aerosols from 
urine. Vertical transmission is also possible (Faine 1994; Straw et al. 2006). Direct 
infection of the blood stream or lymphatics occurs via these routes of entry. The incubation 
period for horizontal infection is between 3 and 7 days (Faine 1994).  
 
Leptospira spp. has been detected in feral pigs in Australia and around the world. It is the 
most common bacterial pathogen isolated from feral pigs in Australia (Choquenot et al. 
1996). Previous studies from the 1970s to the present time have reported a wide range in 
the prevalence of this pathogen among the feral pig populations in different states of 
Australia. Leptospira pomona and tarassovi has been isolated in feral pigs in NSW with a 
prevalence reaching as high as 51% (Giles 1980; Mason et al. 1998). In the 1970s, 
Leptospira serovars pomona, tarassovi and hardjo were isolated from feral pigs in Western 
Australia with a prevalence of 2 to 9% (Masters 1979). In the 1980s, Leptospira spp. were 
also isolated from feral pigs in Northern Queensland and Cape York at a prevalence of 4 to 
22% (Pavlov 1988; Pavlov et al. 1992). More recently, of two feral pig populations culled 
in South Australia in 2003, while one was negative, in the other population 70% of 
individuals were positive for Leptospira pomona (AHA 2003). Recent seropositive results 
were obtained from feral pigs in the Kimberly region in Western Australia, at a prevalence 
of 5.7% (95% confidence interval: 2.6 to 11.9%) (Personal communication, Cowled 2012). 
 
Elder and Ward (1978) compiled the serological test results on Leptospira spp. from serum 
obtained from cattle and pigs in Queensland from 1972 to 1976. During this study, feral 
pigs captured on 43 of the 359 pig enterprises were also tested, and 31.2% of the animals 
were positive. Pig production has undergone significant changes since the time of this 
survey, when pig herds (averaging 12.4 sows per herd) were commonly a sideline for dairy 
enterprises and pigs were mainly kept in free-range style housing (Richardson and 
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O’Connor 1978). By 2007, the average herd size was 180 sows per herd (Australian Pork 
Limited 2008), with most herds housed indoors, reducing the likelihood of feral pig access. 
The introduction of the vaccination for domestic pigs against Leptospira pomona may have 
also resulted in a corresponding change in the prevalence in wild animals. An updated 
assessment of the presence and prevalence of Leptospira spp. in feral pigs near piggeries is 
necessary to estimate the risk of transmission of this pathogen to domestic pigs. 
 
3.7.4.5 Lawsonia intracellularis 
A description of this pathogen can be found in Section 3.6.4.2 on rodents. Lawsonia 
intracellularis has been isolated from free ranging wild pigs in the Czech Republic, 
Sweden, Germany and Australia (Tomanová et al. 2002; Jacobson et al. 2005; Phillips et 
al. 2009). However, all of these studies obtained samples from hunter-harvested pigs, 
without targeting locations in proximity to piggeries.  
 
3.7.5 Feral pig control 
There are a number of common techniques available to landholders for control of feral 
pigs. They involve both lethal and non-lethal practices, with the most common methods 
being shooting, poisoning, fencing and trapping (followed by euthanasia) (Choquenot et al. 
1996). These control measures are used equally by pig producers to manage feral pigs 
around their piggeries (Chapter 2).  
 
Shooting of feral pigs on a large-scale is conducted from the air, and is mainly cost 
effective in open habitats with high pig density over a number of connecting properties 
(Choquenot et al. 1996). Shooting from the ground is largely ineffective if implemented as 
a means of damage control unless it is intensively conducted on a small population. For all 
shooting control methods, time and cost increases when the number of individuals to be 
managed decreases.  
 
Poisoning with sodium monofluoroacetate (compound 1080) can be effective in a range of 
feral pig densities, and is particularly effective in remote areas when alternative food 
options are scarce (Choquenot and Lukins 1996). As such, 1080 poisoning in these areas is 
considered more cost effective than shooting or trapping (Dall 2010). However, non-target 
poisoning of animals with 1080 could occur. To reduce the non-target poisoning, poison 
delivery systems targeted to pigs, including the PIGOUT® bait (Animal Control 
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Technologies, Australia; Cowled et al. 2006), the Hog-Hopper™ (Animal Control 
Technologies, Australia; Dall 2010) and the Boar Operated System (BOSTM; Massei et al. 
2010) delivery containers have been developed. These targeted delivery systems could also 
be used for contraceptives or vaccines after further research and development (Massei et al. 
2010; Ballesteros et al. 2011).  
 
Trapping, although not as effective as poisoning, can also be used to control feral pig 
populations. Records of population capture up to 80% have been reported (Saunders et al. 
1993). Benefits of trapping include euthanasia being entirely target-specific and 
maintenance of the traps can be incorporated into daily farm procedures (Choquenot 1996). 
 
Fencing is typically used to protect small valuable land areas, and is a recommended 
biosecurity practice for all piggeries (Choquenot 1996; APIQ 2010). One fence design has 
been identified as being the most effective at preventing feral pig movement (Hone and 
Atkinson 1983). This fence is approximately 1 metre tall, with steel posts, hinge joints and 
an electric outrigged wire (Hone and Atkinson 1983). However, fencing to prevent feral 
pig access has been described as ineffective over the long term, regardless of the fence 
used, due to physical damage, poor maintenance, human error and electrical failure 
(Choquenot 1996; Seward et al. 2004; Reidy et al. 2008). These attributes, as well as the 
expense of installation and maintenance, can lower the adoption rate of this biosecurity 
practice on piggeries. An alternative, relatively inexpensive fence design has been 
described by Lavelle et al. (2011), in Texas, for temporary containment of feral pigs 
followed by eradication. The 0.86 m tall, hog-panel fence, had a containment effectiveness 
ranging between 83 to 100% when feral pigs were motivated to escape. 
 
3.8 Other animals 
 
 3.8.1 Introduced species 
The postal survey distributed to pig producers identified a number of other species of 
animals that were present on piggeries (Chapter 2). Feral cats were observed by many of 
the survey respondents. A survey of pathogens in wild cats in Australia reported the 
presence of bacterial, viral, helminth and protozoal pathogens. Among these, 50 
pathogenic species were not host-specific to cats (Moodie 1995: unpublished report 
referenced in Dickman 1996). As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2, one of the most 
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important pathogens for human and domestic animal health associated with cats is 
Toxoplasma gondii. Prevalence of Toxoplasma gondii in wild cats in Australia ranged from 
4.9% in Western Australia to 89% on Kangaroo Island (Milstein and Goldsmid 1997; 
Adams 2003; O’Callaghan et al. 2005). Toxoplasma gondii can infect many mammals, 
including pigs and humans. Infection in pigs is considered to originate predominantly from 
a feline source, resulting generally in a marked decline in reproduction and loss of 
condition (Lehmann et al. 2003; Taylor 2006). Cats were not included in this thesis as their 
role in the transmission of Toxoplasma gondii has been previously well studied. 
 
Wild canids, including wild dogs (Canis lupus familiaris and Canis lupus dingo) and foxes 
(Vulpes vulpes), have been associated with a number of different pathogens. Henderson 
(2009) summarised a list of pathogens in wild canids, which included bacterial, viral, 
helminth, protozoal and ectoparasitic pathogens. While the number of pathogen species 
isolated from the wild dog is far greater than from the fox, a pathogen common in both 
canids in Australia and worldwide is the helminth Echinococcus granulosus tapeworm, 
which causes hydatidosis. Wild dogs are the most important definitive host of 
Echinococcus granulosus in Australia, while marsupials, feral pigs and sheep are the most 
common intermediate host, with cattle and humans acting as less significant intermediate 
hosts (Jenkins and Macpherson 2003). The prevalence of Echinococcus granulosus in wild 
dogs has ranged from 25 to 100% in Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland (Baldock 
et al. 1985; Durie and Riek 1995; Jenkins and Morris 2003).  
 
Wild dogs are also definitive hosts of the protozoa Neospora caninum in Australia as 
previously mentioned, and play a role in the sylvatic and domestic lifecycles of the 
protozoan (King et al. 2010; King et al. 2011). Dogs and dingoes are capable of indirectly 
transmitting Neospora caninum to cattle by contaminating food and water with faeces 
containing oocysts (King et al. 2011). The significant consequence of infection in cattle is 
reproductive disease, such as abortions, resulting in an estimated cost to beef and dairy 
industries of AU$110 million annually (Reichel and Ellis 2009). This protozoan has not 
been recorded as leading to disease in pigs. 
 
The three bacterial pathogens Salmonella spp., Campylobacter spp. and Leptospira spp., 
discussed in Sections 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 of this literature review, have also been isolated from 
wild dogs (Henderson 2009). Dogs sampled in South Australia were infected at varying 
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prevalence rates for different Campylobacter spp. serotypes: 34% of dogs carried 
Campylobacter upsaliensis, 7% Campylobacter jejuni and 2% Campylobacter coli (Baker 
1999). Leptospira spp. were detected in 1.9% of domestic dogs sampled at animal shelters 
in Australia (Zwijnenberg et al. 2008).   
 
Cane toads (Bufo marinus), rabbits (Oryctolagus cuniculus) and goats (Capra hirsus) also 
carry a variety of different pathogens. The number and range of the pathogenic species 
isolated in Australia is small in comparison to those isolated from feral cats and wild 
canids (Henderson 2009), but some are of significance to livestock industries. Eleven 
serotypes of Salmonella spp. were isolated from the cane toad in a survey in Queensland 
between 1978 and 1998 (Thomas et al. 2001). Culture of a small number of rabbit faecal 
samples collected from the environment around Sydney water sources in 2002 isolated 
Cryptosporidium and faecal coliforms (Cox et al 2005). Cryptosporidium has been shown 
to cause diarrhoea in experimentally infected pigs (Tzipori et al. 1981).  
 
 3.8.2 Native species 
Marsupials were observed by the survey respondents in and around piggery facilities 
(Chapter 2). Numerous different pathogens have been identified in Australian marsupials. 
Possum populations in the Sydney area had a Toxoplasmosis gondii prevalence of 6.3% 
(Eymann et al. 2006), and the prevalence of Leptospira interrogans serovar Hardjo was 
9.6% (Eymann 2007). Leptospira spp. have also been isolated from Eastern grey 
kangaroos, with Roberts et al. (2010) identifying a high prevalence of 47% among free-
ranging kangaroos sampled in the Warragamba Catchment Area, Sydney. All seropositive 
animals were found to have the pathogen Leptospira weilii serovar Topaz (Roberts et al. 
2010), which was first identified in 2008 on a North Queensland dairy farm (Corney et al. 
2008). Despite this significant prevalence level, the ability of the Eastern grey kangaroo to 
act as a carrier of this pathogen, transmit and infect other animals is still poorly understood 
(Roberts et al. 2010). These findings are concerning, as piggeries do not have measures in 
place to prevent marsupial access, considering the ability of possums to climb and 
kangaroos to jump fences. Furthermore, the health consequences of infection with the new 
Leptospira weilii serovar Topaz have not been determined in animals or humans. 
 
Reptiles were observed by a number of pig producers who responded to the survey. Many 
of the pathogens carried by reptiles in Australia are not zoonotic. The exception to this is 
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the isolation of Salmonella spp. from eight snakes, four lizards and two turtles between 
1978 and 1998 in Queensland in a study by Thomas et al. (2001). 
 
Fruit bats were not observed by pig producers surveyed in 2007 (Chapter 2). This is an 
important observation, as fruit bats are a source of a number of infectious pathogens to 
livestock and humans. Two well known examples of these diseases are the Hendra virus 
infection in horses and humans in Australia, and the Nipah virus infection in pigs and 
humans in Malaysia (Breed et al. 2006). Both of these viruses are Henipavirus, a genus of 
the family Paramyxoviridae. 
 
The first outbreak of Hendra virus was described in Australia in 1994. The disease resulted 
in the death of 14 horses and one human (Murray et al. 1995). Outbreaks in horses and 
subsequent human infection have continued to occur up until the present. A recent study by 
Li et al (2010) has also identified that pigs may be experimentally infected with this virus, 
exhibiting fever, depression and respiratory symptoms. A major epidemic of Nipah virus in 
pigs and humans in Malaysia during 1999 led to 105 human fatalities and a cull of over 
one million pigs (Chua et al. 2000). Fruit bats were also found to be the source of 
Menangle virus infection in pigs, which caused a significant increase in stillborn piglets 
and a significant decrease in the pregnancy rate on one piggery in Australia in 1997 
(Philbey et al. 1998). Fruit bats are also carriers of pathogenic Leptospira spp. and shed 
leptospires into the environment (Cox et al. 2005). Of the fruit bat urine samples analysed 
for pathogenic Leptospirosis by Cox et al. (2005) in Australia, 39% tested positive. 
 
3.9 Evaluating pathogen presence and prevalence 
 
Studies involving pathogen surveillance within a defined population must focus on either 
substantiating freedom from a pathogen, or measuring prevalence of a pathogen (Cameron 
and Baldock 1998). These two different survey aims require different sample sizes. The 
freedom from pathogen studies generally require a smaller sample size and a 
predetermined minimum expected prevalence for inclusion in the calculations of sample 
sizes (Dohoo et al. 2003). The prevalence of the pathogen can also be determined from 
freedom of pathogen surveys, though the confidence intervals around this prevalence 
estimate will be wider than if the sample size required for a survey to measure prevalence 
were used (Cameron and Baldock 1998).  
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Often studies that present a prevalence value for pathogens within a population report the 
apparent prevalence; that is, the proportion of individuals determined to be positive in a 
survey (Gardner 2004; Reiczigel et al. 2010). However, the presentation of apparent 
prevalence as the prevalence estimate for a population is based on the assumption that the 
diagnostic procedure used to determine the pathogen positive/negative status of a sample is 
a perfect test, providing conclusive and error-free results. There is a flaw in this 
assumption when the diagnostic techniques performed are not perfect, with sensitivity 
and/or specificity values lower than 100% (Gardner 2004). The accuracy of a diagnostic 
technique, the sensitivity and specificity, is determined by comparison of the technique 
against a gold standard method (Gardner 2004). The sensitivity (ability of a technique to 
identify a diseased individual as positive) is determined by investigating how well the test 
identifies known positives; the specificity (ability of a technique to identify a non-diseased 
individual as negative) is determined by how well the test determines non-infected samples 
to be negative, and reflects ability of a test to differentiate between the specific pathogen of 
interest and other pathogens. Therefore, false negative results will arise when a test has low 
sensitivity and false positive results when there is low specificity. Transformation of this 
apparent prevalence to account for the sensitivity and specificity values of the diagnostic 
procedure used provides an estimate of the true prevalence of the pathogen. Calculation of 
the true prevalence makes the results more accurate and allows comparisons to other 
pathogen surveillance studies using different diagnostic techniques (Gardner 2004). 
 
3.10 Evaluating risk 
 
Definitive identification of the source of infection for an animal population and proof of 
the pathogen transmission process is often difficult to obtain, particularly in relation to 
endemic diseases. For an outbreak of a new pathogen, as is the case with emerging 
infectious diseases; or an outbreak of a known pathogen in a new region; it is usually 
possible to identify an index case or source. However, for an endemic disease, where there 
may be multiple potential sources of the pathogen, determining the source of infection for 
a previously free population requires consideration of all the potential transmission 
pathways and sources. In this context, an estimation of the probability of transmission 
occurring, considering different event determinants, could provide useful information 
regarding the most likely source of infection.  
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Using a risk analysis approach enables the likelihood and consequences of pathogen 
transmission to be estimated and measured, and procedures to reduce the risk to be 
evaluated. Estimation and evaluation of the risk posed by pathogens (and other types of 
hazards) is an internationally accepted standard underpinning international trade, called 
import risk analysis. There are three different frameworks for analysing risk endorsed for 
use by the World Trade Organisation (WTO): the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) 
of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO)/World Health 
Organisation (WHO) framework for microbial food safety risk assessments; the 
International Plant Protection Convention framework relating to plant health; and the 
World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE 2010) framework for animal disease. 
 
The OIE risk analysis framework consists of four inter-related components: hazard 
identification, risk assessment, risk management and risk communication (OIE 2010) 
(Figure 3.3). The risk analysis process following the OIE framework is summarised below. 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Four components of a risk analysis (OIE 2010). 
 
Hazard identification involves identifying hazards (pathogens, chemical residue, vectors) 
that are potentially harmful, producing adverse consequences for the animal, human or 
country in question. The second component, the risk assessment, is itself comprised of four 
steps: release assessment, exposure assessment, consequence assessment and risk 
estimation (Figure 3.4). Release assessment identifies the pathways and likelihood that a 
specific identified hazard may enter a particular environment. The exposure assessment 
identifies the pathways and likelihood of exposure of an animal or human to the hazard 
released within the environment. The consequence assessment describes the consequences 
of hazard exposure (that is the alternate outbreak scenarios arising from pathogen 
Hazard 
identification 
Risk 
assessment 
Risk 
management 
Risk communication 
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exposure) and the likelihood of each outbreak scenario to occur. These consequences may 
be direct, such as mortality and morbidity; or indirect, such as economic and 
environmental considerations. Risk estimation is the final step, when the likelihoods of 
release and exposure are combined with the consequence estimate to estimate the risk 
associated with the hazard.  
 
 
Figure 3.4. Four components of a risk assessment (OIE 2010). 
 
The risk management component of risk analysis is also comprised of four steps (Figure 
3.5). These include the risk evaluation, option evaluation, implementation, and monitoring 
and review. The risk evaluation compares the risk estimate to the appropriate level of 
protection determined by the country or territory. The appropriate level of protection for 
imports into Australia and New Zealand is a qualitative value of Very Low, which is based 
on the outcome of the overall risk estimation, which includes release, exposure and 
consequences assessments (Biosecurity Australia 2009). Some risk mitigation options 
common for imported products include pre-border quarantine arrangements, screening of 
vessels and imported products at the border, as well as the development of emergency 
response plans to reduce the consequences of an event occurring (Biosecurity Australia 
2009). Identified options that lower the risk to the appropriate level of protection are then 
implemented, monitored and reviewed for effectiveness.  
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Figure 3.5. Four components of risk management (OIE 2010). 
 
Risk communication is an all-encompassing component of the risk analysis process, 
involving the ongoing consultation of interested parties. All stakeholders involved in the 
issue assessed should be consulted and invited to review the risk analysis at different points 
in time, to ensure relevant information and opinions are considered and relevant parties 
remain informed.  
 
Only the exposure assessment component of a risk analysis was undertaken in this thesis. 
In a very broad sense, the hazard identification component of a risk analysis was also 
undertaken in Chapter 2 and throughout the thesis by identifying those pathogens harmful 
to pigs that could be carried by the wild animals included in the study (European starlings, 
rodents and feral pigs). The exposure assessment conducted sought to identify the possible 
pathways through which a pig may be exposed to a sufficient dose of a pathogen from an 
infected wild animal to result in infection, as well as the likelihood of these exposure 
pathways occurring.  
 
Risk assessments have been used recently to determine the likelihood of pathogen 
transmission from wildlife to livestock. Gallagher et al. (2003) used the OIE framework for 
risk assessment to determine the probability of the release of Mycobacterium bovis from 
badgers, the probability of cattle exposure to the pathogen from badgers, and the 
consequence of different pathogen dose responses to the cattle in the south west of 
England. Gallagher et al. (2003) reported that the first cow in a herd of 74 individuals will 
become infected after 102 days if there is a single badger excreting Mycobacterium bovis 
present. This was determined to vary given the number of excreting badgers, the routes of 
pathogen shedding and the likelihood of infection dependent on dose in cattle. Sutmoller et 
al. (2000) determined the probability of foot-and-mouth disease transmission to cattle in 
Risk evaluation Option 
evaluation 
Implementation 
Monitor and review 
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Zimbabwe through a number of different scenarios. Transmission of foot-and-mouth 
disease from buffalo to antelope, which then gain access to the cattle holding areas by 
jumping the double fenced perimeter, was the most likely scenario. Other less likely 
scenarios of transmission involved aerosol transmission, and a break in the fence allowing 
buffalo access to cattle. The results of their studies provided transparent probability values 
with recommendations regarding the most important areas where mitigation strategies 
could be applied to reduce the risk of transmission.  
 
Morgan et al. (2006) and Kilpatrick et al. (2009) also aimed to assess the transmission of 
pathogens from wildlife to livestock. However, neither implemented a standard risk 
assessment methodology and, consequently, their work does not provide a complete 
answer to their study hypotheses. Morgan et al. (2006) studied the likelihood of infection 
of saiga antelope with foot-and-mouth disease virus sourced from livestock: how long the 
virus could persist in the antelope population, and the likelihood of transmission of the 
virus back to livestock. However, the results obtained were unable to determine the 
likelihood of antelope being exposed to the virus from livestock and the reverse likelihood. 
Kilpatrick et al. (2009) aimed to determine the relative risk of Brucella spp. transmission 
from bison to cattle outside Yellow Stone National Park. Authors present results to answer 
this aim; however, quantitative and qualitative estimates are presented without definition of 
the qualitative risk estimates. 
 
The aim of Chapter 7 of this thesis is to determine the quantitative likelihood of exposure 
of domestic pigs on commercial piggeries to pathogens from wild animals. As the 
pathogens investigated are endemic to Australia and present within regions of the piggeries 
included in this study, the release of the pathogen to the region was not required. A 
consequence assessment was beyond the scope of the current study. In addition, extensive 
information is available on the impact of the endemic diseases studied upon domestic pigs 
and the pig industry in Australia.    
 
3.11 Summary 
 
Pathogens can be transmitted in a number of different ways from wildlife to livestock. 
These modes of transmission include direct transmission by contact between animals and 
exchange of body fluids, and indirect methods, such as contamination of the environment, 
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food, water and air in the surroundings of livestock. Often a pathogen is not restricted to 
being transmitted via a single mode. The pig pathogenic agents studied in this thesis can be 
transmitted in either one or many of these pathways.  
 
The bacteria Salmonella spp., Escherichia coli, Campylobacter spp., Brachyspira 
hyodysenteriae, Brachyspira pilosicoli and Lawsonia intracellularis are generally 
transmitted through direct or indirect contact and consumption of infected faeces. Brucella 
suis and Leptospirosis spp. are more commonly transmitted through direct or indirect 
contact with body fluids, such as urine or reproductive fluids. Finally, the two pneumonia-
causing pathogens, Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae and Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae, 
can be transmitted through direct or indirect contact, including aerosols.  
 
The likelihood of pathogen transmission from a wild animal to a domestic pig is affected 
by the pathogen prevalence, the period of time the wild animal is within proximity of a 
piggery, and the mode of transmission. The determination of the probability of endemic 
pathogen transmission from a wild animal to a domestic pig in Australia will assist in 
directing biosecurity practices to mitigate areas of high likelihood of exposure. Not only 
will this help to mitigate endemic pathogen transmission, but it can also be applied to help 
predict likely transmission patterns of transboundary and emerging diseases, for which 
there is little or no data available in Australia.  
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4 European starling biosecurity threat to piggeries 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The three most significant bird pests in the world include the European starling (Sturnus 
vulgarus), house sparrow (Passer domesticus) and the common pigeon (Columba livia) 
(Pimentel et al. 2001). These bird species are highly adaptable to urban environments and 
are primarily found in close association with humans and their practices. As such, these 
birds are common pests on agricultural enterprises, and may be present in large flocks on 
intensive farming practices due to the abundance of freely available food sources. As an 
example, a study in Scotland (Daniels et al. 2003) reported an average of 25 bird faeces 
deposits per metre squared of stored feed per month on a number of different cattle farms. 
This is of concern, as these three bird species are associated with over 40 pathogens, many 
of which are capable of being transmitted inter-species (Weber 1979). Most of these 
pathogens are present in bird excrement; therefore, faecal contamination of feed poses a 
risk of pathogen transmission to domestic animals (Morishita et al. 1999; Craven et al. 
2000; Benskin et al. 2009). The contamination of food and water by Salmonella spp. in 
cattle feedlots in the United States was directly related to the number of starlings present 
(Carlson 2011a) and decreased when starlings were removed from the feedlot (Carlson 
2011b). European starlings were one of the most frequently reported birds on piggeries in 
Australia (Chapter 2). 
 
The majority of diarrhoea-causing illnesses in pigs result from infection with Salmonella 
spp., Campylobacter spp. or Escherichia coli (Jackson and Cockcroft 2007). Infection with 
these pathogens causes significant negative financial implications, mainly due to the 
reduction in feed conversion rate, increased medication expenses and the related mortality 
(Taylor 2006). Additionally, the contamination of food products, such as pork, with 
Salmonella spp., Campylobacter spp. and Escherichia coli account for over 90% of 
bacterial enteritis infections in humans globally (Thorns 2000). These bacterial 
enteropathogens also correspond with the most common bacteria isolated from wild birds 
(Benskin et al. 2009). It is important to determine the prevalence of these pathogens in 
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wild bird populations in the proximity of piggeries in order to assess potential biosecurity 
risks. 
 
Although these pathogens have been previously isolated from birds in Denmark, the 
United States and England, studies in relation to the presence of bacteria in starlings have 
been limited, and no studies have been conducted in Australia. Additionally, the extent of 
the contribution of starlings to the transmission of pathogenic strains of the bacteria to pigs 
has not been determined internationally or in Australia. These three pathogens have 
important financial consequences for the pig industry as well as public health implications 
due to their zoonotic nature. People can get infected through the consumption of 
contaminated pig meat. The objective of the research presented in this chapter was to 
detect the presence of Salmonella spp., Campylobacter spp. and Escherichia coli in 
starlings captured on four large-scale commercial piggeries and the distribution of 
serotypes causing disease in pigs. 
 
4.2 Materials and methods 
 
 4.2.1 Study location and sample size 
Four piggeries in South Australia, de-identified as A, B, C and D as shown in Figure 4.1, 
were selected for capture and sampling of European starlings. Piggeries were purposively 
selected from those involved in an assessment of the use of the DRC-1339 avicide for 
control of starlings at intensive livestock production facilities. The DRC-1339 avicide 
project was in the initial stage of determining the starling population size on piggeries and 
as such would not have had any impact on the results obtained in the current study. 
Selected piggeries had a daily presence of starlings throughout summer, and the piggery 
owners were willing to participate in a confidential disease assessment. 
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Figure 4.1. Relative locations of four piggeries in South Australia which participated in a 
study to detect the presence of Salmonella spp., Campylobacter spp. and Escherichia coli 
in European starlings.  
 
 
In February 2008 and February 2009, a total of 473 starlings were captured on the four 
piggeries. The number of starlings sampled on each piggery is shown in Table 4.1 
 
 
Table 4.1. The number of European starlings sampled on four different piggeries in South 
Australia to detect presence of pathogens at an expected level of ≥ 3.5%. 
Piggery Year Sample size 
(n) 
A 2008 84 
B 2008 2008 88 
B 2009 2009 100 
C 2009 101 
D 2009 100 
N
E 
S
W
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The required sample size (n) of starlings per trapping for each piggery was based on 
calculations to detect pathogens in an infinite population (defined as >1000 animals) using 
the following formula from Dohoo et al. (2003; Eq 2.18.). 
 
q
n
ln
lnα
= ………………………………………………………………………...Equation 4.1 
 
where α = 0.05 (1 − 95% confidence level) and q = 1 − expected prevalence (expected 
prevalence: 3.5%). The expected prevalence of 3.5% was selected because of the 
prevalence of the pathogens of interest found in previous studies (Benskin et al. 2009; 
Gaulker et al. 2009; Carlson et al. 2011a). 
 
 
 4.2.2 Sampling the starling population 
Starlings were trapped using 18 m mist nets (M. Nakamori & Co., Yokkaichi, Japan) 
suspended between two aluminium masts, within 50 cm of the windows of piggery 
buildings shown in Figure 4.2, where the greatest number of birds were previously 
observed by piggery workers. Nets were erected in advance of bird arrival on the piggery 
of a morning. The number of days taken to trap and sample starlings varied between 
piggeries. Piggery A, B in 2008 and C required 2 days each, piggery B in 2009 required 3 
days and piggery D only required a single day. Birds were scared from the open side of the 
piggery building into the mist nets which covered the windows on the opposite side. Birds 
trapped in nets were untangled by hand and placed in white fabric bags in the shade until 
processing. Each bird was banded with one coloured band, each colour specific to the 
piggery the birds were caught on; and one brass band with a sequence number, for 
identification in the case of a recapture. A cloacal swab was taken from each bird using a 
minitip culturette (Interpath Services, Copan Innovation – sterile swab applicators in peel 
pouches) which was then stored in transport media and refrigerated before transportation to 
Gribbles laboratory for culturing each day. Each bird was released after they were banded 
and had the cloacal swab taken. All captive and handling procedures were approved by the 
Department of Primary Industries and Resources of South Australia Animal Ethics 
Committee (reference number # 04-07). 
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Figure 4.2. A mist net erected along the windows of an intensive piggery in South 
Australia to capture European starlings in 2009. 
 
 
 4.2.3 Piggery management and disease control history 
Information on pig health status and disease and pest control programs implemented on 
each piggery was obtained through administration of a written questionnaire to each of the 
piggery managers after sampling of the starlings and laboratory tests were performed 
(Appendix 2). A single page letter outlining results obtained from the starlings captured on 
their piggery was also attached to the three page questionnaire. The questionnaire 
contained open questions covering pig disease history and pest control management. 
Questions on disease history focused on information regarding the history of the presence 
of the pathogens of interest in this study, including how the pathogen presence was 
confirmed, and the medication used to control illness. Questions pertaining to starling pest 
control focused on the control measures in place to manage birds. The general husbandry 
questions requested information on the herd size, piggery production type (e.g. intensive, 
free-range or ecoshelter) and any other potential food sources for starlings within a 20 km 
radius of the piggery. All pig health results were laboratory confirmed, and such were not 
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affected by any potential bias created by knowing the starling results prior to questionnaire 
completion. 
 
 4.2.4 Laboratory testing 
Culture of Salmonella spp., Campylobacter spp. and Escherichia coli was done by 
Gribbles Veterinary Pathology Laboratory (Adelaide, South Australia). The culture 
methods followed those recommended by the Australia/New Zealand standards (Australian 
Standard 2004; Australian Standard 2006; Australian Standard 2009). A different culture 
kit was used to grow each bacterium. Methods follow the instructions on the kit inserts. 
 
4.2.4.1 Transport Media 
Once a cloacal sample was taken, the minitip culturette was placed in bacterial transport 
media. There were two types of transport media used depending on the bacteria being 
tested for. The swabs to be analysed for Salmonella spp. and Escherichia coli were placed 
in Stuart’s medium (ThermoFisher, Oxoid© Australia Pty Limited) which was comprised 
of 0.1 g/L calcium chloride, 1 g/L sodium thioglycollate and 10 g/L di-sodium β -
clycerophosphate (Remel 2003). The swabs to be analysed for Campylobacter spp. were 
placed in Aimes Charcoal media (ThermoFisher, Oxoid© Australia Pty Limited) which was 
comprised of 1.15 g/L di-sodium phosphate, 0.2 g/L monopotassium phosphate, 0.2 g/L 
potassium chloride, 3.0 g/L sodium chloride, 0.1 g/L magnesium chloride, 0.1 g/L calcium 
chloride, 1 g/L sodium thioglycollate, 10 g/L charcoal and 5g/L agar (Remel 2003).  
 
4.2.4.2 Escherichia coli 
The kit for culture was obtained from ThermoFisher (Oxoid© Australia Pty Limited). The 
media used for Escherichia coli culture was half Columbia Horse Blood Agar, half 
MacConkey No Salt Agar (ThermoFisher, Oxoid© Australia Pty Limited). The Columbia 
Horse Blood Agar was comprised of 23 g/L special peptone, 1 g/L starch, 9 g/L sodium 
chloride, 10 g/L agar No. 1 and 50 ml horse blood – defibrinated. The MacConkey No Salt 
Agar was comprised of 20 g/L peptone, 10 g/L lactose, 5 g/L bile salts, 0.075 g/L Neutral 
Red (indicator) and 12 g/L agar. Both sides of the plate were swabbed with the sample and 
incubated at 37 ºC (± 2 ºC) in an oxygen incubator for 24 h. Escherichia coli bacteria 
colonies appear pink on the MacConkey agar, due to acid production as a result of the 
fermentation of lactose. Pathogenic strains of the Escherichia coli are often haemolytic and 
will appear as creamy, grey, wet colonies on the Horse Blood Agar. 
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A Microbact gram-negative identification system was used to identify bacteria according 
to manufacturer’s instructions (ThermoFisher, Oxoid© Australia Pty Limited). Briefly, 1 to 
3 isolated colonies were selected and emulsified in 2.5 ml saline solution (0.85%). A test 
strip was inserted into the holding tray and 4 drops of the bacterial suspension were added 
to each well using a sterile pipette. Then, two drops of a mineral oil were added to the 3 
black wells of the identification strip and the rows were sealed with an adhesive seal and 
incubated at 35 ºC (± 2 ºC) for 18 to 24 h. Reagents were added to appropriate wells and 
read within the time frame recommended. The results were found to be positive or negative 
by comparing them to the colour charts provided.  
 
Serotyping of Escherichia coli isolates and determination of fimbrial antigens were 
performed at the National Escherichia coli Reference Laboratory (Bendigo, Victoria). The 
Escherichia coli isolates were tested via slide agglutination against the serotypes and 
associated fimbrial types pathogenic to pigs in Australia (Gyles 1994), shown in Table 4.2.  
The antisera for the different Escherichia coli serotypes were added to the Escherichia coli 
isolate on a slide under light and observed for agglutination. Agglutination occurring 
within 60 sec was regarded as a positive reaction. 
 
 
Table 4.2. Escherichia coli O serotypes and associated fimbrial and capsule types 
considered to cause disease in pigs in Australia. 
O serotype Associated fimbrial types Associated capsule types 
O8 K88, K99, 987P  
O9 K88, K99, 987P  
O20 K88  
O64 K88, K99  
O101 K88, K99  
O8G7 K88 K87 
O45 K88 K1 
O98  
O138 F18 K81 
O139 K82 
O141 F18 K85ab, K85ac 
O147 K88 K89 
O149 K88, F18 K91 
O157 K88, F18 KV17 
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4.2.4.3 Salmonella spp. 
The kit for culture for Salmonella spp. was obtained from ThermoFisher (Oxoid© Australia 
Pty Limited). The cloacal swab sample was inoculated in a Mannitol Selenite enrichment 
broth. The broth was made of 0.010 g/L cystine, 4 g/L mannitol, 10 g/L sodium 
dihydrogen phosphate, 4 g/L sodium hydrogen selenite and 5 g/L tryptone. This was 
incubated for 18 to 24 h at 35 ºC in aerobic conditions. A subculture of the incubated 
undisturbed Selenite broth was obtained from the surface and swabbed onto an XLD 
(Xylose Lysine Desoxycholate) plate. The XLD plate was comprised of 3 g/L yeast 
extract, 5 g/L L-Lysine HCI, 3.75 g/L xylose, 7.5 g/L lactose, 7.5 g/L sucrose, 1 g/L 
sodium desoxycholate, 5 g/L sodium chloride, 6.8 g/L sodium thiosulphate, 0.8 g/L ferric 
ammonium citrate, 0.08 g/L phonol red and 12.5 g/L Agar No.1. The inoculated XLD plate 
was incubated for 24 to 48 h at 35 ºC (± 2 ºC), in aerobic conditions. Salmonella spp. 
bacteria colonies appear pink with a black centre caused by hydrogen sulphide. The 
Microbact gram-negative identification system was also used to identify bacteria, using the 
methods described above for Escherichia coli. 
 
Serotyping of Salmonella spp. isolates were performed at the Australian Salmonella 
Reference Centre (Institute of Medical and Veterinary Science, Adelaide). The Salmonella 
spp. isolates were tested via slide agglutination against serotypes as per the Kauffman-
White classification scheme (Murray et al. 2003). The Salmonella spp. O serotypes were 
firstly identified via agglutination, and associated fimbrial types were subsequently tested 
also via agglutination. There are over 2000 serotypes of Salmonella spp., which are 
continually updated by the World Health Organisation Collaborating Centre for Reference 
and Research on Salmonella (Popoff and Le Minor 2001). 
 
4.2.4.4 Campylobacter spp. 
Campylobacter spp. are microaerophyllic and their growth is inhibited by atmospheric 
oxygen levels (Kiggins and Plastridge 1956). As such, to grow the Campylobacter spp., 
specific atmospheric conditions were created for incubation. The kit for culture was 
obtained from ThermoFisher (Oxoid© Australia Pty Limited). The cloacal sample was 
inoculated into a saline suspension and a drop of this suspension was applied to the 
Campylobacter spp. agar plate. This plate was comprised of 23 g/L special peptone, 1 g/L 
starch, 5 g/L sodium chloride, 10 g/L Agar No.1, 0.25 g/L sodium pyruvate, 0.25 g/L 
sodium metabisulphite, 0.25 g/L ferrous sulphate, 0.01 g/L vancomycin, 0.005 g/L 
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trimethoprim, 40000 u/L colimycin and 50 ml horse blood defibrinated. The 
Campylobacter spp. agar plate was incubated for 48 h at 42 ºC in a microaerophylic 
environment created by an Oxoid© atmosphere generation system. A control culture of 
Campylobacter spp. was incubated with each sample batch. If the Campylobacter spp. 
control failed to grow, the culture procedure was repeated with a fresh control. 
Confirmation of Campylobacter spp. was done by Gram staining preparations with dilute 
carbol fuchsin and identifying gram-negative, oxidase positive “S”-shaped, gull winged or 
long spiral forms (Winn et al. 2006).  
 
To identify the Campylobacter spp. serotype, the isolate was inoculated into a saline 
suspension and spread over the surface of a new Campylobacter spp. agar plate. A 
nalidixic acid disc and a cephalothin disc (ThermoFisher, Oxoid© Australia Pty Limited) 
were placed on the dried surface of the blood agar separately and incubated at 42 ºC for 48 
h in a microaerophylic environment created by an Oxoid© atmosphere generation system. 
Campylobacter jejuni and Campylobacter coli are sensitive to nalidixic acid and will not 
grow within 6 mm of the disc, whereas they are both resistant to cephalothin, growing right 
up to the disc. To further differentiate between Campylobacter jejuni and Campylobacter 
coli, a hippurate hydrolysis test was performed. Sterile sodium hippurate (South Australian 
Research and Development Institute, Adelaide) was added at a quantity of 0.5 ml to a 
screw capped tube. A loop full of the Campylobacter spp. isolate was added and incubated 
at 37 ºC for 2 h along with an un-inoculated control tube. Ninhydrin solution (bioMérieux 
– Australia Pty. Ltd. Baulkham Hills), 0.2 ml, was added to the tubes. A positive result was 
indicated by the solution turning a deep purple colour within 5 min: only Campylobacter 
jejuni hydrolyses hippurate, resulting in this positive reaction (Winn et al. 2006). 
 
 4.2.5 Data analysis 
4.2.5.1 Calculation to substantiate freedom from a pathogen and to estimate 
prevalence 
The likelihood that a pathogen is present in a population of animals (or alternatively, to 
prove freedom from a pathogen), according to the results of the diagnostic tests for the 
pathogens studied, was calculated based on a hypergeometric exact probability formula by 
Cameron and Baldock (1998) using the FreeCalc version 2 software (Sergeant 2009b). 
This software allows you to conclude if a population is free from a pathogen according to 
the diagnostic test sensitivity and specificity, minimum expected prevalence, the 
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population size, the sample size, and the number of positive reactors. The null hypothesis 
(pathogen is present) is rejected when the probability of x positive reactors is ≤0.05, in 
which case you can conclude that the population is free from a pathogen at the minimum 
expected pathogen prevalence. 
 
The apparent prevalence was calculated by dividing the test positive results by the total 
number of samples tested. The true prevalence (Tp) was estimated using the formula 
developed by Rogan and Gladen (1978) (Equation 4.2) based on the known sensitivity and 
specificity of the laboratory techniques used in laboratory testing.  
 
1
1
−+
−+
= βα
βγTp ………………………………………………………………….Equation 4.2 
 
where γ is the apparent prevalence, α is the test sensitivity and β the test specificity.  
 
The sensitivity and specificity of the laboratory tests used are summarised in Table 4.3. 
The sensitivity and specificity of the different culture methods used for the various 
pathogens being studied were not determined by the diagnostic laboratory where the 
samples were processed. Furthermore, sensitivity of the culture techniques used has not 
been determined in past studies. As such, a range of sensitivities were adapted from 
references that used similar methods or parts thereof. Sensitivities for Escherichia coli 
detection ranged from 49 to 98% (Eriksson and Aspan 2007); Salmonella spp. detection 
ranged from 86 to 100% (Mugg and Hill 1981); and Campylobacter spp. detection ranged 
from 63 to 100% (Patton et al. 1981).  
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Table 4.3. A summary of the sensitivity and specificity of culture methods used to 
determine true prevalence of bacteria species in European starlings trapped and sampled on 
piggeries in Australia in 2008 and 2009. 
Bacteria species Sensitivity range Reference Specificity Reference 
Escherichia coli 60% 90% 100% Adapted from 
Eriksson and 
Aspan (2007) 
100% Eriksson and 
Aspan (2007) 
Salmonella spp. 60% 90% 100% Adapted from 
Mugg and Hill 
(1981) 
98% MicrobactTM 
Gram-Negative 
identification 
system booklet. 
Campylobacter 
spp. 
60% 90% 100% Adapted from 
Patton et al. 
(1981) 
100% Oxoid© 
Technical 
specification 
 
 
The 95% confidence intervals around the true prevalence estimate were calculated using 
the Epitools epidemiological calculator for estimated true prevalence and predictive values 
from survey testing (Sergeant 2009a). From the confidence intervals generated by this 
calculator, the Blaker (2000) method values are reported in this study, because the Blaker 
method provides exact two-sided confidence intervals that are restricted by 0 and 100 and  
are more accurate than values generated using other methods when true prevalence is 
<20% and >80% (Reiczigel et al. 2010).  
 
4.3 Results 
 
 4.3.1 Probability of presence of pathogens in the European starling 
 populations.  
Escherichia coli was found statistically to be present in starling populations on all four 
piggeries with probabilities shown in Table 4.4.  
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Table 4.4. Probability of presence of Escherichia coli in the European starling populations 
at four piggeries in South Australia in 2008 and 2009. 
  Probability of presence of the pathogen in the 
starling population at different test sensitivity 
(Se) and specificity (Sp)a 
Piggery Escherichia coli 
Positive/tested 
Se 60% 
Sp 100% 
Se 90% 
Sp 100% 
Se 100% 
Sp 100% 
A 22/84 1.0 1.0 1.0 
B 2008 46/88 1.0 1.0 1.0 
B 2009 27/100 1.0 1.0 1.0 
C 10/101 1.0 1.0 1.0 
D 68/100 1.0 1.0 1.0 
a Probability that pathogen is present at the specified minimum expected prevalence 
(probability ≤0.05 indicates population is free from the pathogen at the minimum expected 
pathogen prevalence). Probability obtained using the hypergeometric formula described by 
Cameron and Baldock (1998) implemented with the FreeCalc version 2 software (Sergeant 
2009b).  Parameters used: Population size of 2,000 on each piggery; Minimum expected 
prevalence of 3.5%; Estimated values for test sensitivity and specificity based on culture 
technique.  
 
 
Salmonella spp. and Campylobacter jejuni were found statistically to be present in the 
starling population sampled on piggery D with probabilities shown in Table 4.5 and 4.6, 
respectively. The absence of Campylobacter jejuni in the starling populations of piggeries 
A, B and C was statistically confirmed using a laboratory method sensitivity value of 
100%; however, when sensitivity used was 60% and 90%, absence of this pathogen in the 
bird populations could not be confirmed (Table 4.6).  
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Table 4.5. Probability of presence of Salmonella spp. in the European starling populations 
at four piggeries in South Australia in 2008 and 2009.  
  Probability of presence of the pathogen in the 
starling population at different test sensitivity 
(Se) and specificity (Sp)a 
Piggery Salmonella spp. 
Positive/tested 
Se 60% 
Sp 98% 
Se 90% 
Sp 98% 
Se 100% 
Sp 98% 
A 0/84 0.031 0.012 0.009 
B 2008 0/88 0.026 0.01 0.007 
B 2009 0/100 0.022 0.008 0.006 
C 0/101 0.021 0.008 0.006 
D 6/100 0.92 0.82 0.777 
a Probability that pathogen is present at the specified minimum expected prevalence 
(probability ≤0.05, shown in bold font, indicates population is free from the pathogen at 
the minimum expected pathogen prevalence). Probability obtained using the 
hypergeometric formula described by Cameron and Baldock (1998) implemented with the 
FreeCalc version 2 software (Sergeant 2009b).  Parameters used: Population size of 2,000 
on each piggery; Minimum expected prevalence of 3.5%; Estimated values for test 
sensitivity and specificity based on culture technique.  
 
 
Table 4.6. Probability of presence of Campylobacter jejuni in the European starling 
populations at four piggeries in South Australia in 2008 and 2009.  
  Probability of presence of the pathogen in the 
starling population at different test sensitivity 
(Se) and specificity (Sp)a 
Piggery Campylobacter 
jejuni 
Positive/tested 
Se 60% 
Sp 100% 
Se 90% 
Sp 100% 
Se 100% 
Sp 100% 
A 0/84 0.164 0.065 0.047 
B 2008 0/88 0.151 0.057 0.041 
B 2009 0/100 0.158 0.061 0.044 
C 0/101 0.155 0.059 0.043 
D 3/100 0.896 0.717 0.648 
a Probability that pathogen is present at the specified minimum expected prevalence 
(probability ≤0.05, shown in bold font, indicates population is free from the pathogen at 
the minimum expected pathogen prevalence). Probability obtained using the 
hypergeometric formula described by Cameron and Baldock (1998) implemented with the 
FreeCalc version 2 software (Sergeant 2009b).  Parameters used: Population size of 2,000 
on each piggery; Minimum expected prevalence of 3.5%; Estimated values for test 
sensitivity and specificity based on culture technique.  
  
 
 4.3.2 Prevalence of pathogens in the starling populations.  
Table 4.7 shows apparent and true prevalence of pathogens included in this study among 
the starling population sampled on the different piggeries. Escherichia coli was present at 
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the highest apparent prevalence on piggery D (68.0%), with a corresponding true 
prevalence ranging from 68%  to 100%, depending on the sensitivity of the diagnostic test 
(sensitivity of 100% and 60%, respectively). The lowest Escherichia coli true prevalence 
was found on piggery C, ranging from 9.9% to 16.5% for a test sensitivity of 100% and 
60%, respectively. Salmonella spp. were present on piggery D with an apparent prevalence 
of 6% and true prevalence from 4.1% (sensitivity 100%) to 6.9% (sensitivity 60%). The six 
Salmonella spp. serotypes isolated on piggery D were: Salmonella kottbus, Salmonella 
muenster, two Salmonella bredeney, Salmonella anatum and Salmonella oranienburg. 
Campylobacter jejuni was present on piggery D at an apparent prevalence of 3% and a true 
prevalence ranging from 3.0% (sensitivity 100%) to 5.0% (sensitivity 60%). 
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Table 4.7. Apparent prevalence and true prevalence of Escherichia coli, Salmonella spp. and Campylobacter jejuni determined by culture of 
cloacal samples, in European starling populations at four different piggeries sampled in 2008 and 2009 in South Australia. 
 
Apparent prevalence (%) 
(95% CI) 
True prevalence (% along with 95% CI) of pathogens in the 
starling populations at different test sensitivities (Se)  
Piggery Positive 
/tested Se 60% Se 90% Se 100% 
Escherichia coli      
A 22/84 26.2 (18–36.5) 43.7 (29.2–61.3) 29.1 (19.5–40.9) 26.2 (17.5–36.8) 
B 2008 46/88 52.3 (42–62.4) 87.1 (69.0–100.0) 58.1 (46.0–69.6) 52.3 (41.4–62.6) 
B 2009 27/100 27.0 (19.3–36.4) 45.0 (31.2–60.7) 30.0 (20.8–40.4) 27.0 (18.7–36.4) 
C 10/101 9.9 (5.5–17.3) 16.5 (8.5–28.4) 11.0 (5.6–19.0) 9.9 (5.1–17.1) 
D 68/100 68.0 (58.3–76.3) 100.0 (96.8–100.0) 75.6 (64.5–85.3) 68.0 (58.1–76.7) 
Salmonella spp.      
A 0/84 0 (0–4.4) 0a (0–3.9) 0 a (0–2.6) 0 a (0–2.3) 
B 2008 0/88 0 (0–4.2) 0 a (0–3.5) 0 a (0–2.3) 0 a (0–2.1) 
B 2009 0/100 0 (0–3.7) 0 a (0–2.7) 0 a (0–1.8) 0 a (0–1.6) 
C 0/101 0 (0–3.7) 0 a (0–2.6) 0 a (0.1–1.7) 0 a (0–1.6) 
D 6/100 6.0 (2.8–12.5) 6.9 (1.1–17.6) 4.5 (0.7–11.6) 4.1 (0.7–10.4) 
Campylobacter jejuni      
A 0/84 0 (0–4.4) 0 (0–7.1) 0 (0–4.7) 0 a (0–4.2) 
B 2008 0/88 0 (0–4.2) 0 (0–6.8) 0 (0–4.5) 0 a (0–4.1) 
B 2009 0/100 0 (0–3.7) 0 (0–5.9) 0 (0–4.0) 0 a (0–3.6) 
C 0/101 0 (0–3.7) 0 (0–5.9) 0 (0–3.9) 0 a (0–3.5) 
D 3/100 3.0 (1–8.5) 5.0 (1.4–13.6) 3.3 (0.9–9.1) 3.0 (0.8–8.2) 
Confidence intervals (CI) for true prevalence determined using Blakers analysis. Specificity = 100% for Escherichia coli and Campylobacter 
spp.; 98% for Salmonella spp. 
a Statistically confident that the pathogen was determined to be absent from the starling population. 
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Piggery D had the highest level of pig pathogenic serotypes of Escherichia coli, with an 
apparent prevalence of 12.0%, as shown in Table 4.8. The true prevalence of these 
pathogenic serotypes in starling populations on piggery D was 12.0% (CI 6.6–19.7%), 
followed by the 8.0% prevalence among starlings sampled in piggery B in 2008 (CI 3.6–
15.6%). Piggery C had the lowest true prevalence (1%; CI 0–5.1%).  
 
Table 4.8. Apparent prevalence and true prevalence of pig pathogenic serotypes of 
Escherichia coli determined by culture of cloacal samples, in European starling 
populations at four different piggeries sampled in 2008 and 2009 in South Australia. 
Piggery Positive/tested Apparent 
prevalence % 
95% 
confidence 
interval 
True 
prevalence % 
95% 
confidence 
interval 
A 3/84 3.6 1.2–10 3.6 1–9.7 
B 2008 7/88 8 3.9–15.5 8 3.6–15.6 
B 2009 4/100 4 1.6–9.8 4 1.4–9.7 
C 1/101 1 0.2–5.4 1 0–5.1 
D 12/100 12 7–19.8 12 6.6–19.7 
Confidence intervals for true prevalence determined using Blakers analysis. Sensitivity = 
100%, specificity = 100%. 
 
 
A number of different pig pathogenic serotypes of Escherichia coli were identified among 
samples from starlings including 987P serotype O:9, K88 serotype O:8 and O:141 K85ab, 
as shown in Table 4.9. Some serotypes differed among piggeries, while K88 fimbrial type 
was common on piggery A, C and D.   
 
 
Table 4.9. Pig pathogenic serotypes of Escherichia coli isolated from European starling 
populations at four different piggeries sampled in 2008 and 2009 in South Australia. 
Piggery Serotype 
A 3 K88 fimbrial types with non recognised serotype. 
B 2008 5 O9 – 987P serotypes. 
1 987P and 1 K99 fimbrial types with non recognised 
serotype. 
B 2009 4 O9 – 987P  serotype. 
C 1 K88 fimbrial types with non recognised serotype. 
D 3 O8 – K88 serotypes. 
1 O8 – 987P serotype  
1 O141 – K85ab 
6 K88 and 1 987P fimbrial types with non recognised 
serotype. 
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 4.3.3 Disease and pest control history of piggeries 
A description of the pig disease and pest control history of the piggeries included in this 
study is shown in Table 4.10. All four piggeries had persistent Escherichia coli infection in 
their pig herds, according to regular testing of faecal samples. Salmonella spp. and 
Campylobacter spp. were only detected on piggery D, where significant outbreaks of both 
pathogens had occurred in 2008 and 2009. Piggery A and C were both ecoshelter piggeries 
and, as such, practiced an all-in all-out production system, whereas piggeries B and D were 
both intensive piggeries practicing continuous flow production. All piggeries had other 
piggeries within a 20 km radius. Other facilities located within 20km included feed mills, 
feed lots, poultry units and garbage dumps. 
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Table 4.10. Health status and pest control for four piggeries in South Australia from 2007 
to 2009.  
 Piggery A  Piggery B  Piggery C  Piggery D  
Piggery type  Ecoshelter Intensive  Ecoshelter Intensive  
Production 
system 
All-in all-out  Continuous flow All-in all-out  Continuous flow 
Food storage Silos Silos Silos Silos 
Clothing/boot 
change 
Clothing and boots. 
Not changed 
between shelters 
Clothing and 
boots. Not 
changed between 
shelters 
No clothing and 
boots provided 
Clothing and boots. 
Not changed 
between shelters 
Starling 
control 
Window netting. 
Easily damaged. 
Considered 
ineffective 
Nil Nil Nil 
Other  facilities 
within 20 km of 
the piggery 
Two piggeries  Multiple piggery 
and poultry units; 
feedlots; feed 
mills; garbage 
dump 
Multiple 
piggeries; olive 
and grape 
orchards; feed 
mills 
Multiple piggery 
and poultry units; 
feed mills; garbage 
dump 
Escherichia coli 
presence  
Yes, laboratory 
confirmed in 2008 
Yes, laboratory 
confirmed. 
Outbreak in 2007
Yes, laboratory 
confirmed in 
2008 and 2009 
Yes laboratory 
confirmed  
2008: 5–15% stock. 
2009: 5% stock 
Escherichia coli 
control  
Short acting 
penicillin for 
affected pigs 
ECOvaca 
vaccination 
2007. Short 
acting penicillin 
for affected pigs 
Affected piglets 
treated with 
antibiotics in 
feed 
Neomycinb 
injection to affected 
piglets 
Salmonella spp.  
presence  
Not present, 
laboratory 
confirmed at 
slaughter in 2008 
No – no clinical 
symptoms 
No – no clinical 
symptoms 
Yes laboratory 
confirmed 
2008 – 25% stock 
2009 – 20% stock 
Salmonella spp. 
control 
Pressure clean and 
disinfect. 
Pig health 
monitoring schemec
Nil Nil Amoxild and 
Lincomycine in 
water to affected 
pigs 
Campylobacter 
spp. presence 
No – no clinical 
symptoms 
No – no clinical 
symptoms 
No – no clinical 
symptoms 
Yes laboratory 
confirmed 
2008 – 25% stock 
2009 – 25% stock 
Campylobacter 
spp. control 
Pressure clean and 
disinfect. 
Pig health 
monitoring scheme 
Dimetradiazole 
in feed 
Nil Amoxil, 
Lincomycin and 
Dimetradazolef in 
feed 
 
4.4 Discussion 
 
 
a Inactivated Escherichia coli vaccine;  bdef antibiotics; c The scheme involves the examination of 
pig carcases, tissues and organs at slaughter. Disease reports are then sent to producers. 
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4.4 Discussion 
 
Escherichia coli, Salmonella spp. and Campylobacter spp. are three bacterial pathogens of 
significance to the Australian pork industry.  Previous studies have shown that birds can 
carry these bacterial pathogens and excrete them in their faeces (Morishita et al. 1999; 
Tizard 2004; Benskin et al. 2009). Starlings carrying these pathogens have been detected 
on intensive agricultural farms, including intensive poultry farms (Craven et al. 2000) and 
cattle feedlots in the United States (Benskin et al. 2009; Gaukler et al. 2009). However, the 
risk of transmission of these pathogens from starlings to pigs has not previously been 
investigated, nor have the pathogens been investigated in starling populations in Australia.  
 
The presence of Escherichia coli, Salmonella spp. and Campylobacter spp. in starlings are 
not only important to the health of pigs, but also to the health of humans and other 
livestock. They are the predominant enteric pathogens in humans reported to the National 
Notifiable Disease Surveillance System in Australia (Blumer et al. 2003). The rate of 
infection for Salmonellosis has ranged from 33.2 to 90.7 infections per 100,000 individuals 
per month in 2011 in Australia (DHA 2012c). The rate of infection of Campylobacter spp. 
over this same period has ranged from 100.7 to 149.7 infections per month in 100,000 
people (DHA 2012b). Campylobacter jejuni is the most common bacterial cause of food-
borne disease in developed countries (Allos 2001). The consumption of contaminated pork 
is a proven route of infection (Beran 1995). 
 
The current study detected these three pathogens in starling populations around four 
piggeries in the south of Australia. Escherichia coli were detected in starlings on all four 
piggeries, while Salmonella spp. and Campylobacter spp. were only detected on one 
piggery. The sample size was sufficiently large to detect the presence of these pathogens in 
the starling populations at the minimum expected prevalence of 3.5%. This minimum 
prevalence level was based on detection of these pathogens within birds from past studies. 
The sensitivity of the laboratory techniques used to determine the true prevalence of the 
pathogens was not determined for the culture techniques used in the current study, and thus 
were based on assumptions. Consequently, the resulting true prevalence values must be 
provided as a range, making comparison with other studies less accurate. A range of 
sensitivity values were adapted from literature, though the sensitivity value of 60% was 
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probably much lower than the actual value, as culture techniques are one of the most 
accurate methods available for pathogen detection (Eriksson and Aspan 2007).  
 
The true prevalence of Escherichia coli varied greatly between piggeries, with the highest 
prevalence of Escherichia coli isolates, as well as pig pathogenic serotypes, found on the 
same piggery as the Salmonella spp. and Campylobacter spp. infected starlings (piggery 
D). Two previous studies identified Escherichia coli in starlings on cattle farms (Gaulker et 
al. 2009; Nielsen et al. 2004). While Nielsen et al. (2004) only identified Escherichia coli 
in a single starling out of an unknown number of total starlings sampled on a Danish cattle 
farm, Gaulker et al. (2009) reported a similar prevalence of these bacteria to the current 
study in starlings on a cattle feedlot in the United States (ranging from 38.0 to 83.3%). 
Morishita et al. (1999) determined an overall 21.4% prevalence of Escherichia coli in 
starlings in agricultural and urban settings, which was higher than that found among other 
species of birds, though within the prevalence range identified in the current study.  
 
Prevalence of Escherichia coli in piggery B differed among birds caught in 2008 and 2009. 
Similar variation between years in Escherichia coli prevalence in starlings was observed 
by Gaulker et al. (2009); however, this difference was attributed to the different sampling 
methods used over the two years. The same sampling method was used in 2008 and 2009 
in the current study. This shows that Escherichia coli level can vary greatly at a single 
location, and may be attributed to a number of different factors, including Escherichia coli 
level of infection in the pigs on the piggery. Piggery B experienced a diarrhoea outbreak 
related to Escherichia coli infection in late 2007, which aligns with the higher prevalence 
of these bacteria in starlings in 2008 compared to 2009. The level of infection of 
Escherichia coli in other livestock in the proximity of the piggery of study could also 
influence the prevalence of these bacteria in starlings.  
 
Season also impacts upon the pathogen prevalence. Gaulker et al. (2009) determined that 
faecal material collected from starlings during summer was four times more likely to be 
positive for Escherichia coli than during winter. Starlings in the current study were only 
sampled during summer for both years. Assuming the summer temperature conditions and 
the faecal material sampling technique by Gaulker et al. (2009) are equivalent to the 
conditions and cloacal sample in the current study, the reported prevalence in the current 
study may be the highest level of infection and seasonal effects might not apply. Seasonal 
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affects on the prevalence of these pathogens in starlings is an area that may require further 
investigation. 
 
Additional to the overall prevalence of Escherichia coli, the prevalence of pig pathogenic 
serotypes was also determined. Prevalence of pathogenic serotypes also differed by year. 
The common pathogenic serotypes O9;987P, O8;K88 and O8;987P are associated with 
diarrhoea in sucker pigs in Australia, while O141;K85ab is associated with diarrhoea in 
sucker and weaner pigs (Gyles, 1994). The remainder of the isolates were identified as the 
fimbrial types K88, K99 or 987P without recognised pig pathogenic O serotypes attached. 
These fimbrial types enable adherence and colonisation of epithelia in pigs, and are 
significantly correlated with pathogenicity and disease in pigs (Klemm 1985). Therefore, it 
can be assumed these isolates are also likely to be pathogenic despite the O serotype 
attachments not being identified as those most commonly isolated from pigs. Based on this 
information, the fimbrial types have been treated as pathogenic Escherichia coli in 
prevalence estimates in the results. This confirms that starlings are carrying a range of 
Escherichia coli serotypes that are infective and detrimental to pig health and production 
efficiencies in Australia.  
 
Salmonella spp. have been frequently isolated from birds in the past 40 years, this is 
considered to have coincided with the increase of artificial feeding of birds using backyard 
bird feeders (Tizard 2004). Salmonella spp. have been isolated from starlings at a 
prevalence range of 0.7 to 8.8% in a number of different serological studies since the 
1960s, none of which were conducted in Australia (Snoeyenbos et al. 1967; Morishita et al. 
1999; Kirk et al. 2002; Gaukler et al. 2009; Carlson et al. 2011a). A similar prevalence of 
Salmonella spp. was found in the starling population sampled at piggery D in the current 
study (4.1 to 6.9%). In the same piggery, 20 to 25% of pigs were reported to be infected 
with Salmonella spp. during the time of bird sampling. The serotypes of Salmonella spp. 
infecting pigs on this piggery were unknown, and as such could not be compared with 
those in the starlings. This could have been rectified by analysing samples from domestic 
pigs at the time of starling sampling. The fact that the other piggeries (A, B and C) did not 
report Salmonella spp. infection in pigs and the starling populations were also negative for 
these bacteria, seems to indicate that the level of infection in starling populations around 
piggery D is in some way related to the infection in pigs. Carlson et al. (2011a) reported 
the same correlation on cattle feedlots in the United States: Salmonella spp. infection in 
 84
cattle and starlings on the same farms were reported. They took the serological study 
further and identified that removal of starlings resulted in a subsequent drop in Salmonella 
spp. contamination of cattle feed and water (Carlson et al. 2011b).  
 
There were five Salmonella spp. serotypes isolated from the starlings on piggery D, one 
serotype isolated from two different starlings: Salmonella kottbus, Salmonella muenster, 
Salmonella anatum, Salmonella oranienburg, and two Salmonella bredeney isolates. Three 
of these serotypes (Salmonella anatum, Salmonella bredeney and Salmonella kottbus) have 
been isolated from pig carcasses at abattoirs in Australia (Hamilton et al. 2007). This 
suggests there is a correlation between serotypes present in starlings and pigs. Although the 
origin of the infection is unknown, these findings suggest there is a potential risk for 
pathogen transmission between pigs and starlings, with a subsequent public health 
implication.   
 
Campylobacter spp. have been isolated from many wild bird species with a very wide 
prevalence range (3.0 to 90.0%; Benskin et al. 2009). Limited information is available on 
the prevalence of Campylobacter spp. in starlings. A previous study in Sweden (Palmgren 
et al. 1997) reported a 3.2% prevalence of this bacteria among migrating starling 
populations in urban environments. Craven et al. (2000) found a single positive result from 
five intestinal and two cloacal samples from starlings at a broiler chicken farm in Georgia 
(US).  The current study provides an insight into the presence and approximate prevalence 
of infection of starling populations with Campylobacter spp. around piggeries in the south 
of Australia.  
 
Campylobacter jejuni was present in starlings at a true prevalence range of 0.8 to 13.6% on 
piggery D, depending on the different assumed sensitivities of the diagnostic tests. Similar 
to the case for Salmonella spp., pigs from piggery D were reported to be infected with 
Campylobacter spp. during the time of the current study. As such, the level of infection in 
starling populations around piggery D seems to be related to the infection in pigs. 
Additionally, the absence of the pathogen in starlings on piggeries A, B and C, although 
likely, could not be confirmed when the sensitivity used to determine the true prevalence 
was less than 100% due to the potential for false negatives. As a result the two lower 
sensitivities of 60 and 90% provided p-values greater than 0.05, which meant the pathogen 
could not be statistically confirmed to be absent from the population. However it is likely 
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that the sensitivity of the culture method used in this work would be greater than 90%, 
based on slightly different culture techniques used for Campylobacter spp. compared to 
those reported in the literature (Patton et al. 1981). As such, the likelihood that the 
pathogen is present in piggeries A, B and C is low. 
 
Results from the current study show that the prevalence of Campylobacter spp. in starlings 
is lower than in other wild birds. An average 37.0% prevalence of Campylobacter spp. 
among gull species (Larus), obtained from results of nine different studies, was reported in 
a review by Benskin et al. (2009). Despite the lower prevalence in starling populations, 
these birds should still be considered reservoirs of Campylobacter jejuni and a potential 
source of infection to pigs.  
 
The starling population in piggery D had an overall higher presence of enteropathogens 
than starlings in the other three piggeries. Piggery D was located at a minimum of 80 km 
from the other piggeries, while piggery A, B and C were in closer proximity to each other. 
Other facilities located within 20 km of piggery D were similar to those reported for the 
other piggeries in this study, such as other piggeries, poultry farms, feed mills and garbage 
dumps. There is the potential for movement of starlings between piggeries and the other 
facilities in close proximity to the piggeries. LeJeune et al. (2008) demonstrated that 
starlings move between dairy farms in the United States, feeding and associating with 
cattle on the different farms. The starlings shared the same communal night-time roost, and 
travelled at least 20 km each day between the dairy farms and their night-time roost. The 
movement of starlings between piggeries and other facilities and the implications this 
might have for transmission of disease between facilities has not been studied in Australia. 
 
The piggery type and production system may have been correlated to the prevalence of 
Escherichia coli burden in starlings. Piggery B and D, which had a higher prevalence of 
Escherichia coli, were both intensive piggeries, with a continuous flow of pig production, 
while piggery A and C were ecoshelters with an all-in all-out system. Continuous flow 
production is associated with an increased risk of pig infection with certain pathogens 
(Collins and Love 2003). The results of this study suggest that intensive piggeries may 
have a higher prevalence of enteropathogens among the pig population and associated 
starling population. A recent pig infection is also likely to be linked with the pathogen in 
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starlings. The increased pathogen prevalence in starling populations could interfere with 
control measures for diseases on these piggeries. 
 
The detection of the three pathogens in starlings seemed to correspond to the presence of 
the pathogens in pigs. Consequently, any methods implemented to control infection within 
domestic pigs should also include management of starling numbers. Removal of starlings 
from agricultural enterprises, or prevention of starling access to animal feed and water, 
could substantially reduce the risk of transmission of enterobacterial pathogens from 
starlings to livestock. Unfortunately there is no method currently available in Australia to 
substantially reduce starling numbers. The avicide, DRC-1339 is currently being used in 
the United States successfully, as demonstrated by Carlson et al. (2011b), on cattle 
feedlots. Until starling populations and access to piggery interiors can be effectively 
restricted, control of infection in pigs from these and other pathogens will be impaired. The 
magnitude of the risk of transmission of these pathogens from starlings to pigs has been 
evaluated in Chapter 7. 
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5 Rodent biosecurity threat to piggeries 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Rodents are well recognised as the source of infection for major outbreaks in humans and 
livestock of a number of infectious diseases, including Bubonic plague and Leptospirosis 
(Alderton 1996; Smythe et al. 2000). In Australia, rodents have been shown to be 
reservoirs of a large number of pathogens, including bacteria and parasites (Le Moine et al. 
1987; Amass and Clark 1999; Henderson 2009). As rodents thrive in locations where food 
is readily available, such as intensive livestock farms, their presence in substantial numbers 
can impact health and economic return. Their economic significance for farm enterprises is 
due to infrastructural damage, food loss and production loss. The presence of rodents also 
poses a risk of inter-species pathogen transmission. It is documented that each rodent can 
produce an average of 50 faecal deposits a day (Drummond, 2001) and one study recorded 
an average of 80 rodent faeces deposits per metre squared of stored feed per month on a 
number of different cattle farms in Scotland (Daniels et al. 2003). This contamination of 
food and the environment is of concern due to the presence of disease-causing organisms 
in rodent excrement (Twigg 1975). Rats (Black rat: Rattus rattus and Brown/Norway rat: 
Rattus norvegicus) and house mice (Mus musculus) have been shown to be reservoirs of 
many pathogens that can infect pigs, including endemic production-limiting pathogens as 
well as zoonotic pathogens (Le Moine et al. 1987; Amass, 1999; Henderson, 2009). As 
such, they pose a biosecurity threat to piggeries for the introduction, persistence, and 
reintroduction of a number of important pig pathogens.  
 
The four bacteria Brachyspira hyodysenteriae, Lawsonia intracellularis, Salmonella spp. 
and Brachyspira pilosicoli cause illnesses associated with gastrointestinal disruption 
leading to diarrhoea and a multitude of other symptoms that can negatively affect piggery 
productivity, and in some cases result in mortality. Brachyspira hyodysenteriae and 
Lawsonia intracellularis are arguably the two most important pathogens in Australian 
piggeries. Brachyspira hyodysenteriae is the causative pathogen of swine dysentery in pigs 
(Taylor 2006). This disease is one of the most economically important pig diseases in 
Australia (Cutler and Gardiner 1988). Polson et al. (1992) showed a difference in profit 
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margin of US $5.77 per 100 kg live weight pig between a swine dysentery infected piggery 
and a non-infected piggery. Despite it being known that rodents can be infected with this 
pathogen, the role that rats and mice have in the maintenance and reintroduction of swine 
dysentery on piggeries is poorly understood.  
 
Proliferative enteropathy, the disease caused by the pathogen Lawsonia intracellularis, is 
another economically important pig disease, which is present in the majority of Australian 
pig herds (Holyoake et al. 2010b). Holyoake et al. (2010a) estimated the cost of a 
subclinical and clinical infection of Lawsonia intracellularis to be AU $8.33 and AU 
$13.00 per slaughtered pig, respectively. This pathogen has been isolated from wild 
rodents in a piggery in the Czech Republic (Friedman et al. 2008). Lawsonia 
intracellularis has not been investigated previously in wild rodents in Australia, and 
limited information is available on prevalence of this pathogen in wild rodents in piggeries.   
 
The first objective of this study was to detect the presence of the pathogen Brachyspira 
hyodysenteriae in rat and mice populations on three large-scale commercial piggeries that 
had previously applied control methods for eradication of swine dysentery in their pig 
herds. Finding an infected rodent would indicate reinfection of pigs from a rodent source 
could be possible. The second objective was to detect the presence of the gastrointestinal 
pathogens Lawsonia intracellularis, Salmonella spp. and Brachyspira pilosicoli in rats and 
mice on these three piggeries. 
 
5.2 Materials and methods 
 
 5.2.1 Study location and sample size  
Three piggeries were selected using a non-random method based on the method 
implemented for control of swine dysentery in pig populations. Straw et al. (2006) 
provides an outline of the effective control measures for swine dysentery, which loosely fit 
into three main categories: control via medication without piggery depopulation, and 
control with full or partial depopulation (Swiss depopulation). Control via medication 
involves the administration of one of four drugs: Tiamulin, Valnemulin, Tylosin and 
Lincomycin, which are often administered in feed or in drinking water to adult pigs. Total 
depopulation involves removal of all animals from the piggery, disinfection of the piggery, 
and repopulation from uninfected stock. The Swiss depopulation method involves the 
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removal of only the high risk animals, such as the adult breeding stock, medication of 
remaining stock, and reintroduction of medicated animals and replacement stock from 
swine dysentery-free herds. 
 
Two Victorian piggeries were chosen: a piggery (A) with medication against the pathogen, 
and a piggery (B) where a total depopulation and repopulation was applied 18 months prior 
to rat capture. The third piggery (C), which was located in South Australia, had undergone 
a Swiss depopulation 3 months prior to rat capture. No mice were detected on any of the 
piggeries included in this study, so all subsequent methods and results relate to rats. 
 
Sixty rats were obtained from piggery A to detect the presence of pathogens, assuming a 
minimum expected prevalence in the rat population of 5%. One hundred and twenty rats 
were obtained from each of the piggeries B and C to detect the presence of pathogens, 
assuming a minimum expected prevalence in the rat population of 2.5%. The minimum 
expected prevalence used for piggery A was higher compared to piggeries B and C as this 
piggery was known to be swine dysentery infected and using in-feed medication. 
 
The sample size was calculated using the same methods shown in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1. 
 
 5.2.2 Sampling the rat population 
Between September and December 2009, a total of 300 rats were trapped or shot on the 
three piggeries included in the study as part of routine rodent control practices on each 
piggery. Live traps were laid inside piggeries in the walking aisles and along beams on 
walls for ten nights of trapping, prior to shooting. The live traps were baited with a mixture 
of peanut butter, oats, flour, honey and water (recommended by Luke Leung, University of 
Queensland). Traps were checked daily and the bait was refreshed every second day. Rats 
caught in live traps were euthanised humanely. Rats were shot inside the piggeries over 
one or two nights using .22 rifles and rat shot ammunition. All rats obtained in this capture 
exercise were frozen at −20 ºC immediately after removal from the piggery.  
 
 5.2.3 Piggery management and disease control history 
Information on pig health status and disease and pest control programs implemented on 
each piggery was obtained through administration of a written questionnaire to each of the 
piggery managers after sampling of the rats and laboratory tests were performed (Appendix 
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3). A single page letter outlining results obtained from the wild rats captured on their 
piggery was also attached to the four page questionnaire. The questionnaire contained open 
questions covering pig disease history and pest control management. Questions on disease 
history focused on information regarding the history of the presence of the pathogens of 
interest in this study, including how the pathogen presence was confirmed, and the 
medication used to control illness. Moreover, specific questions on the methods of control 
used for swine dysentery were also asked. Questions on rodent pest control obtained 
information about differences in the measures applied before and after swine dysentery 
disease control. The general husbandry questions requested information on the herd size, 
piggery production type (e.g. intensive, free-range or ecoshelter) and any other potential 
food sources for rodents within a 5 km radius of the piggery. The majority of pig health 
results were laboratory confirmed, and such were not affected by any potential bias created 
by knowing the rat results prior to questionnaire completion. 
 
 5.2.4 Laboratory testing 
5.2.4.1 DNA extraction 
Just prior to laboratory testing, rats were thawed and the large intestine was removed. 
Intestinal lining material and faecal material were obtained from the intestinal wall using a 
scalpel. Approximately 0.2 g of this intestinal material was placed in a 2 ml eppendorf tube 
and refrigerated prior to DNA extraction. 
 
A QIAamp DNA Stool Mini Kit (Qiagen), supplying all necessary preparations and 
materials, was used for isolation of DNA from stool for pathogen detection according to 
the manufacturer’s instructions. In summary, 0.18 to 0.22 g stool samples were 
homogenised and lysed in Buffer ASL for one min, incubated for five min at 70 ºC, 
homogenised for a further 15 sec, then centrifuged for one min at 20,000 × gravitational 
force (G). An inhibitEX Tablet was added to 1.2 ml of the supernatant and vortexed 
continuously for one min to absorb inhibitors. The sample was centrifuged for three min at 
20,000 × G, the pellet discarded and the supernatant centrifuged for a further three min on 
20,000 × G. Proteinase K (15 µl) was added to 200 µl of the supernatant, followed by 200 
µl Buffer AL, vortexed for 15 sec and incubated at 70 ºC for 10 min. Ethanol (200 µl) was 
then added, the mixture briefly vortexed, and then the mixture was applied to a QIAamp 
spin column (with a membrane inside) and centrifuged at 20,000 × G for one min. The 
sediment retained by the membrane was washed with two buffer solutions, Buffer AW1 
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(500 µl) and Buffer AW2 (500 µl), each followed by a centrifuge step. To eluate, Buffer 
AE (200 µl) was added to the QIAamp membrane and centrifuged at 20,000 × G for one 
min. The eluate was pipetted back onto the QIAamp membrane and centrifuged for a 
further one min at 20,000 × G. The 200 µl solution containing DNA was stored at 4 ºC 
prior to PCR analysis for a period no longer than 4 weeks. 
 
5.2.4.2 Multiplex PCR 
A multiplex PCR that detects the four pathogens, Brachyspira hyodysenteriae, Brachyspira 
pilosicoli, Salmonella spp., and Lawsonia intracellularis was used, following the 
methodology previously described by Elder et al. (1997).  The primer sequences used are 
shown in Table 5.1. 
 
 
Table 5.1. Primers used for a multiplex PCR amplification of Brachyspira hyodysenteriae, 
Lawsonia intracellularis, Salmonella spp. and Brachyspira pilosicoli (modified from Elder 
et al. 1997).  
Agent Primer sequences Product 
size (bp) 
Reference 
Brachyspira 
hyodysenteriae 
F 5’ GGTACAGGCGGAAACAGAC 3’ 
R 5’ TCCTATTCTCTGACCTACTG 3’ 
1557 Elder et 
al. 1994 
Lawsonia 
intracellularis 
F 5’ TATGGCTGTCAAACACTCGG 3’ 
R 5’ TGAAGGTATTGGTATTCTCC 3’ 
319 Jones et 
al. 1993 
Salmonella 
spp. 
F 5’ TGCCTACAAGCATGAAATGG 3’ 
R 5’ AAACTGGACCACGGTGACAA 3’ 
457 Stone et 
al. 1994 
Brachyspira 
pilosicoli 
F 5’ CATAAGTAGAGTAGAGGAAAGTTTTT 3’ 
R 5’ CTCGACATTACTCGGTAGCAACAG 3’ 
930 Fellstrom 
et al. 1997
 
 
Reactions were performed in a 25 µl total reaction volume, containing 12.5 µl of Qiagen 
Multiplex HotStart Mastermix Taq, 6.5 µl of nuclease-free water (Qiagen), 0.5 µl of both 
forward and reverse primers (Sigma Aldrich; Brachyspira hyodysenteriae primers final 
concentration 0.1 µM, other primers final concentration 0.2 µM) for Brachyspira 
hyodysenteriae, Brachyspira pilosicoli, Salmonella spp., and Lawsonia intracellularis. 
Two µl of extracted DNA sample was then added. For the negative control 2 µl of 
nuclease-free water was added. 
 
The PCR cycling involved an initial Taq polymerase activation step of 15 min at 95 ºC 
followed by 30 cycles of 45 sec at 94 ºC, 90 sec at 60 ºC, and 2 min at 72 ºC. A final 
extension step was performed for 15 min at 68 ºC. Eight µl of PCR product and 2 µl of 
 92
loading buffer were analysed by electrophoreses on a 1% agarose gel (ProBiogen) stained 
with ethidium bromide (Astral Scientific, Ohio, USA).  
 
5.2.4.3 Nox PCR 
A NADH (Nicotinamide adenine dinucleotide) oxidase gene (nox) PCR was used to 
specifically detect Brachyspira hyodysenteriae and confirm the multiplex PCR finding for 
this pathogen (Atyeo et al. 1999). This method is also able to correctly identify some non-
pathogenic Brachyspira spp. that may be classified as a pathogenic Brachyspira spp., such 
as Brachyspira hyodysenteriae using the multiplex PCR method. The use of this nox PCR 
method in addition to the standard PCR method is recommended by Atyeo et al. (1999). 
The primers used for specific amplification of Brachyspira hyodysenteriae are as follows: 
F 5’ TTAAAACAAGAAGGAACTACT 3’; R 5’ CTAATAAACGTCTGCTGC 3’ (Atyeo 
et al. 1999).  
 
Reactions were performed in a 25 µl total reaction volume, containing 12.5 µl of Qiagen 
Multiplex HotStart Mastermix Taq, 6.0 µl of nuclease-free water (Qiagen), 1.0 µl of both 
forward and reverse primers (Sigma Aldrich). Two and a half µl of extracted DNA sample 
was then added. For the negative control 2.5 µl of nuclease-free water was added. 
 
The PCR cycling involved an initial Taq polymerase activation step of 15 min at 95 ºC 
followed by 30 cycles of 30 sec at 94 ºC, 60 sec at 45 ºC, and 2 min at 72 ºC. A final 
annealing step was performed for 60 sec at 48 ºC, followed by an extension step for 10 min 
at 72 ºC. Eight µl of PCR product and 2 µl of loading buffer were analysed by 
electrophoreses on a 1% agarose gel (ProBiogen) stained with ethidium bromide (Astral 
Scientific, Ohio, USA).  
 
5.2.4.4 Quantitative real-time PCR for Lawsonia intracellularis 
All rat DNA samples (n = 299) were subject to an additional real-time qPCR (Collins et al. 
2011), using published primers and a Taq Man probe from Nathues et al. (2009), for the 
detection of Lawsonia intracellularis. Methods are described in full in Collins et al. (2011). 
 
 5.2.5 Data analysis 
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5.2.5.1 Calculation to substantiate freedom from pathogen and to estimate 
prevalence 
Calculations to substantiate freedom from a pathogen and to estimate true prevalence were 
conducted as for Chapter 4, Section 4.2.5.1.  
 
The sensitivity and specificity for the laboratory tests used are summarised in Table 5.2. 
The sensitivity and specificity of the multiplex PCR method used was not determined by 
the diagnostic laboratory. Therefore, as the methods used in this study were based on those 
developed by Elder et al. (1997), test sensitivity (100%) and specificity (98.2%) of the 
multiplex PCR for all pathogens were assumed to be the same as reported by these authors. 
As the sensitivity and specificity of the nox PCR method were unknown and not available 
in the literature, two different values (95% and 100%) of sensitivity and specificity were 
used to calculate freedom from the pathogen, based on values used for the multiplex PCR 
method. The sensitivity and specificity of the Lawsonia intracellularis real-time qPCR 
were 99% and 97%, respectively (Collins et al. 2011). 
 
 
Table 5.2. Specifications of the diagnostic tests used to determine the true prevalence of 
different pathogens in the rat population in two piggeries in Victoria and one piggery in 
South Australia in 2009.  
Pathogen Diagnostic test Sensitivity Specificity Reference 
Brachyspira 
hyodysenteriae, 
Brachyspira pilosicoli, 
Salmonellae spp. and 
Lawsonia intracellularis 
Multiplex PCR 100% 98.2% Elder et al. (1997)
Brachyspira 
hyodysenteriae, 
nox PCR 95%, 100% 95%, 100% Based on 
Multiplex PCR 
Lawsonia intracellularis Real-time qPCR 99% 97% Collins et al. 2011
nox – Nicotinamide adenine dinucleotide oxidase genes 
 
 
5.3 Results 
 
No mice were detected on any of the piggeries included in this study. A total of 300 rats 
were sampled and intestinal material from 299 rats was analysed, as the DNA sample from 
one rat could not be used. 
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 5.3.1 Probability of presence of pathogens in the rat populations.  
5.3.1.1 Multiplex PCR 
Brachyspira hyodysenteriae and Brachyspira pilosicoli were not detected in any of the rat 
samples collected on the three piggeries using the multiplex PCR method. The absence of 
these pathogens from the rat populations was statistically confirmed (Table 5.3). Lawsonia 
intracellularis and Salmonella spp. were present in the rat populations on all piggeries, 
except for Lawsonia intracellularis on piggery C (P = 0.005; Table 5.3). 
 
 
Table 5.3. Probability of presence of Lawsonia intracellularis, Salmonella spp, 
Brachyspira hyodysenteriae and Brachyspira pilosicoli in the rat populations at three 
piggeries in Australia in 2009. Rat samples were analysed using a Multiplex PCR. 
Piggery Positive/tested Probability of presence 
of pathogen in the rat 
population a 
Lawsonia 
Intracellularis 
  
A 1/60 0.080 
B 11/119 0.996 
C 0/120 0.005 
Salmonella spp. 
 
  
A 5/60 0.788 
B 2/119 0.110 
C 2/120 0.107 
Brachyspira hyodysenteriae  
 
  
A 0/60 0.015 
B 0/119 0.005 
C 0/120 0.005 
Brachyspira pilosicoli  
 
  
A 0/60 0.015 
B 0/119 0.005 
C 0/120 0.005 
a Probability that pathogen is present at the specified minimum expected prevalence 
(probability ≤0.05, shown in bold font, indicates population is free from pathogen at the 
minimum expected pathogen prevalence). Probability obtained using the hypergeometric 
formula described by Cameron and Baldock (1998) implemented with the FreeCalc 
version 2 software (Sergeant 2009b). Parameters used: Population size of 2,000 on each 
piggery; Minimum expected prevalence of 5% on piggery A and 2.5% on piggery B and C; 
Test sensitivity and specificity of 100% and 98.2%, respectively. 
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5.3.1.2 Nox PCR Brachyspira hyodysenteriae 
Brachyspira hyodysenteriae was not detected using the nox PCR method in any of the rat 
samples collected on the three piggeries. The absence of this pathogen from the rat 
populations was statistically proven depending on the sensitivity and specificity of the test 
used. As shown in Table 5.4, when the sensitivity and specificity of the diagnostic test 
were assumed 95% and 100% respectively, freedom from the pathogen could not be 
proved.  
 
Table 5.4. Probability of presence of Brachyspira hyodysenteriae in the rat populations at 
three piggeries in Australia in 2009. Rat samples were analysed using a nox PCR. 
 Probability of presence of the pathogen in the rat population at 
different test sensitivity (Se) and specificity (Sp)a 
Piggery Brachyspira 
hyodysenteriae 
Positive/tested 
Se 95% 
Sp 95% 
 
Se 95% 
Sp 100% 
 
Se 100% 
Sp 95% 
 
Se 100% 
Sp 100% 
 
A 0/60 0.002 0.052 0.002 0.044 
B 0/119 <0.001 0.053 <0.001 0.045 
C 0/120 <0.001 0.051 <0.001 0.044 
a Probability that pathogen is present at the specified minimum expected prevalence 
(probability ≤0.05, shown in bold font, indicates population is free from pathogen at the 
minimum expected pathogen prevalence). Probability obtained using the hypergeometric 
formula described by Cameron and Baldock (1998) implemented with the FreeCalc 
version 2 software (Sergeant 2009b). Parameters used: Population size of 2,000 on each 
piggery; Minimum expected prevalence of 5% on piggery A and 2.5% on piggery B and C; 
Estimated values for test sensitivity and specificity based on Multiplex PCR.  
 
 
5.3.1.3 Quantitative real-time PCR Lawsonia intracellularis 
Lawsonia intracellularis was found statistically to be present on all three piggeries using 
the real-time qPCR (Table 5.5). Methods and results for the detection of this pathogen 
using the real-time qPCR have been published by Collins et al. (2011). 
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Table 5.5. Probability of presence of Lawsonia intracellularis in the rat populations at 
three piggeries in Australia in 2009. Rat samples were analysed using a quantitative real-
time PCR. 
Piggery 
Lawsonia intracellularis 
Positive/tested a 
Probability of 
presence of pathogen 
is the rat population b 
A 50/60 1.000 
B 84/119 1.000 
C 5/120 0.363 
a Positive/tested results from reference: Collins et al. (2011). Colonisation and shedding of 
Lawsonia intracellularis in experimentally inoculated rodents and in wild rodents on pig 
farms. Veterinary Microbiology, 150, p 384–388. 
b Probability that pathogen is present at the specified minimum expected prevalence 
(probability ≤ 0.05 indicates population is free from pathogen at the minimum expected 
pathogen prevalence). Probability obtained using the hypergeometric formula described by 
Cameron and Baldock (1998) implemented with the FreeCalc version 2 software (Sergeant 
2009b). Parameters used: Population size of 2,000 on each piggery; Minimum expected 
prevalence of 5% on piggery A and 2.5% on piggery B and C; Test sensitivity and 
specificity of 99% and 97%, respectively. 
 
 
 5.3.2 Prevalence of pathogens in the rat populations.  
5.3.2.1 Multiplex PCR 
The apparent and true prevalence of Lawsonia intracellularis and Salmonella spp. is 
shown in Table 5.6. Lawsonia intracellularis was detected on piggery A and B with a true 
prevalence of 0% (CI 0–6.9%) and 7.6% (CI 3.1–14.2%), respectively. Salmonella spp. 
were detected in rats caught on all piggeries with a true prevalence of 6.7% (CI 1.6–16.4%) 
among rats on piggery A and 0% (CI 0–3.9%) on piggery B and C. 
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Table 5.6. Apparent prevalence and true prevalence of Lawsonia intracellularis and of 
Salmonella spp. determined by multiplex PCR reaction assay, in rat populations at three 
different piggeries sampled in 2009 in Australia. 
Piggery Positive/tested Apparent 
prevalence % 
95% 
confidence 
interval 
True 
prevalence % 
95% 
confidence 
interval 
Lawsonia 
Intracellularis 
 
     
A 1/60 1.7 0.3–8.9 0 0–6.9 
B 11/119 9.2 5.2–15.8 7.6 3.1–14.2 
C 0/120a 0 0–3.1 0 0–1.2 
Salmonella 
spp. 
 
     
A 5/60 8.3 3.6–18.1 6.7 1.6–16.4 
B 2/119 1.7 0.5–5.9 0 0–3.9 
C 2/120 1.7 0.5–5.9 0 0–3.9 
Confidence intervals for true prevalence determined using Blakers analysis. Sensitivity = 
100%, specificity = 98.2%;  
a Statistically confident that the pathogen was determined to be absent from the rat 
population. 
 
 
5.3.2.2 Quantitative real-time PCR Lawsonia intracellularis 
Lawsonia intracellularis was detected in rats caught on all piggeries using a real-time PCR 
assay (Table 5.7). It was detected at a true prevalence of 83.7% for piggery A, 70.4% for 
piggery B and 1.2% for piggery C.  
 
 
Table 5.7. Apparent prevalence and true prevalence of Lawsonia intracellularis 
determined by real-time PCR assay in rat populations at three different piggeries sampled 
in 2009 in Australia. 
Piggery Positive/testeda Apparent 
prevalence % 
95% 
confidence 
interval 
True 
prevalence % 
95% 
confidence 
interval 
Lawsonia 
Intracellularis 
 
     
A 50/60 83.3 72–90.7 83.7 71.9–92.1 
B 84/119 70.6 61.9–78 70.4 61.3–78.5 
C 5/120 4.2 1.8–9.4 1.2 0–6.5 
a Positive/tested results from reference: Collins et al. (2011). Colonisation and shedding of 
Lawsonia intracellularis in experimentally inoculated rodents and in wild rodents on pig 
farms. Veterinary Microbiology, 150, p 384–388. 
Confidence intervals for true prevalence determined using Blakers analysis. Sensitivity = 
99%, specificity = 97%. 
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5.3.2.3 A comparison of Lawsonia intracellularis true prevalence determined by 
enteric multiplex PCR and real-time PCR.  
The true prevalence of Lawsonia intracellularis in the rat population using the quantitative 
real-time PCR method was greater than that obtained using the multiplex PCR for the three 
piggeries. Figure 5.1 shows the true prevalence of this pathogen obtained using both 
diagnostic tests. The real-time PCR detected a true prevalence 83.7%, 62.8% and 1.2% 
higher than the multiplex PCR for piggery A, B and C, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. True prevalence of Lawsonia intracellularis in the rat population in three 
piggeries determined using a Multiplex PCR method (sensitivity = 100%, specificity = 
98.2%) and a Quantitative real-time PCR method (sensitivity = 99%, specificity = 97%). 
 
 
 5.3.3 Piggeries health management and disease control  
Piggery characteristics in relation to health management and disease control are shown in 
Table 5.8. All piggeries utilised a continuous flow production system and had other food 
sources within a 5km radius. All three piggeries utilised baiting and occasional shooting to 
control rat populations. 
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All three piggeries had confirmed swine dysentery in the past and chosen to undertake a 
control method to reduce the impacts of the disease in their piggery. Piggery A controlled 
swine dysentery in their pig herd from 2003 with dimetradazole (nitroimidazole antibiotic) 
in-feed. Piggery B applied a total depopulation technique spanning over 2007 and 2008 for 
control of swine dysentery in their pig herd. Piggery C applied a Swiss depopulation 
technique spanning over 2008 and 2009 for control of swine dysentery in their pig herd. 
 
On piggery A, Salmonella spp. were present in the pigs determined by pig isolates prior to 
swine dysentery control and during the time of rat collection. Lawsonia intracellularis, 
causative bacteria for proliferative enteropathy, was present in pigs on the piggery at the 
time of rat collection despite using in-feed medication with the antibiotics tiamulin, 
chlortetracycline or amoxycillin. This was confirmed by histopathology in thickened ileal 
mucosa of pigs at the abattoir prior to and after swine dysentery control. Brachyspira 
pilosicoli was assumed to be present in the pigs based on clinical symptoms and colitis 
prior to swine dysentery control and during the time of rat collection.  
 
Salmonella spp. were not detected on piggery B from pig isolates prior to or at the time of 
rat capture; however, a confirmed outbreak of Salmonella occurred on this piggery shortly 
afterwards (January 2010). Clinical proliferative enteropathy was present in pigs on the 
piggery at the time of rat collection despite using in-feed medication with tiamulin, 
chlortetracycline or amoxicillin. Lawsonia intracellularis was confirmed in randomly 
collected faeces from grower and finisher pigs via PCR prior to rat capture. Brachyspira 
pilosicoli was not detected on farm by piggery managers or veterinarian, based on the 
absence of clinical symptoms prior to or at the time of rat capture.  
 
Salmonella spp. were confirmed to be present in pigs on piggery C based on pig isolates 
prior to swine dysentery control and during the time of rat collection. There were no 
clinical symptoms of clinical proliferative enteropathy present in pigs on the piggery at the 
time of rat collection. Brachyspira pilosicoli was assumed to be present in the pigs by the 
piggery manager and veterinarian, based on clinical symptoms prior to swine dysentery 
control and during the time of rat collection.  
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Table 5.8. Health status and pest control for three piggeries: two located in Victoria, and 
one located in South Australia from 2003 to 2009.  
 Piggery A Piggery B Piggery C 
Intensive piggery 
size (breeding 
sows) 
2,500 11,600 7,500 
Production system Continuous flow Breeder continuous, 
all-in all-out by 
shed 
Breeder continuous, 
all-in all-out by shed 
Rat control Bait and shoot 2 hours per week 
dedicated to 
baiting. Occasional 
shooting 
Baits were checked 
twice a week prior to 
Swiss depopulation. 
Baiting became 
irregular post Swiss 
depopulation. 
Shooting 
Other food sources 
within 5 km radius 
Multiple intensive 
piggery and poultry 
units. One swine 
dysentery positive 
piggery within 7 km
Multiple intensive 
poultry units. 
One feed mill 
Time since last 
confirmed 
Brachyspira 
hyodysenteriae 
February 2003 October 2005 2005 
Date of control 
implementation for 
Brachyspira 
hyodysenteriae 
March 2003 Start 18th October 
2007. 
Restock 24th March 
2008 
February 2008 – July 
2009. 
Control method Medication Total depopulation Swiss depopulation 
Salmonella spp. 
presence prior to 
and at time of rat 
collection (y/n) 
Yes, laboratory 
confirmed in 2003 
and 2009 
No Yes, laboratory 
confirmed in 2008 
and 2009 
Lawsonia 
intracellularis 
presence (y/n) 
Yes – clinical, PCR 
verified in 2009 
Yes – clinical, PCR 
verified in 2009 
Yes – sub clinical, 
PCR verified in 2008 
and 2009 
Brachyspira 
pilosicoli presence 
(y/n) 
Suspected – clinical 
symptoms in 2009 
No – no clinical 
symptoms 
Suspected – clinical 
symptoms in 2008 
and 2009 
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5.4 Discussion 
 
Previous studies have identified that rats can be infected with a number of important 
pathogens that can affect pigs (Hampson et al. 1991; Friedman et al. 2008; Joens 1980). 
However, the risk of transmission of these pathogens from rodents to pigs has not 
previously been investigated in detail. The foundation knowledge required to assess this 
risk includes identifying the biosecurity threat rats pose to piggeries for the introduction, 
persistence and reintroduction of pathogens; as well as identifying the prevalence of these 
pathogens in the rat populations on piggeries.  
 
To further previous research, the current study investigated the presence of Brachyspira 
hyodysenteriae in the rat population on three piggeries that had undertaken various 
procedures to control and eradicate swine dysentery from the pigs. Brachyspira 
hyodysenteriae was not detected in the large intestine of any of the 299 rats obtained from 
the three piggeries included in this study. The results of the multiplex PCR were confirmed 
by the use of the nox PCR method which did not detect any Brachyspira hyodysenteriae 
pathogens either.  
 
The nox PCR was developed to identify only the pathogenic Brachyspira spp. serotype 
hyodysenteriae, whereas the multiplex PCR may identify other Brachyspira spp. It is also 
sensitive enough to detect as few as 10-10 Brachyspira hyodysenteriae organisms per gram 
of faeces (Atyeo et al. 1999) whereas the multiplex PCR has been proven to be sufficiently 
sensitive to detect between 0.1 and 1 Brachyspira hyodysenteriae organisms per gram of 
faeces (Elder, 1994). The only instance in which the likelihood of the pathogen being 
absent from the population was not statistically confirmed was if the nox PCR method had 
a sensitivity of 95% and a specificity of 100%, although the P-values were very close to 
0.05. As the nox PCR is able to detect fewer Brachyspira hyodysenteriae organisms per 
gram of faeces than the multiplex PCR, the sensitivity is likely to be close to 100%. As 
such, considering the estimated population size, the number of rats sampled on each 
piggery, and the sensitivity and specificity of the diagnostic tests, the results indicate that 
the rat population was free of Brachyspira hyodysenteriae at the minimum expected 
prevalence of 5% on piggery A and 2.5% on piggery B and C.  
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Previous studies have reported the presence of Brachyspira hyodysenteriae in one rat on an 
Australian piggery out of 44 sampled (Hampson et al. 1991) and mice on piggeries in the 
United States (Joens and Kinyon 1982) at a prevalence of 2.5%, and in Sweden at a 
prevalence of 37.5% (Fellström et al. 2004). The sample size in the current study was 
sufficiently large to prove freedom from the pathogen in the rat population at the minimum 
expected prevalence with 95% confidence. Although the study cannot prove pathogen 
freedom if the pathogen is present at a lower prevalence, previous studies support the 
minimum expected prevalence chosen for the sample size calculations. Moreover, only a 
low level of infection in the rat populations in our study would have been needed for 
detection of the pathogen using both PCR diagnostic tests.  
 
Joens (1980) has shown that Brachyspira hyodysenteriae exists in the intestines of a mouse 
for 180 days after infection. This carrier state duration has not been estimated for rats. 
Negative detection of Brachyspira hyodysenteriae in the current study suggests that the 
pathogen, if present in the rat population before swine dysentery control in pigs, has not 
replicated and maintained in the rat population over the period of time since its control, or 
alternatively, the pathogen in rats has been controlled and eliminated by the medication 
given to pigs on piggery A and C.  
 
Brachyspira pilosicoli was also not detected in any rats caught on the three piggeries in 
this study. The presence of Brachyspira pilosicoli in rats has not been previously detected, 
though it has been detected in other animal species, including 18% of exotic waterbirds in 
a botanical garden in Perth, Australia (Oxberry et al. 1998) and 8% of wild ducks captured 
at a piggery in Australia (Oxberry and Hampson, 2003). The presence of this pathogen in 
the domestic pigs on the piggeries at the time of rat collection was also unconfirmed. This 
could have been rectified by analysing samples from the domestic pigs at the time of rat 
sample analysis. 
 
Rat populations on piggeries A, B and C were identified as positive for Lawsonia 
intracellularis via the real-time qPCR at different true prevalence levels. The prevalence 
was higher on piggery A and B where the pigs were exhibiting clinical symptoms of 
proliferative enteropathy, unlike piggery C where the pigs were not exhibiting symptoms. 
The prevalence of this pathogen on piggery A and B was notably higher than the 17% 
reported for rats caught on piggeries in the Czech Republic, where pigs had proliferative 
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enteropathy (Friedman et al. 2008). However, this prevalence was obtained by a single 
positive rat sample out of six rats caught and sampled from four different piggeries. 
Despite the low number of rats sampled by Friedman et al. (2008), the presence of 
Lawsonia intracellularis in rats from infected piggeries was confirmed. Where clinical 
disease is present in a piggery, it seems likely that infected rats will be identified.  
 
The real-time qPCR was also capable of determining the amount of bacteria being excreted 
in faeces by the rats. Of the infected rats on piggery A, 40% were excreting greater than 
105 Lawsonia intracellularis organisms per gram of faeces, and on piggery B this 
proportion was 18% (Collins et al. 2011). One rat was even excreting as many as 1010 
organisms per gram of faeces. Pigs dosed with 105 Lawsonia intracellularis organisms 
develop infection (Collins and Love 2007). Due to this high amount of bacterial excretion 
in rats, a single faecal deposit from approximately 40% of rats on a piggery with 
proliferative enteropathy would be sufficient to infect pigs. This has implications on 
control of Lawsonia intracellularis in piggeries. Control of the disease through destocking 
or medication can not be a gradual process as infected rats can retransmit the infection to 
naïve pigs, recirculating the infection.  
 
The 299 rat DNA samples were also subjected to an older detection method, the multiplex 
PCR. This method was not capable of determining the quantity of bacteria in rat excrement 
as with the real-time qPCR. Using the multiplex PCR Lawsonia intracellularis was found 
statistically to be present in rats on piggeries A and B at a much lower true prevalence than 
that found using the real-time qPCR method. The reason for this variation in prevalence 
estimates between these two methods may be for two different reasons: the differences in 
the level of detection of the organism per gram of faeces, or the performance of the 
multiplex PCR below published standards.  
 
The sensitivity and specificity of the two PCR methods are quite similar (sensitivity 100% 
and specificity 98.2% for the multiplex PCR;  99% sensitivity and specificity 97% for the 
real-time qPCR); however, the detection levels are different. The multiplex PCR was 
shown to detect 103 organisms per gram of faeces (Jones et al. 1993), while the new real-
time qPCR method to date has been tested at a detection level of 108 to 104 organisms per 
gram of faeces (Collins et al. 2011). The real-time qPCR method may be able to detect 
fewer than the 103 organisms per gram of faeces that the multiplex PCR is capable of 
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detecting. It is recommended that detection levels in the range of 101–104 organisms per 
gram of faeces should be assessed for the real-time qPCR. Additional to this disparity in 
detection levels and likely of higher importance is the possibility that the multiplex PCR in 
the current study was not performing to the standard sensitivity and specificity levels 
described in published literature. To determine whether this is an issue, further validation 
within the laboratory may be necessary.  
 
The rat populations from the three piggeries were positive for Salmonella spp. However, 
the true prevalence for this pathogen was higher in piggery A (1.6–16.4%) than piggery B 
and C (0–3.9%). Wild rats have previously been confirmed as carriers of Salmonella spp. 
One of the first studies confirming the presence of Salmonella spp in rats was in a piggery 
near Baltimore in the United States, where two positive rats were detected (Davis, 1948). 
In Brittany, west of France, Salmonella spp. were isolated from the faeces of one out of 40 
rats captured on 15 different piggeries (Le Moine et al. 1987). The health of the pigs in 
these piggeries was not determined, though the piggeries were thought to be representative 
of the size and management of intensive piggeries in the region.  
 
Information collected from the piggeries consulting veterinarians around the time of rat 
collection indicated that clinical proliferative enteropathy was present in pigs on piggery A 
and B, and sub-clinical proliferative enteropathy, which does not exhibit clinical signs, was 
confirmed to be present on piggery C from laboratory analysis. Piggery B also experienced 
unexplained development of severe Lawsonia intracellularis infections in individual pigs 
in pens. The history of Lawsonia intracellularis in pigs aligns with the prevalence detected 
in the rat population in these piggeries, especially when results from the real-time qPCR 
are considered. Similarly, the history of Salmonella spp. infection in pigs also aligns with 
the findings in the rat populations. Pigs at piggeries A and C were PCR positive at the time 
of rat sampling, while piggery B was negative. However, pigs from Piggery B had 
Salmonella spp. detected and confirmed via laboratory testing and post-mortem 
examination 4 months after detection of this pathogen in rats. The true prevalence of this 
pathogen in rats on piggery B and C was zero, though it was not statistically proven to be 
absent from the rat population. As such, assuming the two positive results in rats for 
piggeries B and C were not false positives, it could be determined that rats may be able to 
contribute to the maintenance of Salmonella spp. within a piggery, cycling it among rats 
and from rats to pigs and pigs to rats. There is also the real possibility that the pathogen 
 105
could have been transmitted to the domestic pigs on piggery B by the infected and 
shedding rats. 
 
All piggeries in this study were experiencing a large burden of rats, irrespective of the 
different rodent control programs applied in each piggery. This might be due to the level of 
effectiveness of the different methods for rodent control. Anticoagulant poison baits are the 
most common technique used for control of rodents in Australian piggeries (Chapter 2) as 
well as internationally (Corrigan et al.1992; Endepols et al. 2003). This was also the main 
method used in the study piggeries. However, this method is not effective in situations 
where a large amount of alternative food to the poison bait is freely available (Quy et al. 
1992; Gomez et al. 2001; Leung and Clark 2005).  
 
The three piggeries involved in the current study had alternate sources of food within a 5 
km radius. Piggery A had three piggeries within a close proximity, one 3.5 km away, one 5 
km away, and a swine dysentery-infected piggery 7 km away. Rats generally have small 
home ranges in the presence of a food source. The minimum home range of Rattus rattus is 
estimated to be 17 m in piggeries with sufficient food sources (Leung and Clark 2005). 
Long-range movements are mainly as a result of translocation or food removal. Rattus 
rattus translocated from their home territory have been recorded travelling up to 8 km to 
return (Pippin 1961).  In the case of food resource removal, Rattus norvegicus have been 
recorded travelling a 3.3 km round trip in a single day in search of a new food source in the 
United Kingdom (Taylor and Quy 1978). For Brachyspira hyodysenteriae, it is known that 
mice shed sufficient quantities to infect pigs. Pigs may be infected with doses between 107 
and 109 Brachyspira hyodysenteriae per gram (Jacobson et al. 2004), while mice have been 
recorded shedding 107 to 2.2 × 108 Brachyspira hyodysenteriae per gram of faeces, with 
four out of four pigs becoming infected when exposed to the infected mice in this same 
study (Joens 1980). The quantity shed by rats has not been studied, and as such, 
quantification via real-time qPCR is recommended to assess the risk posed by migrating 
rats from one piggery to another in the event of a piggery closure. With this additional 
information the role of rodents as a potential means of reinfection of piggeries would be 
better understood. 
 
Results from this study indicate that the rat populations of the study piggeries were free 
from Brachyspira hyodysenteriae; however, the proximity of other sources of food could 
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pose a risk of contact with other rat populations that may carry the pathogen. This study 
also provides accurate information on the level of infection in the rat population in 
piggeries of different pathogens of economical importance for the pig industry. The study 
highlights the importance of including rodent control techniques on piggeries in 
conjunction with health management programs, particularly for Lawsonia intracellularis, 
to reduce the possibility of transmission and spread of disease through rodents and 
subsequently improve efficiency of the health programs.  
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6 Feral pig biosecurity threat to piggeries 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Feral pigs are a wild animal reservoir responsible for several major exotic disease 
outbreaks in livestock internationally, including classical swine fever (Fritzemeier et al. 
2000), African swine fever (Penrith and Vosloo 2009) and pseudorabies (Hahn et al. 2010). 
In Australia, feral pigs are known reservoirs of important endemic pathogens, many of 
which are transmissible to other species including humans, and all of which are 
transmissible to domestic pigs (Pavlov et al. 1992; Godfroid 2002; Phillips et al. 2009). As 
feral pigs move through their home ranges they may come within close proximity of 
commercial piggeries (Wu et al. 2011). Feral pigs have been shown to move within 100 m 
of domestic piggeries in the United States, suggesting that contact between wild and 
domestics pigs is possible (Wyckoff et al. 2009). Most pathogen prevalence studies in feral 
pigs to date have aimed to detect pathogens subject to mandatory notification and zoonotic 
pathogens of general risk to humans and livestock. In contrast, Baker et al. (2011) and 
Phillips et al. (2009) investigated the prevalence of domestic pig production-limiting 
pathogens in feral pigs. However, neither study investigated the presence of these 
pathogens in feral pig populations near piggeries.  
 
Despite the acknowledgement of the potential for production-limiting and notifiable 
pathogen transmission from feral pigs to domestic pigs in Australia, no prevalence surveys 
have been conducted in the vicinity of piggery facilities. The first objective of the research 
presented in this chapter was to detect the presence of the notifiable pathogen Brucella suis 
and the four production-limiting bacterial pathogens Leptospira spp., Lawsonia 
intracellularis, Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae and Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae, in a 
feral pig population within a 10 km radius of two large-scale commercial piggeries in 
Southern Queensland. The second objective was to investigate the movement pattern of 
individual pigs within the feral population in the vicinity of these two piggeries. 
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6.2 Materials and methods 
 
 6.2.1 Study location and sample size  
Southern Queensland was purposively selected based on the presence of both feral pigs 
and commercial piggeries and the conduct of a feral pig ecological damage study in this 
region. The ecological damage study by the Queensland Murray Darling Committee 
(QMDC) aimed to assess the impact of feral pigs on agriculture and natural ecology, and 
determine whether management of feral pig populations reduced these impacts (Gentle et 
al. 2011). Feral pigs were captured or shot during the QMDC study which enabled 
serological samples to be obtained for this current study. The two piggeries involved in the 
study incorporated all pig production facility types: the first piggery was a free-range 
piggery shown in Figure 6.1, while the second piggery was an intensive piggery with some 
ecoshelter units shown in Figure 6.2 (piggery identification is confidential). The intensive 
piggery had three different units separated from each other for disease management 
purposes, including 20 ecoshelters separated from the two intensive housing units. The 
current study considered that the feral pigs in the study region (including both piggeries) 
constituted a single population. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Free-range piggery included in a feral pig pathogen detection survey in 2010 
and 2011 in Southern Queensland, Australia. 
  
1                      0.5                    0                                                 1 
Kilometres 
Scale 
 109
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2. An intensive piggery and ecoshelters included in a feral pig pathogen detection 
survey in 2010 and 2011 in Southern Queensland, Australia. 
 
 
A minimum of 27 feral pigs needed to be sampled to detect the presence of pathogens at a 
prevalence of 10% or greater in the feral pig population surrounding the piggeries. The 
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sample size (n) was calculated to detect a pathogen in a finite population using the 
following formula from Dohoo et al. (2003; Eq 2.17):  
 
( ) 

 −
−−=
2
11 /1 DNn Dα ....................................................................................Equation 6.1 
 
where: α = 0.05 (1-confidence level); 
N = 175.5 (population size). The feral pig population size ranged from 0.34–3.51 
pigs km-2 (Gentle et al. 2011). To ensure sufficient feral pigs were sampled, the 
highest population density estimate of 3.51 pigs km-2, equalling 175.5 pigs within a 
50 km radius of piggeries, was used;  
D = N multiplied by minimum expected prevalence (10%). 
 
In addition, sows from the intensive piggery were also sampled to detect Leptospira spp., 
Lawsonia intracellularis and Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae. A minimum of 59 sows needed 
to be sampled to detect the presence of pathogens at a prevalence of 5% or greater in the 
domestic sow population. The prevalence of some pathogens was expected to be lower in 
the domestic sows (5%) than in the feral pigs (10%), necessitating a larger sample size to 
detect pathogen presence. Consent to sample pigs from the free-range piggery was not 
granted. 
 
The sample size for domestic sows was calculated using Equation 4.1 for an infinite 
population, shown in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1.  
 
 6.2.2 Sampling in the feral pig population 
Blood samples were collected from 83 feral pigs, and lung samples from 72 of these 
animals. Feral pigs were captured within 10 km from each piggery, in agreement with feral 
pig movement capabilities (Saunders and Kay 1996; Dexter 1999; Mitchell et al. 2009). A 
proportion of the feral pigs sampled were shot from a helicopter as a part of the feral pig 
ecological damage study (n=33); the remainder were trapped within 5 km of either piggery 
(n=50) using swing door box pig traps (BLASK Engineering, Australia) and 43 were shot. 
The sex and approximate age of all sampled animals was recorded. Their age was 
approximated based on their body size as defined by Phillips et al. (2009): weaners were 
<10 weeks old and <10 kg; adults >1 year old and >35 kg; and juveniles between the two 
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age groups. All capture and handling procedures were approved by the Department of 
Primary Industries and Fisheries Animal Ethics Committee (reference number CA 
2009/10/386). 
 
A blood sample was collected from the jugular of all euthanised feral pigs (n=76) within 5 
min of euthanasia in an 8 ml vacuette with clot separator tube (Interpath). One quarter of 
lung from the right, dorsal lobe was collected from 72 of the euthanised animals. Samples 
were kept chilled in eskies throughout the day. Serum was removed from the blood sample 
each afternoon and divided into three 2 ml eppendorf tubes using disposable pipettes, then 
frozen along with the lung samples at −20 ºC.  
 
Of the 50 feral pigs trapped, seven were sedated with either Zoletil (4–9 mg/kg) or Xylazil 
(1.1–2.2 mg/kg) via intramuscular injection into the muscle of the hind leg in order to be 
fitted with a radio collar (Sirtrack®, Havelock North, New Zealand). Collars were attached 
around the neck of each pig and secured using the provided fasteners. Collared feral pigs 
were larger than 15 kg and were an even gender spread: four females and three males. The 
fitted collars included an ultra high frequency (UHF) radio for tracking and a Global 
Positioning System (GPS) data-logger; tasking rates were programmed to acquire fixes at 
30 min intervals from activation. These fixes are stored on-board the collar and needed to 
be retrieved from the pigs to download the acquired data points. Blood samples were 
obtained from the collared pigs from the main vein on the hind leg using a size 19-gauge 
needle syringe. Blood samples were then processed as above. A single collared male, Male 
2, had an additional blood sample taken on recapture for collar retrieval. The radio collars 
were fitted with the aim to collect six months of movement data per pig; however, four 
collars were retrieved after these pigs were shot by hunters before the six-month period 
was complete. The remaining pigs were tracked by UHF after six months and when located 
were shot. One female could not be located and hence the collar could not be retrieved. 
 
 6.2.3 Sampling in the domestic pig population 
Blood samples were collected from 86 adult sows from the intensive piggery on the 16th of 
August and the 14th of October, 2010, at an abattoir. All sows sent to the abattoir by the 
intensive piggery on these dates as part of routine culling due to age, decreased 
performance or illness were sampled. Blood samples were collected from the jugular vein 
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into a small specimen jar immediately post mortem. Serum samples were extracted and 
divided into three 2 ml eppendorf tubes using disposable pipettes, then frozen at −20 ºC.  
 
 6.2.4 Piggery management and disease control history 
Information on pig health status and disease and pest control programs implemented on 
each piggery was obtained through administration of a written questionnaire to each of the 
piggery managers after sampling of the feral pigs and laboratory tests were performed 
(Appendix 4). A single page letter outlining results obtained from the feral pigs captured 
near their piggery was also attached to the four page questionnaire. The questionnaire 
contained open questions covering pig disease history and pest control management. 
Questions on disease history focused on information regarding the history of the presence 
of the pathogens of interest in this study, including how the pathogen presence was 
confirmed, and the medication used to control illness. Questions pertaining to feral pig 
control focused on the control measures in place to manage the feral pig population on 
their property. The general husbandry questions requested information on the herd size and 
piggery production type. The majority of pig health results were laboratory confirmed, and 
such were not affected by any potential bias created by knowing the feral pig results prior 
to questionnaire completion. 
 
 6.2.5 Laboratory testing 
6.2.5.1 Brucella suis 
Serologic testing of antibodies against Brucella spp. was done by the Elizabeth MacArthur 
Agricultural Institute (Menangle, NSW, Australia). For Brucella suis, a Rose Bengal test 
(RBT) was used, followed by confirmation of those that tested positive using a 
complement fixation test (CFT), following Australian standard diagnostic techniques for 
animal diseases (Corner 1993). Tests are not specific for Brucella suis, as antibodies to 
Brucella abortus and Brucella melitensis may also be detected; however, the latter two 
pathogens are considered to be absent from Australia (WAHID 2010). The RBT is a spot 
agglutination test. Serum from the feral pig (25 μl) and positive and negative controls were 
mixed with an antigen (25 μl, BENGA TEST®- Rose Bengal stained acidified buffered 
Antigen, Synbiotics Corporation) on an 80-well perspex plate (World Health Organisation 
perspex plate). The serum and antigen were gently mixed together and agglutination scored 
between 1 and 3, depending on the amount of agglutination present. The RBT is appropriate 
for rapid screening of samples.  
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A confirmation CFT was used to increase the specificity of the results. The complement is a 
constituent of serum and plays an important part in the development of immunity. Antibodies 
and antigens in serum absorb or fix complement (Corner 1993). In the CFT for Brucella spp. 
the serum to be tested was initially incubated at 60 ºC for 45 min to inactivate any 
complement present in the serum. A diluted CFT antigen was added to 1/4, 1/8, 1/16, 1/32, 
1/64, 1/128 dilutions of serum and positive and negative controls. This antigen will bind with 
any antibodies that may be present in the test serum. This was followed by addition of a 
dilution of complement (Guinea Pig Serum, Lyophilised). This added complement binds with 
any antibody-antigen complex that may have formed. Sensitised red blood cells were then 
added. If the added complement has bound to antibody-antigen complexes, then the red blood 
cells will not lyse. Once spun, the red blood cells will coalesce at the bottom of the microtitre 
plate, forming a red spot, indicating a positive result. A negative result will be a uniform pink 
colour to the well contents, due to lysis of the red blood cells by the free, unbound 
complement.  
 
6.2.5.2 Leptospira spp. 
Testing for Leptospira spp. was undertaken at the Queensland Health Forensic and 
Scientific Services Laboratory (Brisbane, Queensland, Australia), a World Health 
Organisation, United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization and Office International 
des Epizooties accredited laboratory. A microscopic agglutination test (MAT) was used for 
Leptospira spp. identification (Faine 1994). The MAT is used most frequently and is the 
preferred method for diagnosis of Leptospira spp. in reference laboratories due to its high 
degree of sensitivity and specificity (Bajani et al. 2003). The density of cells that 
agglutinate, or clump together, determines whether a serum is positive or negative. The 
serum to be tested was diluted 1: 25–1: 6400 in phosphate-buffered saline at pH 7.4 (PBS), 
in microtitre plates (Millipore, North Ryde, Australia). Live Leptospira cell suspensions 
representing one of a panel of 16 known Australian serovars were then added in the same 
quantity to each well, including the control cells. Serovars included in the panel of live 
Leptospira included pomona, hardjo, tarassovi, grippotyphosa, celledoni, australis, zanoni, 
robinsoni, canicola, kremastos, szwajizak, medanensis, bulgarica, arborea and topaz. The 
serum and live suspensions were gently mixed together and incubated for 90 mins at 30 ºC. 
The level of agglutination in each cell was examined by dark-field microscopy at a 
magnification of ×100. The endpoint was the weakest dilution of serum that agglutinated at 
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least 50% of the Leptospires. A MAT titre of at least 1:50 was necessary to determine a 
sample positive.  
 
6.2.5.3 Lawsonia intracellularis 
Serological detection of antibodies against Lawsonia intracellularis was done by Ace 
Laboratory Services (White Hills, Victoria Australia). An enzyme-linked immunosorbent 
assay (ELISA) antibody test kit was used, following the methods described in the manual 
distributed with the testing kit (BioScreen ELISA, Svanova, Sweden). The ELISA was 
used to analyse the samples as a quicker and cheaper alternative to the PCR test. 
Microplates were provided with the testing kit that were sensitised with Lawsonia 
intracellularis antigens in the bottom of each well. After addition of 100 μl of a 1:10 
dilution of each individual sample and positive and negative controls to the wells, antibodies 
present in the samples would bind with the antigen in the wells. The microplate was gently 
shaken to ensure mixing and incubated for 1 hr at 37 ºC. Plates were washed three times 
using a dilution of the wash buffer supplied. An anti-Lawsonia intracellularis-horseradish 
peroxidase conjugate was added to each well, in a quantity of 100 μl, and re-incubated for 1 
hr at 37 ºC. This conjugate binds to any free Lawsonia intracellularis antigens in the 
bottom of each well. The microplate was washed again to remove excess conjugate and 
100 μl of a buffered peroxidase substrate was added to each well. The plate was shaken and 
then incubated at room temperature for 10 min. A stop solution in a quantity of 50 μl was 
then added to each well to halt the reaction. The addition of the buffered peroxidase substrate 
reveals the enzyme linked to the conjugate as a coloured product. The absence of antibodies 
for Lawsonia intracellularis in a sample will result in a more intense colour reaction. The 
optical densities of the wells were read at 450 nm in a microplate spectrophotometer. A 
percentage of inhibition value greater than 30% was considered positive. 
  
6.2.5.4 Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae 
Serologic testing of antibodies against Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae was done by the 
Elizabeth MacArthur Agricultural Institute (Menangle, NSW, Australia). An ELISA 
antibody test kit was used to detect Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae, with the procedures 
detailed in the kit manual (Idexx laboratories, manufactured Westbrook, Maine, USA). The 
ELISA method is very similar to that used for Lawsonia intracellularis antibody detection. 
The antigen-coated plates will bind any antibodies in the serum samples throughout the 
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incubation process. After the excess was washed away, a conjugate was then added which 
binds to the attached antibodies in the wells during incubation. This is the opposite of the 
Lawsonia intracellularis method, which binds to the unattached antigens. The excess, 
unbound conjugate was washed away and an enzyme substrate was added. The presence of 
antibodies for Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae in a sample results in a more intense colour 
reaction. A sample to positive ratio of greater than 0.4 indicates a positive result. The 
sample to positive (S/P) ratio was obtained by using the following formula detailed in the 
ELISA antibody test kit manual: 
 
S/P ratio = Sample A(650) – NCmean...................................................................Equation 6.2 
          PCmean – NCmean 
 
where: Sample A(650) = The light absorbance value of the sample when the wavelength of 
the  spectrophotometer is set to 650nm; 
NCmean = The negative control (provided in the kit) mean light absorbance value 
when the wavelength of the spectrophotometer is set to 650nm; 
 PCmean = The positive control (provided in the kit) mean light absorbance value 
when  the wavelength of the  spectrophotometer is set to 650nm. 
 
A polymerase chain reaction (PCR) was conducted on the 72 lung samples obtained from 
the feral pigs to compare those animals that may have been infected in the past (determined 
by the ELISA) to those that are currently infected and shedding the Mycoplasma 
hyopneumoniae bacteria. Lung samples were analysed by the Department of Primary 
Industries Pig Health Laboratory (Bendigo, Victoria, Australia) for Mycoplasma 
hyopneumoniae DNA using a specific PCR (Mattson et al. 1995). DNA was extracted from 
the lung samples for both the Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae PCR and the Actinobacillus 
pleuropneumoniae PCR using a DNA extraction kit (DNeasy Blood & Tissue, Qiagen 
DNA) with the procedures detailed in the kit manual. The steps in the DNA extraction can 
be very simply broken down into lysing of the sample, binding of DNA to the DNeasy 
membrane, washing and filtering the eluate containing DNA into a clean 1.5 ml 
microcentrifuge tube. 
 
A 25 µl total reaction volume was used for the PCR, containing 12.5 µl of Qiagen HotStart 
MasterMix Taq, 7 µl of nuclease-free water (Qiagen), 0.5 µl of both forward and reverse 
primers (Sigma Aldrich; Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae primers final concentration 0.2 µM) 
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and 2 µl of 10x orange G loading buffer (Monash University). The forward and reverse 
primers were as follows (Mattson et al.1995):  
forward primer: 5’-GAG CCT TCA AGC TTC ACC AAG A-3’ 
reverse primer: 5’-TGT GTT AGT GAC TTT TGC CAC C-3’  
 
Two and a half µl of extracted DNA sample was then added. For the negative control 2.5 
µl of nuclease-free water was added. The PCR cycling involved an initial Taq (Thermus 
aquaticus) polymerase activation step of 5 min at 94 ºC followed by 40 cycles of 45 sec at 
93 ºC, 60 sec at 60 ºC, and 2 min at 72 ºC. A final termination step was performed for 10 
min at 72 ºC. Ten µl of the PCR product were analysed by gel electrophoreses on a 1% 
agarose gel (ProBiogen) stained with ethidium bromide (Astral Scientific, Ohio, USA).  
 
6.2.5.5 Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae 
Lung samples were analysed by the Department of Primary Industries Pig Health 
Laboratory (Bendigo, Victoria, Australia) for Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae using a 
specific polymerase chain reaction (PCR) (Gram and Ahrens 1998). Spare DNA extracted 
for the Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae PCR was used for the Actinobacillus 
pleuropneumoniae PCR. The PCR process was very similar to that mentioned for the 
Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae resulting in a final reaction volume of 25 µl. Differences 
between methods were the addition of only 6 µl of nuclease-free water, with more primer 
used, 1 µl of both forward and reverse primers (Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae primers 
final concentration 0.2 µM) The forward and reverse primers were as follows (Gram and 
Ahrens 1998):  
forward primer: 5' - AAG GTT GAT ATG TCC GCA CC - 3'  
reverse primer: 5' - CAC CGA TTA CGC CTT GCC A - 3'  
 
The PCR cycling parameters also differed with an initial Taq polymerase activation step of 
15 min at 95 ºC followed by 30 cycles of 30 sec at 94 ºC, 20 sec at 62 ºC, and 2 min at 72 
ºC. A final termination step was the same as for the Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae PCR. 
The DNA was then imaged using the gel electrophoresis step outlined above. 
 
 6.2.6 Data analysis 
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6.2.6.1 Calculation to substantiate freedom from a pathogen and to estimate 
prevalence 
Calculations to substantiate freedom from a pathogen and to estimate true prevalence were 
conducted as for Chapter 4, Section 4.2.5.1.  
 
The sensitivity and specificity for the laboratory tests used are shown in Table 6.1. 
 
 
Table 6.1. Specifications of the diagnostic tests used to determine the true prevalence of 
different pathogens in the feral pig population near two piggeries in Southern Queensland, 
Australia in 2010 and 2011.  
Pathogen Diagnostic test Sensitivity Specificity Reference 
Lawsonia 
intracellularis 
ELISA 72% 93% Jacobson et al. 2011 
Leptospira spp. 
 
MAT 93.8% 97.3% Bajani et al. 2003 
Actinobacillus 
pleuropneumoniae 
PCR 93% 100% Fittipaldi et al. 2003 
Mycoplasma 
hyopneumoniae 
PCR 97.3% 93% Cai et al. 2007 
Mycoplasma 
hyopneumoniae 
ELISA 63% 100% Erlandson et al. 2005
Brucella spp 
 
RBT and CFT 72.3% a 97.7% a Gall and Nielsen 
2004 
ELISA – Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay  
MAT – Microscopic agglutination test 
PCR – Polymerase chain reaction  
RBT - Rose Bengal test 
CFT - Complement fixation test 
a Sensitivity and specificity for Brucella spp. was a combination of RBT and CFT 
calculated in series using standard formula (Dohoo et al. 2003). RBT and CFT were 
assumed to be conditionally independent tests. 
 
 
6.2.6.2 GPS collar movement analysis 
6.2.6.2.1 GPS data: The satellite fixes obtained for each feral pig were stored as GPS 
location data. These data points were downloaded from the collars using the Sirtrack 
download interface in comma-separated values (CSV) format. The GPS collars store 
position data using the Geographic Coordinate System (Lat/Long as decimal degrees) 
(GCS) in the World Geodetic System (WGS) 84 geographic projection. Data were loaded 
into the ArcMap 9.2 Geographic Information System (GIS) program (ESRI Inc, Redlands). 
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Data layers were produced for each pig and examined for spurious data points. All data 
points taken prior to individual pigs being captured, and after they had been killed to 
retrieve the collars, were discarded. The coordinates for the boundaries of each of the 
piggery building locations had not been gathered in the field. The piggeries were located in 
Google Earth® (Google Inc 2011) on-line satellite imagery program. Using the zoom 
function in the Google Earth program, the coordinates for the boundaries of the piggeries 
were obtained from a simulated eye height of 1 km. For the free-range piggery, the 
boundaries were taken as the extent of the area the pigs use on the piggery, and for the 
intensive piggeries the boundaries were taken as the perimeter of properties on which pig 
sheds were located, shown by the grey line encompassing the yellow hatched lines in 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2. These data were entered into the GIS and data layers formed for each 
piggery. As Google Earth® displays geographic data using the WGS 84 projection, 
transformation of data points was not required. Locations of feral pigs and domestic 
piggeries were overlaid onto SPOT5 2.5 m satellite imagery (SPOT Satellite Imaging 
Corporation). 
 
6.2.6.2.2 Horizontal dissolution of precision: The GPS collars record a Horizontal Dilution 
of Precision (HDOP) value with each fix. This HDOP value is calculated based on the 
position of the satellites in the sky at the time a data point is recorded. The HDOP values 
are unit-less numbers generally ranging between 1 and 13 that give an indication of the 
level of spread of satellites the collar communicated with in order to attain that fix location. 
A small HDOP value indicates that the available satellites were spread widely across the 
sky, providing highly accurate fixes. A large HDOP value indicates that the satellites were 
closely grouped in the sky, thus increasing the probability of location error; for example, 
Recio et al. (2010) found that only 33% of fixes with a HDOP of 9.0 were accurate to 
within 50 m of the true location. A value of 6.0 was chosen as the cut off point for this 
study and all fixes with a HDOP value greater than 6.0 were discarded from the analyses to 
minimise the potential for error. A beacon study is generally undertaken to determine the 
appropriate cut off value for HDOP values; however, such a study was not undertaken in 
the current study due to the low number of collars available for use. The cut off value was 
determined based on the topography of the study area in comparison with other research 
recently undertaken using Sirtrack collars (Moseby et al. 2009; Hilmer 2010; Buckmaster 
2011). Based on the topography in the studies by the above authors, the use of a HDOP cut 
off in the current study of 6.0 was justified. 
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6.2.6.2.3 Feral pig proximity to piggeries: Buffers were created around each piggery to a 
distance of 50, 100, 500 and 5000 m using the buffer tool in ArcMap 9.2. The Hawth’s 
Analysis Tool for ArcGIS (Beyer 2004) plug-in was used to determine the number of data 
points for each collared pig that fell within each of the buffer zones around each piggery. 
The 50 and 100 m buffer zones were chosen based on feral pig-domestic pig contact zones 
determined by Wyckoff et al. (2009), as well as the potential error of the collar. Feral pigs 
moving within the 100 m buffer were determined to have a high likelihood of contacting 
domestic pigs. Feral pigs moving within 500 m were in close proximity to the piggery and 
were also considered to have the possibility of contact with domestic pigs (Wyckoff et al. 
2009). The fourth buffer zone of 5000 m was selected based on the tested aerosol dispersal 
of Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae. Dee et al. (2009) detected Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae at 
a maximum tested distance of 4.7 km from the pathogen source. Infected feral pigs in this 
buffer zone have the potential to transmit Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae via the air to 
domestic pigs. 
 
6.2.6.2.4 Interaction between collared feral pigs: To determine the number of times each 
collared feral pig was within 50 m of another collared feral pig in an hour, the date and 
time of each fix for each collared pig were converted to a numeric value in Microsoft 
Excel, where each day has a value of 1 and each hour has a value of 0.04167 (one hour 
divided by 24 hours in a day). This converted data were entered into ArcMap 9.2. Each 
data point for each pig was buffered to a distance of 50 m. The output layers for every pig 
were overlaid on top of each other using the ArcMap 9.2 intersection tool. This provided 
an output giving all data points that fell within 50 m of a data point from another collared 
pig. A structured query language (SQL) interrogation of the attributes of this output was 
used to then determine which of the identified fixes were taken within one hour of a fix for 
the other pigs.  
 
6.2.6.2.5 GPS collar fix rate: The GPS collar fix rate for each collar was calculated using 
the expected number of fixes that would be obtained from the 30 min tasking rate for the 
number of days the collar was on a live feral pig, compared with the number of successful 
fixes recorded by the GPS collar.   
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6.2.6.2.6 Autocorrelated data: Autocorrelation of the GPS data was not considered to have 
influenced the outcome of these analyses. Regardless of how it is collected, all tracking 
data are autocorrelated to some degree. However, it is particularly apparent with data 
collected using GPS collars due to the regularity of the fixes. Autocorrelation of tracking 
data can introduce confounding effects when analysing home range sizes for the animals 
being tracked and generally results in a negative bias in home range size calculations 
(Kernohan et al. 2001; Swihart and Slade 1997). While the data used in these analyses 
were highly autocorrelated, it was not considered to have introduced bias into either the 
analyses or interpretation of the results as no analysis of home range size was undertaken. 
 
6.3 Results 
 
Eighty-three feral pigs were tested for pathogen detection, 48% female and 52% male. A 
total of 6 samples were from weaners (7.2%), 48 were from juveniles (57.8%) and 29 were 
from adults (34.9%).   
 
 6.3.1. Presence of pathogens in the feral pig population. 
All pathogens were found to be present in the feral pig population except for 
Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae, which was statistically determined to be absent, shown 
in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2. Probability of presence of Lawsonia intracellularis, Leptospira spp., 
Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae, Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae and Brucella suis in the 
feral pig populations near two piggeries in Southern Queensland, Australia in 2010 and 
2011.  
Pathogen  Positive/tested  
Probability of presence of 
pathogen in the feral pig 
populationa  
Lawsonia intracellularis  76/83 1.000 
Leptospira spp.  39/83 1.000 
Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae 0/72 <0.001 
Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae PCR  23/72 1.000 
Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae ELISA  22/83 1.000 
Brucella suis  8/83 0.622 
a Probability that a pathogen is present at the specified minimum expected prevalence 
(probability ≤0.05, shown in bold font, indicates the population is free from a pathogen at 
the minimum expected pathogen prevalence). Probability obtained using the 
hypergeometric formula described by Cameron and Baldock (1998) implemented with the 
FreeCalc version 2 software (Sergeant 2009b).  Parameters used: Population size of 176 
individuals in the region of each piggery; Minimum expected prevalence of 10%; test 
sensitivity and specificity in Table 6.1. 
 
 
Apparent and true prevalence of the different pathogens in the feral pig population is 
shown in Table 6.3. Difference between apparent prevalence and true prevalence figures 
for the five pathogens in the feral pigs arise from accuracy of the laboratory methods used. 
The exception was Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae with an apparent prevalence and true 
prevalence both equalling 0%. Five separate serotypes of Leptospira spp. were detected: 
Pomona (36 isolations), Tarassovi (1 isolation), Copenhageni (4 isolations), Robinsoni (1 
isolation) and Topaz (7 isolations).  
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Table 6.3. Apparent prevalence and true prevalence of Lawsonia intracellularis, 
Leptospira spp., Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae, Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae and 
Brucella suis in feral pig populations near two different piggeries sampled in 2010 and 
2011 in Southern Queensland, Australia. 
Pathogen and detection method Positive
/tested 
Apparent 
prevalence 
% 
95% 
confidence 
interval 
True 
prevalence 
% 
95% 
confidence 
interval 
Lawsonia intracellularis ELISAb 76/83 91.6 83.6–95.9 100 100–100 
Leptospira spp. MAT b 39/83 47.0 36.6–57.6 48.6 36.5–60.6
Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae PCRc 0/72 0 0–5.1 0a 0–5.3 
Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae PCRc 23/72 31.9 22.3–43.4 27.6 16.5–40.6
Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae ELISAb  22/83 26.5 18.2–36.9 42.1 28.2–59.1
Brucella suis RBT and CFTb 8/83 9.6 5.0–17.9 10.5 2.8–22.1 
ELISA – Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay  
MAT – Microscopic agglutination test 
PCR – Polymerase chain reaction  
RBT - Rose Bengal test 
CFT - Complement fixation test 
Confidence intervals for true prevalence determined using Blakers analysis. Test 
sensitivity and specificity in Table 6.1. 
a Statistically confident that the pathogen was determined to be absent from the feral pig 
population. 
b In Serum 
c In lungs 
  
 
Of the seven feral pigs collared to track movement of feral pigs around piggeries, six had 
their collars retrieved: three males and three females. All of these feral pigs tested positive 
for Lawsonia intracellularis, while one was positive for Leptospira pomona and two were 
positive for Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae (Table 6.4). Male two was sampled a second 
time upon recapture six months later, and was still positive for Lawsonia intracellularis but 
remained negative for all other pathogens. 
 
 
Table 6.4. Presence of Lawsonia intracellularis, Leptospira spp., Mycoplasma 
hyopneumoniae and Brucella suis in six feral pigs at time of collar application to track 
movement near two piggeries in Southern Queensland, Australia in 2010.  
Feral pig 
Lawsonia 
intracellularis
Leptospira 
spp. 
Mycoplasma 
hyopneumoniae Brucella suis 
Male 1 + +   
Male 2 +     
Male 3 +    
Female 1 +  +  
Female 2 +    
Female 3 +  +  
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 6.3.2. Presence of pathogens in the domestic pig population. 
Lawsonia intracellularis, Leptospira spp. and Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae were all 
present in the adult sow population sampled from the intensive piggery (Table 6.5). 
 
 
Table 6.5. Probability of presence of Lawsonia intracellularis, Leptospira spp. and 
Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae in 86 breeding sows on one intensive piggery in Southern 
Queensland, Australia in 2010.  
Pathogen  Positive/tested  
Probability of presence of 
pathogen in the feral pig 
populationa  
Lawsonia intracellularis  86/86 1.000 
Leptospira spp.  4/86 0.243 
Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae ELISA  62/86 1.000 
a Probability that a pathogen is present at the specified minimum expected prevalence 
(probability ≤0.05 indicates the population is free from the pathogen at the minimum 
expected pathogen prevalence). Probability obtained using the hypergeometric formula 
described by Cameron and Baldock (1998) implemented with the FreeCalc version 2 
software (Sergeant 2009b).  Parameters used: Population size of 5000 individuals at the 
piggery; Minimum expected prevalence of 5%; test sensitivity and specificity in Table 6.1. 
 
 
As with the feral pig samples the apparent prevalence and true prevalence differed for 
Leptospira spp. and Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae in the domestic sows due to accuracy of 
laboratory methods, but were the same for Lawsonia intracellularis (100%; Table 6.6). 
There was one serotype of Leptospira spp., Topaz, detected in four of the domestic sows. 
 
 
Table 6.6. Apparent prevalence and true prevalence of Lawsonia intracellularis, 
Leptospira spp. and Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae in 86 breeding sows on one intensive 
piggery in Southern Queensland, Australia in 2010. 
Pathogen Positive
/tested 
Apparent 
prevalence 
% 
95% 
confidence 
interval 
True 
prevalence 
% 
95% 
confidence 
interval 
Lawsonia intracellularis ELISAa 86/86 100 95.7–100 100 100–100 
Leptospira spp. MATa 4/86 4.7 1.8–11.4 2.1 0–9.4 
Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae ELISAa 62/86 72.1 61.8–80.5 100 98–100 
ELISA – Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay  
MAT – Microscopic agglutination test 
Confidence intervals for true prevalence determined using Blakers analysis. Test 
sensitivity and specificity in Table 6.1. 
a In Serum 
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 6.3.3 Health management and disease control in the domestic pig population. 
Health, disease control and biosecurity practices applied at the two piggeries included in 
this study are presented in Table 6.7. Both piggeries undertook standard biosecurity 
procedures, such as enclosing feed silos, providing clothing and shoes for piggery visitors, 
and controlling feral pig populations. In addition, both piggeries had a single fence barrier 
to prevent entry of feral pigs on to their property, which was reported to be effective 
against feral pig access by the piggery manager. Limited information on disease status and 
control measures was provided by the free-range piggery. Both piggeries had had recent 
outbreaks of Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae, of an unknown origin and pigs were currently 
infected. The free-range piggery did not provide any information on other diseases, other 
than the use of vaccinations for prevention of Leptospirosis. The intensive/ecoshelter 
piggery had not had any past infections of Leptospira spp., Brucella suis or Actinobacillus 
pleuropneumoniae, though it had a history of past infections of Lawsonia intracellularis. 
This piggery vaccinated their breeding herd against Lawsonia intracellularis using 
Enterisol® (a live porcine vaccine) as a result of the 2009 outbreak. They considered the 
vaccination to be effective when pigs remain seronegative to 6 weeks post-vaccination. 
The free-range piggery reported vaccinating against Leptospira. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 125
Table 6.7. Health status and pest control for two piggeries in Southern Queensland in 
2010.  
 Free-range piggery Intensive/Ecoshelter piggery 
Piggery size (breeding 
sows) 
>500 sows Approximately 5000 sow 
Production system Continuous flow Breeder continuous flow, all-in all-
out  by ecoshelter 
Food storage Silos Silos 
Clothing/boot change Clothing and boots for 
visitors. Not changed 
between paddocks. 
Clothing and boots for visitors. 
Not changed between sheds. 
Fencing Yes – Barb wire fence with 
an electric outrigged wire. 
Checked daily for holes and 
erosion. 
Yes – single barb wire fence 
Feral pig control Shooting, trapping, and 
baiting when there is region 
wide organisation. 
Shooting – once per week 
Effectiveness of prevention 
of contact between feral 
and domestic pigs? 
Yes Yes 
Brucella suis presence Information not provided No – confirmation details not 
provided 
Leptospira spp. presence Information not provided No – confirmation details not 
provided 
Leptospira spp. vaccination ECOvacLEa give to sow pre-
farrowing 
PLEvacb give at weaning 
Lawsonia intracellularis 
presence 
Information not provided Yes, February 2009. Laboratory 
confirmed via ELISA. 
Lawsonia intracellularis 
proportion infected 
Information not provided 2–5% breeders 
Lawsonia intracellularis 
medication 
Information not provided Enterisol live porcine vaccination 
to pre-weaning pigs post 2009 
outbreak 
Mycoplasma 
hyopneumoniae presence 
Yes, recent outbreak, pigs 
currently infected. 
Yes, PCR confirmed, recent 
outbreak, pigs currently infected. 
Mycoplasma 
hyopneumoniae medication 
Information not provided RespiSure®c or M+Pacd; 
Chlortetracyclinee, Tilmicosinf and 
Lincomycing used in feed.  
Commenced immediately post 
confirmation. 
Actinobacillus 
pleuropneumoniae presence 
Information not provided No – confirmation details not 
provided 
a Vaccination for prevention of Escherichia coli, Leptospira pomona and Erysipelas; b 
Vaccine for prevention of parvovirus, Leptospira pomona and erysipelas; c vaccination 
preventing Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae, effective for 22 weeks post vaccination; d an 
improved vaccine for Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae; efg antibiotics.  
 
 
 
 126
 6.3.4 Feral pig movement 
Of the 83 feral pigs sampled for pathogens, seven were collared between June 2010 and 
December 2010. A collar from one pig was unable to be found. These animals were 
collared within a 10 km radius of each of the two piggeries in Southern Queensland 
(Figure 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3). The total number of data points collected on individual animals 
ranged from 2747 to 5189 GPS fixes, over a range of 64 to 184 days (Table 6.8). The total 
number of data points per animal ranged from 2079 to 4609 when the HDOP was restricted 
to ≤ 6 (Table 6.8). The successful GPS fix rate ranged from 52.9–89.4% (mean 72.3%) for 
the total number of data points obtained for each pig, and 40.3–79.3% (mean 62.8%) for 
the HDOP ≤ 6 total data points for each pig (Table 6.8). 
 
 
Table 6.8. The expected number of data points collected per feral per pig and the 
proportion of actual data points collected per feral pig in Southern Queensland in 2010 and 
2011.  
  
Total 
daysa 
Expected 
number of 
data 
pointsb 
Actual total 
number of 
data pointsc 
Fix 
rated 
(%)  
Actual total 
number of 
HDOP ≤ 6 data 
points 
Fix 
ratee 
(%) 
Male1 118 5664 3285 58.0 2934 51.8 
Male 2 184 8832 4669 52.9 3557 40.3 
Male 3 84 4032 2410 59.8 2079 51.6 
Female 1 122 5856 5189 88.6 4609 78.7 
Female 2 64 3072 2747 89.4 2435 79.3 
Female 3 102 4896 4166 85.1 3695 75.5 
Mean     72.3  62.8 
a Number of days over which collars obtained GPS fixes for still living individuals. 
b Tasking rates were programmed to acquire one fix every 30 minutes. 
c Total number of GPS fixes collected on individual animals. 
d Percentage of total GPS fixes (data points) as a proportion of expected fixes (data points). 
e Percentage of total Horizontal Dilution Of Precision value ≤ 6 (data points) as a 
proportion of expected fixes (data points). 
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 Piggery 
Male 1 
Male 2 
Male 3 
Female 1 
Female 2 
Female 3 
Figure 6.3. Total movement of six feral pigs in the vicinity of two commercial piggeries between June 2010 and December 2010 in 
Southern Queensland, Australia. 
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There were 15 data points, corresponding to a single individual, within 500 m of the free-
range piggery (Figure 6.4). This corresponded to 0.32% of its total data points (Table 6.9). 
With the HDOP restricted to ≤ 6, there were 13 data points for this pig within 500 m of the 
free-range piggery, corresponding to 0.37% of its total data points (Table 6.10). There 
were 6 data points for the same individual within 100 m of the free-range piggery (Figure 
6.4; Table 6.9), and 5 data points with the HDOP restricted to ≤ 6 (Table 6.10). The 
majority of feral pig data points were within 5 km of either piggery, ranging from 52.3% to 
99.7% per individual, with the exception of Female 2 (Table 6.9). These ranges are very 
similar to the HDOP ≤ 6 data, with 53.6–99.7% of data points within 5 km of the piggeries 
(Table 6.10). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4. Total movement of a single large male feral pig in the vicinity of a commercial 
free-range piggery between June 2010 and December 2010 in Southern Queensland, 
Australia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Male 2
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Table 6.9. Movement of individual collared feral pigs within differing distances of 
piggeries in Southern Queensland, Australia during 2010–2011. 
    Distance from piggery (meters)     
  
Sex <50 <100 <500 <5000 
% of 
locationsa 
Total no. 
data pointsb 
1 Male 0 0 0 3005 91.5 3285 
2 Male 0 6 15 3973 85.1 4669 
3 Male 0 0 0 1773 62.3 2410 
1 Female 0 0 0 5174 99.7 5189 
2 Female 0 0 0 3 0.1 2747 
3 Female 0 0 0 2180 52.3 4166 
a Percentage of total data points within 5000 meters of piggery – given distance set on 
piggery boundary not sheds/shelters where the domestic pigs are housed. 
b Total number of data points collected on individual animals. 
 
 
Table 6.10. Movement of individual collared feral pigs within differing distances of 
piggeries in Southern Queensland, Australia during 2010–2011. The Horizontal Dilution 
Of Precision (HDOP) value is restricted to ≤ 6 based on Moseby et al. (2009). 
    Distance from piggery (meters)     
  
Sex <50 <100 <500 <5000 
% of 
locationsa 
Total no. 
data pointsb 
1 Male 0 0 0 2695 91.9 2934 
2 Male 0 5 13 3047 85.7 3557 
3 Male 0 0 0 1564 75.2 2079 
1 Female 0 0 0 4596 99.7 4609 
2 Female 0 0 0 2 0.1 2435 
3 Female 0 0 0 1943 52.6 3695 
a Percentage of total data points within 5000 meters of piggery – given distance set on 
piggery boundary not sheds/shelters where the domestic pigs are housed. 
b Total number of data points collected on individual animals. 
 
 
Male 1, Male 2 and Female 1 had the potential for direct contact with each other, as they 
roamed within 50 m of each other in the same one hour period over multiple occasions 
(Table 6.11).  
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Table 6.11. The total number of movement data points that indicate feral pigs were within 
50 meters of each other on the same date and in the same hour in Southern Queensland, 
Australia. 
Feral pig individuals Total number of data points Total number of 
HDOP ≤ 6 data points 
Male 1 and Male 2 47 36 
Male 1 and Female 1 1108 876 
Male 2 and Female 1 454 309 
Male 1, Male 2 and Female 1 7 5 
HDOP = Horizontal Dilution Of Precision value ≤ 6 based on Moseby et al. (2009). 
Fix acquired every 30 minutes 
 
 
Male 1 and Female 1 were in close contact with each other for the greatest proportion of 
total data points compared to the other feral pigs (Table 6.12). Male 1 was within 50 m of 
Female 1 for 33.7% of its total recorded data points, and 29.9% of its HDOP ≤ 6 total data 
points (Table 6.12). Feral pigs collared near the intensive piggery did not have any 
recorded data points where they roamed to within 50 m of another collared individual. 
 
 
Table 6.12. The proportion of total data points that feral pigs were within 50 meters of 
each other on the same date and in the same hour in Southern Queensland, Australia. 
  
Proportion of total 
data points (%) 
Proportion of total 
HDOP ≤ 6 data points 
(%) 
Male 1 within 50 m Male 2 1.4 1.2 
Male 2 within 50 m Male 1 1.0 1.0 
Male 1 within 50 m Female 1 33.7 29.9 
Female 1 within 50 m Male 1 21.4 19.0 
Male 2 within 50 m Female 1 9.7 8.7 
Female 1 within 50 m Male 2 8.7 6.7 
HDOP = Horizontal Dilution Of Precision value ≤ 6 based on Moseby et al. (2009). 
Fix acquired every 30 minutes. 
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6.4 Discussion  
 
To calculate the risk of feral pigs spreading pathogens into commercial piggeries, two steps 
are necessary. First, the presence of pathogens in both feral and domestic pigs must be 
accurately detected, and secondly, the movements of feral pigs and likelihood of feral and 
domestic animals coming into close proximity needs to be considered. In the current study, 
Lawsonia intracellularis, Leptospira spp., Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae and Brucella suis 
were all detected in feral pigs within 10 km of two piggeries in southern Queensland. 
 
The true prevalence of Lawsonia intracellularis in feral pigs in this study was higher than 
that found in Western Australia (18.9%; Phillips et al. 2009). This prevalence was also 
greater than that found among wild pig populations in the Czech Republic (51.4%, 
Tomanova et al. 2002; 9.1%, Dezorzova-Tomanova et al. 2006) and Germany (20.6%, 
Reiner et al. 2011). An ELISA test was used in the current study, which detects antibody 
presence against a current or past infection with the pathogen. The previously mentioned 
studies used PCR or a combination of PCR and immunofluorescent antibody test. The PCR 
results identified the presence of the bacteria in feral pig faeces, and thus determined the 
proportion of pigs currently shedding the pathogen. Of the feral pigs that have 
seroconverted against Lawsonia intracellularis using the ELISA in the current study, not 
all would have been shedding the pathogen, and thus been identified as positive via PCR. 
Brandt et al. (2010) investigated 60 domestic pigs for detection of Lawsonia intracellularis 
using a PCR and the same ELISA used in the current study. Of these 60 pigs, 39 were 
positive via PCR and 49 positive via ELISA; this is a difference of 16.7%. If we assume a 
similar proportion of feral pigs in the current study would not have shed the pathogen, the 
prevalence would still have been much greater in the current study compared to the 
previous studies, and vastly greater than Phillips et al. (2009), the only other study to detect 
this pathogen in feral pigs in Australia. Consequently, it can be determined that the 
pathogen status of feral pigs, for Lawsonia intracellularis in particular, differs between 
different regions of Australia. Thus the risk of pathogen transmission from feral pigs to 
domestic pigs may differ depending on piggery location, with for example a lower risk for 
Lawsonia intracellularis expected in Western Australia compared to Queensland. 
 
The period of time that Lawsonia intracellularis antibodies are present in serum is also 
longer than the period of time that pathogen DNA is present in the faeces of an infected 
 132
animal. Domestic pigs that recovered from proliferative haemorrhagic enteropathy caused 
by infection with Lawsonia intracellularis had serum antibody levels detectable for three 
months post-infection (Guedes et al. 2002). This time period indicates that the collared 
feral pig, Male 2, may have been suffering a second infection with Lawsonia 
intracellularis upon recapture six months after initial collar application and serum sample.  
 
Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae was identified for the first time, to the best of the author’s 
knowledge, in Australian feral pigs. This indicates that feral pigs could be a potential 
pathway of exposure and transmission of this pathogen to naïve domestic pigs. Where 
there is an infected piggery, such as the two piggeries in the current study, feral pigs may 
be a minor contributor to the maintenance of Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae within a 
piggery, with the infection cycling between feral and domestic pigs. Cycling of the 
infection between domestic pigs is likely to be the major contributor to the maintenance of 
the pathogen. The true prevalence of Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae in feral pigs was 
comparable to levels reported in previous studies in Slovenia (21%, Vengust et al. 2006) 
and the United States (32%, Baker et al. 2011). The sensitivity of the Mycoplasma 
hyopneumoniae ELISA was lower than the PCR method; however, it was able to detect 
antibodies that may have remained after an infection, rather than the prevalence of infected 
individuals (Table 6.1). Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae (APP) was determined to be 
absent from the feral pig population. This pathogen has not been studied in feral pig 
populations in Australia previously to the best of the author’s knowledge; however, it has 
been detected in feral pigs in Slovenia (52%, Vengust et al. 2006). 
 
In Australia, Brucella suis and Leptospira spp. have been detected in previous studies of 
feral pigs. However, in the current study Brucella suis was present at a higher true 
prevalence than previous Australian studies (Table 6.2; 4.1%, Pavlov 1991; 1.9%, Mason 
and Fleming 1999). These studies sampled more isolated areas of Australia, including 
Cape York in Queensland, and were not selected for their vicinity to agricultural premises 
or urban centres where pathogen transmission risk to commercial pigs is greater. The 
recommended method for testing in most laboratories in Australia is the RBT, followed by 
confirmation with the CFT. This method of testing in series increased the overall 
specificity, filtering out more false positive results than when each test was used 
individually. However, this method decreases the overall sensitivity, such that some 
positive samples may have been falsely determined to be negative. The RBT and CFT are 
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also non-specific for Brucella suis, detecting all Brucella spp., such as Brucella abortus 
and Brucella melitensis, which are presumed to be eradicated from Australia (WAHID 
2010). As such the preferred testing method for Brucella suis in Australia is reliant upon 
continued accurate determination of the absence of Brucella abortus and Brucella 
melitensis from Australia. 
 
Previous Australian studies of Leptospira spp. prevalence in feral pigs present a range of 
2% to 51% (Choquenot et al. 1996). The results of this study fall in this range, confirming 
this finding in feral pigs (Table 6.2). Leptospira interrogans serotype Pomona was the 
most common isolate, which agrees with previous studies (Choquenot et al. 1996), 
followed by the recently recognised Australian serotype Leptospira weilii serotype Topaz. 
The serotype was detected at a high prevalence in eastern-grey kangaroos (47%, Roberts et 
al. 2010) and has been isolated from one cow sample (Corney et al. 2008).  
 
Leptospira spp. has previously been detected in feral pigs caught on piggeries in 
Queensland at a prevalence of 31% (Elder and Ward, 1978). During the time of this study, 
1972 to 1976, piggeries were more of a sideline enterprise, and were generally free-range 
in style, so would have been more accessible to feral pigs than they are presently 
(Richardson and O’Connor 1978). The prevalence of Leptospira spp. in feral pigs has 
increased since the time of the Elder and Ward (1978) study, despite the incorporation of a 
vaccination routine on piggeries for Leptospira interrogans serotype pomona. This 
indicates that feral pigs are a stand alone reservoir of Leptospira spp. infection, and pose a 
source of infection for domestic pigs in the absence of protective vaccinations. This again 
emphasises the particular risk posed by the presence of Leptospira weilii Serovar Topaz in 
the feral pig population at these piggeries. 
 
Lawsonia intracellularis, Leptospira spp. and Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae were all 
detected in the domestic sows on the intensive piggery near to the feral pig population. The 
true prevalence of Lawsonia intracellularis in these breeding sows was the same as that in 
the feral pigs. The Enterisol® vaccination used for control of Lawsonia intracellularis on 
this piggery does not present as a positive result in the ELISA (Dohoo 2011), indicating 
sows were infected with the pathogen, suggesting control measures for this pathogen are 
not effective in breeding sows over the long term. This is additionally supported by 
research findings by a number of authors (Guedes et al. 2003; Dohoo 2011). 
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Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae was present at a much higher true prevalence in the domestic 
sows despite medication compared to the feral pigs. This may be due to the domestic pig’s 
confinement to buildings, allowing for propagation and transmission at a greater level than 
in feral pigs, as well as the limited duration of the vaccination effectiveness. Due to the 
infected status of these domestic pigs, and the uncertainty of the infection source, domestic 
pigs may have transmitted the infection via infected aerosolised particles to the feral pigs, 
or the feral pigs may have transmitted the infection to the domestic pigs.  
 
Leptospira spp. were present at a lower true prevalence in the domestic pigs than in feral 
pigs. However, the domestic sows had been vaccinated against Leptospira interrogans 
serotype Pomona. This vaccination is specific to one serotype and does not provide 
protection against other serotypes (Taylor 2006). The only serotype found in the domestic 
pigs was Leptospira weilii Serovar Topaz. This is the first ever identification of this 
serotype in pigs, to the author’s knowledge. This has important biosecurity implications, as 
the consequences of this pathogen for herd health and productivity are unknown. The 
symptoms of infection with this serovar in humans are typical of infection with other 
Leptospira spp. and include fever, headaches, chills and myalgia (Slack et al. 2007). The 
number of individual isolations of the serotype in the domestic sows was similar to that 
found in the feral pigs. Due to the identification of this serotype in both wild and domestic 
pigs, the role of the eastern grey kangaroo in the transmission of this pathogen requires 
further investigation.  
 
As the domestic pigs sampled from the piggery were specific to one sex and age group, the 
prevalence of pathogens may be biased, and higher than they actually are in the entire 
domestic pig population on this piggery. These results may also be biased as only the 
intensive piggery was sampled for pathogen detection, due to concerns about 
confidentiality and repercussions of pathogen detection by the other piggery manager. The 
piggeries were also unwilling to be sampled for detection of Brucella suis in the domestic 
pig herd, as the consequences of a positive sample would be very costly due to the 
necessary removal of all positive animals within a pig herd and costs of mandatory testing 
of pigs to confirm pathogen eradication. All positive Brucella suis isolates in a commercial 
piggery must be reported and quarantine procedures ensue. This restriction also impacts 
the results presented in this chapter. 
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The presence of these pathogens in both the domestic and feral pig population has 
implications for the control of the production-limiting pathogens. Management strategies 
for control or eradication of these pathogens on the piggeries need to consider the risk of 
re-infection by feral pigs. The feral pigs act as a reservoir for pathogens that may be 
transmitted in a number of different ways, some not requiring direct contact, such as 
aerosol transmission for Mycoplasma hyodysenteriae.  
 
The results from collared pigs show the majority of movement was within 5 km of the 
piggeries, with the exception of Female 2. This is a similar result to that found in a study of 
feral pig movement near piggeries in Texas, US (Wyckoff et al. 2009). None of the 
collared feral pig data points were within a close enough proximity to piggeries to indicate 
direct contact with domestic pigs. This prevention of contact with feral pigs is a 
requirement of the Australian pork industry quality assurance program (APIQ 2010). One 
individual, a large male boar, moved to within 100 m of the free-range piggery. The natural 
movement behaviour of the collared feral pigs in the current study may have been 
disrupted by the eradication of their group members that were trapped with them, as well 
as through the cull of feral pigs conducted from a helicopter as a part of the QMDC project 
over a single day in the region of the current study. Displacement of feral pigs from their 
home ranges has been reportedly associated with continued hunting pressure on the ground 
or from helicopters (Caley 1993b, Saunders and Bryant 1988). Pigs tend to forage and feed 
in groups (Kyriazakis and Whittemore 2006), as such, the disruption of the natural 
structure of feral pig groups in the current study may have caused a shift in the original 
home range of some of the individuals, affecting their movement in relation to the 
piggeries, but also providing a possible explanation for the movement and collar retrieval 
of Male 1 approximately 20 kilometres from initial site of capture. Whether the hunting 
pressure experienced in the current study was continuous enough to bring about feral pig 
displacement is unknown. 
 
The collared pigs often overlapped in their movement, and had a number of possible 
contact events, providing the opportunity for pathogen transmission between feral 
individuals. The results of the current study were limited by the collaring of only seven 
feral pig individuals, one of which could not be recaptured. These individuals were 
captured within a 5 km radius of each of the piggeries, and as such did not allow for 
collection of movement data from feral pigs that may have been present within the 
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intermediate region of the two piggeries. However, based on the density of feral pigs in the 
region (Gentle et al. 2011), it can be assumed there were feral pigs present in the 
intermediate zone between piggeries, thereby allowing for intermingling and pathogen 
transmission between feral pig populations. Based on the interaction of feral pigs around 
the free-range piggery, contacts between these pigs, intermediate pigs and feral pigs around 
the intensive piggery were likely to occur.  
 
The average GPS fix rate of 72% in this study was similar to that obtained by previous 
studies (Cain et al. 2005). The feral pig that came into closest proximity to the piggery, 
Male 2, had the lowest fix success rate at 52.9%, indicating that this pig may have spent 
more time in close proximity to the piggery than was recorded. There are many factors that 
affect the fix acquisition, including the location and angle of the antenna on the collar due 
to the position of the pig’s head during fix acquisition, or movement of the collar with pig 
natural movements (Cain et al. 2005). Topography, vegetation and satellite location can 
also affect fix acquisition (Cain et al. 2005).  
 
The proximity estimates obtained in the current study demonstrate the threat feral pigs 
present to domestic pigs. Of the collared pigs, one was positive for Leptospira interrogans 
serotype pomona, five were positive for Lawsonia intracellularis and two were positive for 
Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae, based on the apparent prevalence of pathogens. The known 
prevalence of these pathogens and of the other pathogens in feral pigs in such close 
proximity to the domestic pigs is a biosecurity risk. Pathogen transmission via infected air 
provides an additional complication, and risk for pathogen transmission from feral to 
domestic pigs and visa versa. Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae can be transmitted via the air. 
Dee et al. (2009) detected Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae at a maximum tested distance of 
4.7 km from the pathogen source. The majority of feral pig movement in the current study 
was within 5 km, demonstrating the risk associated with feral pigs. Aerosol transmission of 
exotic highly pathogenic diseases, such as foot-and-mouth disease, has been investigated 
due to risk of livestock infection from a long-distance source. Spread of foot-and-mouth 
disease has been measured at 60 to 100 km over land, and is capable of maintaining an 
infective dose over this distance (Donaldson 1979; Alexanderson et al. 2002). This high 
density of feral pigs, the major reservoir host of foot-and-mouth disease (Productivity 
Commission 2002), around piggeries poses great concern for disease control, especially in 
the event of a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in Australia. 
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Aerosol transmission is reliant on climate, temperature and wind conditions, each of which 
may differ between different pathogens. The optimal conditions for Mycoplasma 
hyopneumoniae aerosol transmission are relatively low humidity levels, less than 30% 
(Mitscherlich and Marth 1984), and cool temperatures below 27 ºC, which increase the 
number of airborne particles (Stark 1999). Disease prevention measures such as dust 
reduction, air filtration, air disinfection and the establishment of disease-free regions are 
options for mitigation of aerosol transmission that currently are not implemented on 
piggeries (Stark 1999), likely due to the high infrastructural and running costs and low 
implementation feasibility in practice. 
 
This study has provided an accurate measure of the pathogen prevalence in a feral pig 
population in Southern Queensland. Prevalence has been coupled with movement data on 
feral pigs to estimate time spent in close proximity to piggeries. This increases the risk of 
transmission of production-limiting pathogens and jeopardises piggery disease 
management. Only bacterial pathogens were investigated in this study; however, the modes 
of transmission of all pathogens, apart from vector-borne, have been covered through the 
selection of pathogens included in this study. Piggery type may have an impact on the level 
of risk of pathogen transmission. Intensive piggeries have an additional physical barrier 
between pigs and the outdoors, unlike free-range piggeries. Consequently, the risk of 
contact between free-range domestic pigs and feral pigs is greater (Wu et al. 2011). It is 
recommended, where possible, that all piggeries located near a feral pig population double 
fence their perimeter to create an exclusion zone, with an outrigged electric wire. This 
minimises the risk of feral pigs making direct contact with domestic pigs through fences, 
and gaining entry to piggeries by digging. Findings from this study provide accurate 
information on the potential risks of pathogen transmission from feral pigs to domestic 
pigs. How likely it is that this transmission could occur is further investigated in Chapter 7. 
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7 Risk of pathogen transmission from wild animals to domestic pigs in 
Australia 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Pathogen transmission from wild animals to livestock and humans has occurred in the past, 
with 72% of zoonotic emerging infectious pathogens coming from a wild animal source 
(Jones et al. 2008). In the event of a new disease outbreak, the index case or source of 
infection can sometimes be determined; such was the case with fruit bats identified as the 
source of Nipah virus in pigs in Malaysia, and Menangle virus in pigs in Australia (Chua et 
al. 2000; Philbey et al. 2008). These cases identify the potential risk of pathogen 
transmission from wild animal species to domestic pigs. However, in the case of endemic 
diseases, the source of an outbreak and the level of contribution from wild animal hosts to 
the introduction and persistence of a pathogen among domestic animals can be difficult to 
establish. In these instances, determining how much risk wild animals pose to the 
introduction and maintenance of an infection, and how much effort is needed to mitigate 
this risk, can be guess work. 
 
The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) has determined that, for the purposes of 
international trade, a country must provide a rigorous and transparent assessment of the 
risk posed by a product in order to require mitigation or deny importation (OIE 2010). This 
assessment must follow the OIE risk analysis framework, which provides the scientific 
principles necessary to determine the probability of an adverse event occurring, and 
underpins decisions to mitigate unacceptable levels of risk. Risk analysis methods used in 
animal health were originally applied to evaluate the risk of pathogen or pest introduction 
via imports to a country (MacDiarmid 1997). In addition, risk analysis methods have been 
applied to evaluating the risk of exotic disease incursions through other pathways, such as 
international passenger travel (Gratz et al. 2000; Kilpatrick et al. 2004; Kilpatrick et al. 
2006) and migratory birds (Martinez et al. 2011).  There have been recent cases when risk 
analysis has been used to determine the risk of pathogen transmission from wild animals to 
livestock. Some examples include determining the risk of Mycobacterium bovis 
transmission from badgers to cattle in England (Gallagher et al. 2003), and foot-and-mouth 
transmission from buffalo to cattle in Zimbabwe (Sutmoller et al. 2000).  
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Risk can be qualitatively or quantitatively assessed. Both of these methods are accepted 
under the OIE methodology for risk analysis. In addition, quantitative methods can be 
deterministic (using point estimates) or stochastic. Stochastic simulation models using 
probability distributions as input values are used to incorporate uncertainty and variability 
in quantitative models (OIE 2010). 
 
Quantifying the risk of pathogen transmission from wild animals to pigs has not been 
previously conducted, to the author’s knowledge. This study aims to quantify the risk of 
exposure to the pathogens Escherichia coli, Salmonella spp. and Campylobacter spp. from 
European starlings; Brachyspira hyodysenteriae, Lawsonia intracellularis and Salmonella 
spp. from rats; and Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae, Leptospira spp., Brucella suis and 
Lawsonia intracellularis from feral pigs to domestic pigs on commercial piggeries in 
Australia. In conducting this exposure assessment, the most likely pathways of infection as 
well as those parameters with most influence on the probability of exposure will be 
identified. Results from these exposure assessments will provide information to determine 
the most effective mitigation strategies to reduce the risk posed by wild animals for 
pathogen exposure to pigs on piggeries, and will support decision making for disease 
management and control in the future. 
 
7.2 Materials and Methods 
 
 7.2.1. Risk assessment methodology 
This risk assessment follows the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) 
methodology for risk analysis (OIE 2010). As discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.10, the 
OIE risk assessment is comprised of four interrelated steps: hazard identification, risk 
assessment, risk management and risk communication. Chapter 2 of this thesis identified 
that starlings, rats and feral pigs were commonly observed in and around piggeries. 
Consequently, these wild animals were targeted for further risk investigation. The 
subsequent chapters of this thesis identified key pathogens carried by these wild animals 
that could pose a risk to domestic pigs, which were therefore considered the hazards for 
this assessment.  
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Risk assessment is itself comprised of four steps: the release, exposure and consequence 
assessments, and the risk estimation (OIE 2010). As the wild animals of interest and target 
pathogens considered in this risk assessment are already present in Australia, a release 
assessment was not necessary. The exposure assessment describes the potential pathways 
for infection of domestic pigs with the targeted pathogens from the specified wild animals. 
These pathways were described in the current study using scenario trees, the common 
method for representing steps in the process for hazard exposure to a susceptible animal in 
an import risk assessment (OIE 2010). Consequence assessment investigates the 
probability of pathogen spread from the index farm and the impacts of this spread. In 
general terms, the impacts of domestic pig infection with the target pathogens in this study 
have been previously investigated, and have been considered for the selection of pathogens 
to be included in the current study. Consequences associated with clinical symptoms and 
the financial implications of these pathogens have been described in Chapter 3. However, a 
consequence assessment and subsequent risk estimation for wildlife to pig pathogen 
transmission was beyond the scope of this study. 
  
The scenario trees for the exposure assessment were implemented in Microsoft Excel (PC/ 
Windows XP, 2003) and probabilities were calculated using quantitative stochastic 
simulation modelling with @RISK 5.7 software (Palisade Corporation, USA). Each 
simulation consisted of 5,000 iterations, using Latin hypercube sampling and a random 
seeding type. The median, 5% and 95% values were obtained from the simulation output to 
describe the probability of exposure. Median probabilities of exposure were compared 
between different pathogens within each animal species. In addition, exposure estimates 
for the feral pig assessment were compared according to piggery type (indoor vs. free-
range) and different animal densities of feral pigs. 
  
The exposure models represent the likelihood of exposure to a pathogen from a wildlife 
species on an average commercial piggery in Australia at any point in time. The models 
assume a constant likelihood of exposure year round as seasonality effect on the animal 
densities and the pathogen prevalence has not been considered. 
 
 7.2.2 Population framework and data sources 
A variety of data sources were used in this exposure assessment to estimate the quantitative 
input values required to determine the probability of exposure of domestic pigs to 
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pathogens from wild animals. Data from Chapters 2, 4, 5 and 6 of this thesis provide the 
majority of the assessment inputs. Information from literature and expert opinion were also 
used for a number of parameters that were beyond the scope of those chapters. 
 
7.2.2.1 Postal survey 
Chapter 2 reports the results of a postal survey administered to the pork-producing 
members of Australian Pork Limited. The results of the questionnaire identified the 
proportion of piggeries experiencing incursions by wild animals, the type of wild animals 
and animal numbers observed per week by respondents. Information on the control 
techniques implemented by piggeries to mitigate wild animal entry to piggery housing and 
control wild animal population size was also obtained. This information was used 
extensively throughout this exposure assessment.  
 
7.2.2.2 Presence of pathogens in the European starling population in domestic 
piggeries 
Chapter 4 reports the results of a pathogen detection study in starlings captured from 
piggeries in South Australia. A total of 473 starlings were captured to provide an estimate 
of the presence of the pathogens Escherichia coli, Salmonella spp. and Campylobacter 
spp., as well as an estimation of the prevalence of these pathogens in starling populations. 
 
7.2.2.3 Presence of pathogens in the rat population in domestic piggeries 
Chapter 5 reports the results of a pathogen detection study in rodents on two piggeries in 
Victoria and one piggery in South Australia. A total of 300 rats were obtained to detect the 
presence of Brachyspira hyodysenteriae, Brachyspira pilosicoli, Lawsonia intracellularis 
and Salmonella spp., and provide an estimate of the prevalence of these pathogens among 
rats on piggeries that applied different methods of control for Brachyspira hyodysenteriae 
infection in pigs. Control methods include medication, Swiss depopulation and total 
depopulation, described in Chapter 5. Brachyspira pilosicoli has not been included in this 
exposure assessment as this pathogen was not detected in rats, and has not been detected in 
rodents in any previous studies, to the author’s knowledge.  
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7.2.2.4 Presence of pathogens in the feral pig population in the area surrounding 
domestic piggeries 
Chapter 6 reports the findings of a pathogen detection study in feral pigs in the vicinity of 
two piggeries in Southern Queensland. A total of 83 feral pigs were captured and sampled 
to detect the presence of the pathogens Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae, Actinobacillus 
pleuropneumoniae, Leptospira spp., Brucella suis and Lawsonia intracellularis, as well as 
estimate the prevalence of these pathogens in the feral pig population in this region. 
Additionally, the movement of feral pigs in the vicinity of these piggeries was assessed by 
collaring and obtaining GPS data on six feral pigs: three male and three female. As 
Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae was not detected in the feral pig population, and has not 
been detected in feral pigs in Australia in any previous studies, this pathogen was not 
included in this exposure assessment. 
 
7.2.2.5 Literature and expert opinion 
Literature and expert opinion were used when suitable data were not available from the 
current study to estimate input values used in the exposure assessment. For expert opinion, 
a pig veterinarian, with over 15 years of experience working in Victoria, South Australia 
and New South Wales; and with previous involvement in research projects with pig 
producers in Victoria, South Australia, New South Wales, Queensland and Western 
Australia; was consulted to obtain required information that had not been collected. 
Consultation was informally conducted by email using open questions.   
 
 7.2.3 Pathways and scenario trees 
7.2.3.1 European starlings 
The scenario tree shown in Figure 7.1 was used to describe the exposure of domestic pigs 
to the three pathogens studied in starlings. Three pathways of exposure of a domestic pig to 
a pathogen from a starling were identified: contaminated faeces in the environment, 
contaminated faeces in food, and contaminated faeces in water. The pathways and nodes of 
this scenario tree are represented in Figure 7.1, and nodes and branches for each node are 
described below and summarised in Table 7.1. It was assumed there would be no direct 
contact between starlings and pigs via consumption of a starling carcass. 
 
7.2.3.1.1 European starlings present around the piggery: Starlings must be present at a 
piggery for exposure to occur. The proportion of piggeries with starlings present was 
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identified in Chapter 2. Of the 170 piggeries that reported wild animal observations, 24 
recorded specific starling observations and an additional 31 recorded observations of 
unspecified wild birds, some or all of which may have been starlings. The proportion of 
piggeries with starlings was incorporated into the model using a Beta distribution with the 
total starling and wild bird observations, to account for uncertainty around this proportion.  
 
7.2.3.1.2 Number of starlings present: The number of starlings present on piggeries is 
likely to impact the probability of exposure and subsequent risk of transmission, and thus 
was considered a risk factor. This node accounted for the differential risk of pigs being 
exposed, while using a single value for probability of exposure across all piggeries (Martin 
et al. 2007), and thus is considered a risk node. The number of starlings on piggeries 
reporting their presence was also obtained from Chapter 2. Of the 24 piggeries that 
observed starlings, 15 provided estimates of starling numbers. This node had three 
branches according to the number of starlings reported per week, obtaining piggeries with 
low, medium and high numbers of birds. Four piggeries observed less than 500 starlings, 8 
observed between 500 and 1999 starlings, and 3 observed greater than 2000 starlings a 
week. A Beta distribution was used for each of these number proportions to account for 
uncertainty around this estimate. In addition, to incorporate the differential risk associated 
with the number of starlings around the piggery, an estimate of the risk of exposure in 
piggeries with high numbers of birds relative to those in the other two piggery categories 
was required. As no information was available regarding the difference in risk according to 
the bird number, the relative risk of high and medium number was assumed to be 10 and 5 
times higher, respectively, than that in piggeries with a low number of starlings. To 
incorporate uncertainty around the relative risk, the Pert distributions (5, 10, 15) and (2, 5, 
10), were used for a high and medium number of birds, respectively. 
      
7.2.3.1.3 Proportion of piggeries with different starling infection: Results from Chapter 4 
indicate that not every piggery had starlings infected with the pathogens studied, or may 
have a varying level of pathogen presence in starlings. Consequently, the proportion of 
piggeries with infected starlings was included in the model. For the purposes of this 
exposure assessment, the sampling events in 2008 and 2009 for piggery B have been 
treated as separate piggeries due to the different sampling periods and possibly different 
starling populations, bringing the total number of piggery observations to five. Only one 
out of the five piggeries selected for capture and sampling of starlings had starlings 
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infected with Campylobacter spp. and Salmonella spp. Pathogenic Escherichia coli was 
detected in starlings in all five piggery observations. However, the prevalence of this 
pathogen varied between piggeries: four piggery observations had a prevalence higher than 
3.9% (considered moderate prevalence) and one piggery had starlings infected at a low 
prevalence (1%). Proportions of piggeries with starlings infected with low or moderate 
prevalence were incorporated into the model using a Beta distribution. 
 
7.2.3.1.4 Prevalence in starlings: Starlings must be infected with the target pathogen of 
interest for exposure to occur. Prevalence estimates were obtained from Chapter 4. The 
true prevalence of Campylobacter spp. and Salmonella spp. in starlings is shown in Table 
4.7 in Chapter 4. True prevalence data of pig-pathogenic Escherichia coli is shown in 
Table 4.8 in Chapter 4. Prevalence was incorporated into the model with a Pert distribution 
using the lower 95% confidence interval, true prevalence estimate and upper 95% 
confidence interval for each pathogen. An additional 20% was added to the Salmonella 
spp. prevalence estimates based on Hinton (1988), who identified that cloacal swabs 
underestimate the proportion of Salmonella spp. infected birds by 23% compared to caecal 
contents. For a pathogen where more than one piggery has a low, moderate or high 
prevalence, an average of the Pert distributions was obtained. For those piggeries that did 
not have the pathogen detected in the starling population, the upper 95% confidence 
interval was not zero, and thus a Pert distribution was calculated for these as well.  
 
7.2.3.1.5 Starling access to pig environment: Whether starlings had access to the pig 
environment was estimated by information on piggery types and bird control measures 
described in Chapter 2. Of the 55 pig producers reporting starlings and wild birds, only two 
used nets that restricted entry of birds to the piggery. Access was assumed to occur in those 
piggeries without nets. A Beta distribution of the proportion of piggeries without nets 
according to the results from Chapter 2, [1−(2/55)], was considered to be the maximum 
value among piggeries in Australia. As such, this value was used as the maximum of a Pert 
distribution, with minus 5% and 10% for the most likely and minimum values.  
 
7.2.3.1.6 Starling access to pig food and water: Estimation of starling access to food and 
water, once pig housing was accessed, was based on the types of feed and water 
distribution systems used in piggeries. As information on the proportion of piggeries using 
different types of food and water distribution systems in Australia was not available, a pig 
 145
veterinarian was consulted. Two different types of feeding systems were identified: ad 
libitum feeding troughs, and feed distributing conveyor or auger systems. Similarly, two 
types of water systems were identified: ad libitum water troughs, and enclosed water nipple 
or bite drinkers.  
 
The troughs and open auger designs allow for starling access. An estimated 75% and 30% 
of piggeries have feeders and drinkers that allow birds access to pig feed and water, 
respectively. These proportions were incorporated into the model as the most likely value 
of a Pert distribution with minus and plus 10% as the minimum and maximum values to 
account for uncertainty around these estimates. 
 
7.2.3.1.7 Pathogen survival: The survival of pathogens excreted in bird faeces in various 
substrates was estimated based on literature. However, survival of these pathogens in the 
same substrates found in piggeries has not been previously studied. As such, a qualitative 
value was assigned to pathogen survival, which was then translated into a quantitative 
value using a uniform distribution following the semi-quantitative methodology described 
in the Guidelines for Import Risk Analysis (DAFF 2004). Standard conversions of 
qualitative values were as follows: very low probability ranged from 0.001 to 0.05, low 
probability ranged from 0.05 to 0.3, moderate probability ranged from 0.3 to 0.7 and high 
probability ranged from 0.7 to 1.0. The same procedure was used for all qualitative 
estimates throughout the exposure assessment. 
 
Survival of Escherichia coli in the pig environment, food and water was determined to be 
high. This estimation was based on the 66-day survival of Escherichia coli in soil seeded 
with chicken manure and containing 103 organisms per gram at room temperature 
(Mitscherlich and Marth 1984). Although survival of Escherichia coli in water was shown 
to be variable, previous studies reported survival periods of 26 (Cools et al. 2001) and 49 
days (Guan and Holley 2003). Escherichia coli survive for longer at cooler temperatures. 
 
Survival of Salmonella spp. was also estimated to be high. This pathogen was reported to 
survive for 13 months in dry faeces (Fedorka-Cray et al. 2000). In a study by Temple et al. 
(1980), the pathogen declined from 106 bacteria per gram of soil to 104 per gram of soil 
over an 8-week period, indicating a half life of over 2 months at room temperature. On an 
organic outdoor Danish piggery, Salmonella spp. was detectable for up to 5 weeks in 
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paddocks after the removal of pigs (Jensen et al. 2006). Salmonella spp. also survive for 
long periods of time in water, as reported by Guan and Holley (2003), who found that the 
pathogen survived in water for between 45 and 152 days. Salmonella spp. survive longer at 
cooler temperatures. 
 
Survival of Campylobacter spp. in different substrates is comparatively lower than survival 
of the other pathogens. At temperatures between 20 and 30 ºC, survival is less than 2 days 
in natural water, 10 days in soil and 3 days in cattle manure or slurry (Guan and Holley 
2003). As such, survival was estimated to be moderate in the pig environment and low in 
pig food and water. This pathogen could survive for longer periods of time at lower 
temperatures, with the longest survival reported at temperatures below 0 ºC. 
 
7.2.3.1.8 Pig contact: Pig contact with the contaminated environment, food and water was 
also determined by expert opinion. Contact of the pigs with food and water was determined 
to be certain. Similarly, contact of pigs with bird faeces in their environment, although not 
certain, was estimated to be very high probability due to the curious nature of pigs. A Pert 
distribution with a maximum of 1, most likely of 0.95 and minimum of 0.90 was used.  
 
7.2.3.1.9 Infection of pig: The probability of the pig being infected after contact with the 
pathogen was estimated based on the amount of pathogen shed by birds, as well as the dose 
required to infect pigs. These parameters were determined from literature. It is assumed 
that the domestic pigs are totally susceptible. 
 
The probability of pigs being infected with Escherichia coli on contact with any of the 
contaminated materials was estimated to be high. The infective dose of Escherichia coli for 
pigs is low, at approximately 104 bacteria (Cornick and Helgerson 2004). Shedding 
quantity and duration from chickens and other wild birds was used as there was no data 
available in literature about shedding of these pathogens from starlings. Chickens shed the 
pathogen at a high level for 35 days, and a medium level for another 35 days. Geese, coots 
and gulls shed an average quantity of 8.8 ×106, 1 ×107 and 1.2 ×108 colony-forming units 
per gram of faeces, respectively, though the period of time in which they shed the pathogen 
is unknown (Meerburg et al. 2011). These levels are sufficient to cause infection in pigs. 
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Infection of pigs on contact with Salmonella spp.-contaminated materials was also deemed 
to be high probability. Although the infective dose in pigs is much higher than for 
Escherichia coli, with 108 bacteria required to reliably achieve infection (Anderson et al. 
1998), infected chickens are reported to shed the pathogen at a qualitatively-described high 
level for up to six weeks in some cases (Shivaprasad et al. 1990). 
 
The probability of pigs becoming infected with Campylobacter jejuni was also estimated to 
be high. Previous work reported an infective dose in pigs of between 104 and 108 bacteria, 
which is considered low (Mansfield et al. 2003; Parthasarathy and Mansfield 2009). In 
addition, gulls, pigeons and wild geese can shed from 104 to 106 colony-forming units per 
gram of faeces (Ogden et al. 2009), and shedding can last for approximately 2 months at an 
average of 3.2 ×106 colony-forming units per gram of faeces in the caeca of chickens 
(Achen et al. 1998). 
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Figure 7.1. Scenario tree representing the exposure assessment evaluating the probability 
of domestic pigs on piggeries in Australia being exposed to Escherichia coli, Salmonella 
spp. and Campylobacter jejuni from European starlings.  
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Table 7.1. Nodes, parameters and input values used for the exposure assessment evaluating the probability of domestic pigs on piggeries in 
Australia being exposed to Escherichia coli, Salmonella spp. and Campylobacter jejuni from European starlings. 
Node Branch of 
node 
Parameter estimates Input values a Data sources 
1. European 
starlings present 
around the piggery? 
Yes 
 
No 
Probability of European 
starlings being present 
around the piggery 
RiskBeta (56, 116) 
 
Chapter 2 
2. Number of 
European starlings 
present around the 
piggery per week 
Low (<500) 
 
Medium (500–
1999) 
 
High (≥ 2000) 
Proportion of piggeries 
with low, medium and high 
number of European 
starlings observed per 
week 
 
Relative risk of exposure 
according to the number of 
European starlings around 
the piggery per week (Low 
being the reference) 
Low: RiskBeta (5, 12) 
Medium: RiskBeta (9, 8) 
High: RiskBeta (4, 13) 
 
 
 
Medium: RiskPert (2, 5, 10) 
High: RiskPert (5, 10, 15) 
 
Chapter 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assumption 
3. Proportion of 
piggeries with 
different starling 
infection 
Yes 
 
No 
Proportion of piggeries 
with infected starlings.  
 
Proportion of piggeries 
with low and moderate 
level of infection (for 
Escherichia coli, as all 
piggeries were infected) 
Salmonella spp. Moderate: RiskBeta (2, 5) 
Campylobacter jejuni Moderate: RiskBeta (2, 5) 
Escherichia coli:    Low: RiskBeta (2, 5) 
   Moderate: RiskBeta (5, 2) 
 
 
Chapter 4 
4. Prevalence in 
starlings  
Yes 
 
No 
Prevalence of the pathogen 
in the European starling 
population  
Escherichia coli (two levels of prevalence):  
Moderate: Average of the output of the  
following Pert distributions 
Chapter 4 and 
Literature: Hinton 
1988. 
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 1: RiskPert (0.01, 0.04, 0.10) 
2: RiskPert (0.04, 0.08, 0.16) 
3: RiskPert (0.01, 0.04, 0.10) 
4: RiskPert (0.07, 0.12, 0.20) 
Low: RiskPert (0, 0.010, 0.051) 
 
Salmonella spp.: 
Moderate: RiskPert ( 0.01, 0.04, 0.10) ; + 20% 
of RiskPert output 
Low: Average of the output of the  following 
Pert distributions + 20% 
1: RiskPert (0, 0, 0.02) 
2: RiskPert (0, 0, 0.02) 
3: RiskPert (0, 0, 0.02) 
4: RiskPert (0, 0, 0.02) 
 
Campylobacter jejuni  
Moderate: RiskPert ( 0.01, 0.03, 0.08) 
Low: Average of the output of the  following 
Pert distributions 
1: RiskPert (0, 0, 0.04) 
2: RiskPert(0, 0, 0.04) 
3: RiskPert (0, 0, 0.04) 
4: RiskPert (0, 0, 0.04) 
5. Starling access to 
pig environment 
Yes 
 
No 
Probability that European 
starlings will have access 
to pig housing 
RiskPert (maximum −10%, maximum −5%, 
maximum) 
maximum: 1−Proportion of piggeries with nets to 
control European Starlings (RiskBeta(3, 54)) 
Chapter 2 and 
Expert Opinion 
6. Starling access to Yes Probability that European Food: RiskPert (most likely −10%, most likely, Chapter 2 and 
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pig food/water  
No 
starlings will have access 
to pig food/water 
most likely +10%) 
Most likely: 0.75 (75% piggeries with feeders 
allowing bird access) 
 
Water: RiskPert (most likely −10%, most likely, 
most likely +10%) 
Most likely: 0.3 (30% piggeries allow bird water 
access) 
Expert Opinion 
7. Pathogen survival Yes 
 
No 
Probability that the 
pathogen will survive in 
the 
environment/food/water 
Escherichia coli: High: RiskUniform (0.7, 1.0) 
 
Salmonella spp.: High: RiskUniform (0.7, 1.0) 
 
Campylobacter jejuni: 
Environment: Moderate: RiskUniform ( 0.3, 
0.7); Food/water: Low: RiskUniform (0.05, 0.3) 
Literature: 
Temple et al. 1980; 
Mitscherlich and 
Marth 1984; Guan 
and Holley 2003; 
Cools et al. 2001; 
Fedorka-Cray et al. 
2000; Jensen et al. 
2006 
8. Pig contact Yes 
 
No 
Probability pigs will 
contact the 
environment/food/water 
Environment: RiskPert (maximum−10%, 
maximum – 5%, 1) 
 
Food/water: 1 
Expert Opinion 
9. Infection of pig Yes 
 
No 
Probability pigs will 
receive sufficient dose of 
pathogen and become 
infected 
RiskUniform (0.7, 1.0)  Literature: 
Anderson et al. 
1998; Achen et al. 
1998; Cornick and 
Helgerson 2004; 
Shivaprasad et al. 
1990; Ogden et al. 
2009; 
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Parthasarathy and 
Mansfield 2009; 
Mansfield et al. 
2003; Meerburg et 
al. 2011. 
a RiskBeta = Beta distribution (successes + 1, total number – successes + 1); RiskPert = Pert distribution (minimum, most likely, maximum); 
RiskUniform = Uniform distribution (minimum, maximum) 
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7.2.3.2 Rats 
The scenario tree shown in Figure 7.2 was used to describe the exposure of domestic pigs 
to the three pathogens studied in rats. There were four pathways of exposure of a domestic 
pig to a pathogen from a rat: contaminated faeces in the environment, contaminated faeces 
in food, contaminated faeces in water, and ingestion of an infected rat carcass. The 
pathways and nodes of this scenario tree are represented in Figure 7.2, and nodes and 
branches for each node are described below and summarised in Table 7.2.  
 
7.2.3.2.1 Rats present around the piggery: This node was calculated as for the European 
starlings (Section 7.2.3.1.1). Of the 170 piggeries that reported wild animal observations, 
66 recorded rodents. This proportion was incorporated using a Beta distribution to account 
for the fact that this scenario considers rats only (instead of all rodents).  
 
7.2.3.2.2 Number of rats present: This node was calculated as for the European starlings 
(Section 7.2.3.1.2). Of the 66 piggeries that observed rodents, 28 provided estimates of 
rodent numbers. This node had two branches, according to the number of rodents reported 
per week, obtaining piggeries with low and high numbers of rodents. Twenty-two piggeries 
observed less than 100 rodents, and six observed greater than or equal to 100 rodents a 
week. A Beta distribution was used for each of these number proportions to account for 
any uncertainty due to the estimates being for rodents in general, not rats specifically. The 
differential risk was incorporated as for European starlings, described in Section 7.2.3.1.2, 
though with only a low and a high category used. 
 
7.2.3.2.3 Proportion of piggeries with different rat infection: Results from Chapter 5 
indicate that not every piggery has rats infected with the pathogens studied, or may have a 
varying level of pathogen presence in rats. As such, the proportion of piggeries with 
different levels of infection in rats was included in the model. None of the piggeries 
selected for capture and sampling of rats had rats infected with Brachyspira 
hyodysenteriae, and as a consequence there were not different levels of infection in rats 
identified in our study. The level of infection in rodents was investigated in literature, see 
Section 7.2.3.2.4. According to literature a similar level of infection was reported for 
studies, though these studies were located in different countries and detected the pathogen 
in rats or mice, as such the literature did not allow for categorisation of piggeries in to 
different levels of infection. Subsequently for Brachyspira hyodysenteriae this node was 
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not considered. Lawsonia intracellularis, detected via real-time qPCR, and Salmonella spp. 
were detected in rats on all three piggeries. Only one piggery had rats infected at a low 
prevalence (lower than 5%) for Lawsonia intracellularis, and only one piggery was 
infected at a moderate level (greater than 5%) for Salmonella spp.. The proportions of 
piggeries with rats infected and these varying prevalence levels were incorporated into the 
model using a Beta distribution.  
 
7.2.3.2.4 Prevalence in rats: This node was calculated as for the European starlings 
(Section 7.2.3.1.4). Pert distributions were included as for European starlings (Section 
7.2.3.1.4). Prevalence estimates of the pathogen presence in rats were obtained from 
Chapter 5. In the case of Brachyspira hyodysenteriae, which was not detected in any of the 
three piggeries undertaking measures to control the disease in domestic pigs, the 
prevalence of rodent infection was obtained from literature. Hampson et al. (1991) detected 
1 infected rat out of a total 44 sampled from a piggery in Australia; Joens and Kinyon 
(1982) detected 4 infected mice out of a total 157 sampled from piggeries in the United 
States; and Fellström et al. (2004) detected 3 positive mice out of a total 8 sampled in a 
piggery in Sweden. The true prevalence of Lawsonia intracellularis from the real-time 
qPCR and Salmonella spp. in rats is shown in Table 5.7 and 5.6, respectively, in Chapter 5. 
Prevalence was incorporated into the model with a Pert distribution using the lower 95% 
confidence interval, true prevalence estimate and upper 95% confidence interval for each 
pathogen.  
 
7.2.3.2.5 Rat access to pig environment: This node was calculated as for the European 
starlings (Section 7.2.3.1.5). There are no strategies available to prevent rodent entry to a 
piggery that is not entirely enclosed. A Beta distribution was used to incorporate 
uncertainty around the estimate of the proportion of piggeries that are not completely 
enclosed, with a maximum figure of 100%. A Pert distribution was used and a most likely 
value, of 5% less than this maximum figure, and minimum proportion, of 10% less than 
this maximum figure were included.  
 
7.2.3.2.6 Rat access to pig food and water: This node was calculated as for the European 
starlings (Section 7.2.3.1.6). According to the expert consulted in this assessment, the 
majority of piggeries have feeders that would allow rats access to pig feed. The 
corresponding input value was incorporated into the model using a Pert distribution with a 
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maximum of 100%, most likely of 95% and minimum of 90%. In contrast, only 30% of 
piggeries were estimated to be using drinkers that would allow rat access to water, such as 
water troughs and cups. This proportion was used as the most likely probability of rats 
accessing pig water in a Pert distribution. The minimum and maximum values of the 
distribution were estimated as minus 10% and plus 10% of this most likely value (0.3). The 
rest of the piggeries use nipple or bite drinkers, which are assumed to prevent rat contact 
with water.  Rat access to pig food was estimated to be more likely than that of birds, as 
rats usually live inside the piggery and can directly access feed in the pig pens. 
 
7.2.3.2.7 Pathogen survival: This node was calculated as for the European starlings 
(Section 7.2.3.1.7). The survival of pathogens excreted in rat faeces in various substrates 
was estimated based on literature.  
 
Survival of Brachyspira hyodysenteriae in the pig environment, food and in a rat carcass 
was determined to be high. This estimation was based on the survival of the pathogen in 
soil and faeces for 112 days at 10 ºC (Boye et al. 2001). Survival in water was estimated to 
be moderate, with an average survival time of 5 to 6 days with a temperature range 
between 13 and 32°C (Olson 1995). 
 
Survival of Lawsonia intracellularis was also estimated to be high in all substrates. This 
was based on the survival of the bacteria in sufficient quantities in faeces stored in air at 
room temperature over a two week period to still cause infection of pigs (Collins 2006). 
The survival of the pathogen in water has not been investigated, and is an area of data 
deficiency. 
 
Survival of Salmonella spp. was also high in all substrates, and is described in the 
European starling Section 7.2.3.1.7.   
 
7.2.3.2.8 Pig contact: This node was calculated as for the European starlings (Section 
7.2.3.1.8). Contact of pigs with a rat carcass in their environment was estimated to be at a 
maximum level of 90%. This was based on the curious nature of pigs from expert opinion. 
A Pert distribution using this maximum, a most likely value 5% lower than this and a 
minimum value 10% lower than this was used.  
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7.2.3.2.9 Infection of pig: This node was calculated as for the European starlings (Section 
7.2.3.1.9). The probability of pigs being infected with Brachyspira hyodysenteriae on 
contact with any of the contaminated materials was estimated to be high. This was based 
on the infective dose of Brachyspira hyodysenteriae for pigs, being between 107 and 109 
bacteria (Jacobson et al. 2004). Mice shed around 107 and 108 bacteria per gram of faeces 
for 180 days (Joens 1980).   
 
The proportion of pigs that would be infected on contact with faeces from a rat infected 
with Lawsonia intracellularis was 29.05%. This was based on a dose rate to cause 
infection in pigs of 105 (Collins et al. 2011). Collins et al. (2011) determined that 29.05% 
of the wild rodents caught on the three piggeries in the current study were shedding 105 
bacteria or greater per gram of their faeces. 
 
Infection of pigs on contact with Salmonella spp.-contaminated materials from rats was 
estimated to be moderate, as mouse droppings have been shown to contain up to 105 
colony forming units per gram of faeces of Salmonella spp. (Fedorka-Cray et al. 2000), 
though pigs require a dose of 108 bacteria to reliably achieve infection (Anderson et al. 
1998). 
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Figure 7.2. Scenario tree representing the exposure assessment evaluating the probability 
of domestic pigs on piggeries in Australia being exposed to Brachyspira hyodysenteriae, 
Lawsonia intracellularis and Salmonella spp. from rats. 
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Table 7.2. Nodes, parameters and input values used for the exposure assessment evaluating the probability of domestic pigs on piggeries in 
Australia being exposed to Brachyspira hyodysenteriae, Lawsonia intracellularis and Salmonella spp. from rats. 
Node Branch of 
node 
Parameter estimates Input values a Data sources 
1. Rat present 
around the piggery? 
Yes 
 
No 
Probability of rats being 
present around the piggery 
 
RiskBeta (67, 105) 
 
Chapter 2 
2. Number of rats 
present around the 
piggery per week 
Low (< 100) 
 
High (≥ 100) 
Proportion of piggeries with 
low and high number of rats 
observed per week 
 
Relative risk of exposure 
according to the number of 
rats around the piggery per 
week (Low being the 
reference) 
Low: RiskBeta (23, 7) 
High: RiskBeta (7, 23) 
 
 
High: RiskPert (5, 10, 15) 
Chapter 2 
3. Proportion of 
piggeries with 
different rat 
infection  
Yes 
 
No 
Proportion of piggeries with 
infected rats.  
 
Proportion of piggeries with 
low and moderate level of 
infection for Salmonella spp. 
and proportion of piggeries 
with low and high for 
Lawsonia intracellularis as 
all piggeries were infected. 
Node not relevant for 
Brachyspira hyodysenteriae 
Lawsonia intracellularis: Low: RiskBeta (2, 
3); High: RiskBeta (3, 2) 
 
Salmonella spp.: Low: RiskBeta (3, 2) 
Moderate: RiskBeta (2, 3) 
 
 
Chapter 5 
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4. Prevalence in rats  Yes 
 
No 
Prevalence of the pathogen 
in the rat population.  
 
Brachyspira hyodysenteriae – With control: 
Average of the output of the following Pert 
distributions: 
1: RiskPert (0.0, 0.0, 0.04) 
2: RiskPert (0.0, 0.0, 0.01) 
3: RiskPert (0.0, 0.0, 0.01) 
 
Brachyspira hyodysenteriae – Without control: 
Average of the output of the following Pert 
distributions: 
1: RiskPert (0.0, 0.01, 0.10) 
2: RiskPert (0.0, 0.01, 0.04) 
3: RiskPert (0.10, 0.36, 0.71) 
 
Lawsonia intracellularis (two levels of 
prevalence):  
Low: RiskPert (0.0, 0.01, 0.07)  
 
High: Average of the output of the  following 
Pert distributions: 
1: RiskPert (0.72, 0.84, 0.92) 
2: RiskPert (0.61, 0.70, 0.79) 
 
Salmonella spp. (two levels of prevalence):  
Moderate: RiskPert (0.016, 0.067, 0.164)   
 
Low: Average of the output of the following 
Pert distributions: 
1: RiskPert (0.0, 0.0, 0.04) 
2: RiskPert (0.0, 0.0, 0.04) 
Chapter 5 (Data for 
Brachyspira 
hyodysenteriae not 
shown) Literature: 
True prevalence 
calculations from 
Hampson et al. 
1991; Joens and 
Kinyon 1982; and 
Fellström et al. 
2004 
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5. Rat access to pig 
environment 
Yes 
 
No 
Probability that rats will 
have access to pig housing 
RiskPert (maximum −10%, maximum −5%, 
maximum) 
maximum: 1 
Chapter 2 and 
Expert Opinion 
6. Rat access to pig 
food/water 
Yes 
 
No 
Probability that rats will 
have access to pig 
food/water 
Food: RiskPert (0.9, 0.95, 1.0) 
 
Water: RiskPert (most likely −10%, most 
likely, most likely +10%) 
most likely: 0.3 
 
Chapter 2 and 
Expert Opinion 
7. Pathogen survival Yes 
 
No 
Probability that the pathogen 
will survive in the 
environment/food/water 
Brachyspira hyodysenteriae: 
Environment/food/rat carcass: High: 
RiskUniform (0.7, 1.0) 
Water: Moderate: RiskUniform (0.3, 0.7)  
 
Lawsonia intracellularis: High: RiskUniform 
(0.7, 1.0) 
 
Salmonella spp.: High: RiskUniform (0.7, 1.0) 
Literature: 
Boye et al. 2001; 
Olson 1995; 
Collins 2006; 
Fedorka-Cray et al. 
2000; Temple et al. 
1980; Jensen et al. 
2006; Guan and 
Holley 2003 
8. Pig contact  Yes 
 
No 
Probability pigs will contact 
environment/food/water/rat 
carcass 
Environment: RiskPert (maximum −10%, 
maximum –5%, 1) 
 
Food/water: 1 
 
Rat carcass: RiskPert (maximum −10%, 
maximum –5%, 0.9) 
Expert Opinion 
9. Infection of pig Yes 
 
No 
Probability pigs will receive 
sufficient dose of pathogen 
and become infected 
Brachyspira hyodysenteriae: RiskUniform 
(0.7, 1.0) 
 
Lawsonia intracellularis: 0.29 
Literature: Joens 
1980; Shivaprasad 
et al. 1990; 
Anderson et al. 
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Salmonella spp.: RiskUniform (0.3, 0.7) 
 
1998; Fedorka-
Cray et al. 2000; 
Collins et al. 2011. 
a RiskBeta = Beta distribution (successes + 1, total number – successes + 1); RiskPert = Pert distribution (minimum, most likely, maximum); 
RiskUniform = Uniform distribution (minimum, maximum)  
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7.2.3.3 Feral pigs 
Two different scenario trees, shown in Figure 7.3 and 7.4, were used to describe the 
exposure of domestic pigs to the four pathogens studied. The first scenario tree (Figure 7.3) 
describes the two pathways of exposure of a domestic pig to a pathogen, Mycoplasma 
hyopneumoniae, which may be transmitted via direct contact between feral and domestic 
pigs or via the air. Although it is possible that infection through indirect contact with 
contaminated secretions may be a route of infection, it is not listed in Taylor (2006), Straw 
et al. (2006) or Jackson and Cockcroft (2007). Additionally, Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae 
infects pigs via the respiratory system, so inhalation is necessary to start an infection, 
hence indirect contact was deemed too insignificant to be included in the current study. 
Direct contact, as well as contact with contaminated feral pig secretions, were the two 
pathways used for exposure of a domestic pig to the final three pathogens, Leptospira spp., 
Brucella suis and Lawsonia intracellularis (Figure 7.4). The pathways and nodes of these 
scenario trees are represented in Figure 7.3 and 7.4, and nodes and branches for each node 
are described below and summarised in Table 7.3 and 7.4.  
 
7.2.3.3.1 Feral pig present around the piggery: This node was calculated as for the 
European starlings (Section 7.2.3.1.1). Of the 170 piggeries that reported wild animal 
observations, 20 recorded feral pigs. To account for uncertainty around this proportion, a 
Beta distribution of the feral pig observations was used. 
 
7.2.3.3.2 Number of feral pigs present: This node was calculated as for the European 
starlings (Section 7.2.3.1.2). Of the 20 piggeries that observed feral pigs, 15 provided 
estimates of feral pig numbers. This node had two branches, according to the number of 
feral pigs reported per week, obtaining piggeries with low and high numbers of feral pigs. 
Nine piggeries observed up to one feral pig and six observed more than one feral pig per 
week. A Beta distribution was used for each of these proportions to account for any 
uncertainty around the estimates. The differential risk was incorporated as for European 
starlings, Section 7.2.3.1.2, though with only a low and high category used. 
 
The node for level of infection included in the starling and rat exposure assessment, 
identifying the proportions of piggeries with a high, moderate or low infection prevalence, 
was not included in the feral pig exposure assessment. This was due to the fact that only a 
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single feral pig population around two different piggeries was analysed, so a proportion of 
infection difference was not ascertained for different piggeries. 
 
7.2.3.3.3 Prevalence in feral pigs: This node was calculated as for the European starlings 
(Section 7.2.3.1.4). Prevalence estimates of the pathogen presence in feral pigs were 
obtained from Chapter 6. The true prevalence of Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae, Leptospira 
spp., Brucella spp. and Lawsonia intracellularis in feral pigs is shown in Table 6.3 in 
Chapter 6. The Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae PCR true prevalence and confidence intervals 
were used, as the PCR indicated current infection and shedding of the pathogen, while the 
ELISA detected antibodies which may have been as a result of a past infection. Prevalence 
was incorporated into the model with a Pert distribution using the lower 95% confidence 
interval, true prevalence estimate and upper 95% confidence interval for each pathogen. 
 
7.2.3.3.4 Feral pig access to piggery property: The probability of feral pigs accessing a 
piggery property was estimated from information in Chapter 2 and literature. One pig 
producer among the 20 reporting feral pigs provided comment that feral pigs dig under the 
perimeter fence to gain access to their property. This probability of 5% was used as the 
most likely figure of pig access. A Pert distribution was then used with a minimum 
estimate of 1% and maximum estimate of 10%. The minimum and maximum probability 
values were estimated through information on piggery sizes in literature, with the small 
piggeries with less than 10 sows (approximately 70% of pig producers in Australia) 
assumed to have a higher likelihood of lower biosecurity practices (APL 2008).  
 
7.2.3.3.5 Feral pig direct contact: The probability that feral pigs and domestic pigs were 
able to have direct contact once the piggery perimeter had been breached was based on 
expert opinion. On free-range piggeries, contact between feral and domestic pigs was 
estimated to be very likely. A probability of 90% was used as the most likely value in a 
Pert distribution, with a minus and plus 10% range as the minimum and maximum values.  
 
The probability of direct contact on an indoor piggery was estimated to be 10%, 
significantly lower than that for free-range piggeries. This was expected to occur mainly in 
old indoor piggeries with poor maintenance and damaged infrastructure. High uncertainty 
was associated with this estimate due to the wide range of characteristics and practices of 
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indoor piggeries. As such, a minus and plus 50% of the most likely value (0.1) were used 
as the minimum and maximum figures in a Pert distribution.  
 
7.2.3.3.6 Feral pig proximity to the piggery: This node only relates to Mycoplasma 
hyopneumoniae, as shown in Figure 7.3 and Table 7.3. The proximity of feral pigs to the 
piggery was based on the data in Table 6.10 in Chapter 6 where data points were restricted 
to a Horizontal Dilution of Precision of ≤ 6.0. The number of data points for total recorded 
movement of feral pigs was 19,309. The total number of data points occurring within 100 
m, 100 m to 500 m, and 501 m to 5000 m, were 5, 8 and 13839, respectively. Proportions 
of these proximity measures were incorporated into the model using a Beta distribution. 
 
7.2.3.3.7 Pathogen survival: This node only relates to Leptospira spp., Brucella spp. and 
Lawsonia intracellularis, as shown in Figure 7.4 and Table 7.4. The survival of pathogens 
excreted in feral pig secretions was estimated to be high for all three pathogens and was 
based on literature.  
 
The survival of Leptospira spp. in soil and water was estimated to be 45 to 74 days and 7 
to 14 days at room temperature, respectively (Faine 1994). Survival of Brucella spp. was 
120 days in bovine faeces at room temperature, 27 days in soil at room temperature, 81 
days in water at 22 ºC, 114 days in water at −4 ºC, and 4 days in cow urine at room 
temperature (Mitscherlich and Marth 1984). Survival of Lawsonia intracellularis was as 
for rats, shown in Section 7.2.3.2.7. 
 
7.2.3.3.8 Pig contact with secretions: This node only relates to Leptospira spp., Brucella 
spp. and Lawsonia intracellularis, as shown in Figure 7.4 and Table 7.4. Domestic pig 
contact with contaminated secretions was estimated by expert opinion to have a most likely 
value of 0.90 for free-range piggeries, minus and plus 10% for minimum and maximum 
figures included in the Pert distribution. The most likely figure on indoor piggeries was 
estimated to be 0.10, minus and plus 20% for minimum and maximum figures included in 
the Pert distribution.    
 
7.2.3.3.9 Infection of pigs: The probability of pigs being infected upon direct contact or 
indirect contact with contaminated secretions or air was determined from literature. It is 
assumed that the domestic pigs are totally susceptible. 
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The probability of pigs being infected with Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae on direct contact 
with feral pigs was a Beta distribution of 10 out of 12 (Fano et al. 2005). The probability of 
infection with Leptospira spp. and Brucella spp. on direct contact was estimated to be 
high. A Beta distribution of 9 out of 10 pigs became infected with Leptospira spp. upon 
direct contact with an infected individual (Burnstein and Baker 1954). A high estimate was 
used for Brucella suis, as a dose rate of 105 is required to cause Brucella spp. infection in 
domestic pigs, while boars eliminate Brucella spp. bacteria in their semen in tremendous 
numbers (Hutchings 1950). A moderate level of infection was estimated for Lawsonia 
intracellularis, as infection through direct contact with this pathogen occurs via the faecal 
oral route. Faecal ingestion on direct contact was estimated to be less likely, despite the 
likelihood of feral pigs shedding in sufficient quantities in their faeces to cause infection. 
 
For in-direct contact, the probability of domestic pigs becoming infected with Leptospira 
spp. upon contact with feral pig urine was a Beta distribution of 9 out of 10 (Burnstein and 
Baker 1954). These figures were used as pigs excrete Leptospira bacteria in their urine in 
enormous numbers, with bacteria excreted in the urine of 32 of 34 pigs in a study by 
Burnstein and Baker (1954). Additionally, the bacterium survives in cow urine for up to 35 
days when stored between 15 and 17 ºC. In the absence of accurate data for Brucella suis, 
an estimate of 8 out of 10 was used due to the similarity in dose and secretions to 
Leptospira spp. For Lawsonia intracellularis, four out of five pigs become infected upon 
contact with infected faeces (Collins 2008). A Beta distribution was used for all of these 
estimates to account for variability. 
 
The probability of domestic pigs becoming infected with Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae 
through infected air was reliant upon the distance from the infection source and was 
estimated from literature. Dee et al. (2009) has reported detection of the pathogen 4.7 km 
from the infection source. However, the quantity of bacteria detected was not investigated. 
Whether there would be a sufficient quantity to cause infection in pigs at this distance still 
remains unknown. Cardona et al. (2005) determined an infection rate of 100% with 
Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae at a distance from the source of 150 m. Infection response in 
pigs located at a greater distance than 150 m from the source of infection has not been 
studied. In the current study it was assumed that Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae was being 
constantly expired from infected pigs. Due to this high uncertainty, qualitative estimates 
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were used for airborne infection of this pathogen for feral pigs: less than 100 m from the 
piggery, defined as high risk; 100 m to 500 m from the piggery, defined as moderate risk; 
and between 500 m and 5000 m from the piggery, defined as low risk.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.3. Scenario tree representing the exposure assessment evaluating the probability 
of domestic pigs on piggeries in Australia being exposed to Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae 
from feral pigs. 
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Figure 7.4. Scenario tree representing the exposure assessment evaluating the probability 
of domestic pigs on piggeries in Australia being exposed to Leptospira spp., Brucella suis 
and Lawsonia intracellularis from feral pigs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 168
Table 7.3. Nodes, parameters and input values used for the exposure assessment evaluating the probability of domestic pigs on piggeries in 
Australia being exposed to Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae from feral pigs. 
Node Branch of 
node 
Parameter estimates Input values a Data sources 
1. Feral pig present 
around the piggery? 
Yes 
 
No 
Probability of feral pigs 
being present around the 
piggery 
RiskBeta (21,151) 
 
Chapter 2 
2. Number of feral 
pigs present 
Low (≤1) 
 
High (>1) 
Proportion of piggeries 
with low and high number 
of feral pigs observed per 
week 
 
Relative risk of exposure 
according to the number of 
feral pigs around the 
piggery per week (Low 
being the reference) 
Low: RiskBeta (10, 7) 
High: RiskBeta (7, 10) 
 
 
 
High: RiskPert (5, 10, 15) 
 
Chapter 2 
3. Prevalence in 
feral pigs 
Yes 
 
No 
Prevalence of the pathogen 
in the feral pig population.  
 
Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae (PCR):  
RiskPert (0.17, 0.28, 0.41) 
 
 
Chapter 6 
4. Feral pig access to 
piggery property 
Yes 
 
No 
Probability that feral pigs 
will have access to piggery 
property 
RiskPert (0.01, 0.05, 0.1) 
  
Chapter 2 and 
Literature: 
APL 2008 
5. Feral pig direct 
contact 
Yes 
 
No 
Probability that feral pigs 
will have direct contact 
with domestic pigs. 
Free-range piggery: RiskPert (−10% most likely, 
0.9, +10% most likely) 
 
Indoor piggery: RiskPert (−50% most likely, 0.1, 
+50% most likely) 
Expert Opinion 
 169
6. Feral pig 
proximity to the 
piggery 
< 100 m 
100–500 m 
> 500 m 
Proportion of the reference 
population of feral pigs’ 
range of movement within 
5 km of piggeries. Feral 
pig movement outside of 5 
km are not included as 
transmission is assumed to 
not occur. 
< 100 m: RiskBeta (6, 19305) 
100–500 m: RiskBeta (9, 19302) 
> 500 m: RiskBeta (13840, 5471) 
 
Chapter 6 
7. Infection of 
domestic pig 
Yes 
 
No 
Probability pigs will 
receive sufficient dose of 
pathogen and become 
infected  
 
Direct contact: 
RiskBeta (11, 3) 
 
Aerosol: 
< 100 m: RiskUniform (0.7, 1.0) 
 
100–500 m: RiskUniform (0.3, 0.7) 
 
> 500 m: RiskUniform (0.05, 0.3) 
Literature: Fano et 
al. 2005; Dee et al. 
2009 
a RiskBeta = Beta distribution (successes + 1, total number – successes + 1); RiskPert = Pert distribution (minimum, most likely, maximum); 
RiskUniform = Uniform distribution (minimum, maximum)  
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Table 7.4. Nodes, parameters and input values used for the exposure assessment evaluating the probability of domestic pigs on piggeries in 
Australia being exposed to Leptospira spp., Brucella suis and Lawsonia intracellularis from feral pigs. 
Node Branch of 
node 
Parameter estimates Input values a Data sources 
Nodes 1–2 and 4–5 
as for Table 7.3. 
    
3. Prevalence in 
feral pigs 
Yes 
 
No 
Prevalence of the pathogen 
in the feral pig population.  
 
Leptospira spp.: RiskPert (0.37, 0.49, 0.61) 
 
Brucella suis: RiskPert (0.03, 0.11, 0.22) 
 
Lawsonia intracellularis: RiskPert (1.0, 1.0, 1.0) 
Chapter 6 
6. Pathogen survival Yes 
 
No 
Probability that the 
pathogen will survive in 
the feral pig secretions in 
the environment 
RiskUniform (0.7, 1.0) 
 
Literature: Faine 
1994; Mitscherlich 
and Marth 1984; 
Collins 2008 
7. Pig contact with 
secretions 
Yes 
 
No 
Probability domestic pigs 
will contact feral pig 
secretions in the 
environment. 
RiskPert (minimum, most likely, maximum) 
 
Free-range: RiskPert (−10% most likely, 0.9, 
+10% most likely) 
 
Indoor: RiskPert (−20% most likely, 0.1, +20% 
most likely) 
Expert Opinion 
8. Infection of 
domestic pig 
Yes 
 
No 
Probability pigs will 
receive sufficient dose of 
pathogen and become 
infected. 
Direct Contact: 
Leptospira spp.: RiskUniform (0.7, 1.0) 
 
Brucella suis: RiskUniform (0.7, 1.0) 
 
Lawsonia intracellularis: RiskUniform (0.3, 0.7) 
 
Literature: 
Hutchings 1950; 
Burnstein and 
Baker 1954; 
Collins 2008  
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Indirect Contact: 
Leptospira spp.: RiskBeta (10, 2) 
 
Brucella suis: RiskBeta (9, 3) 
 
Lawsonia intracellularis: RiskBeta (5, 2) 
a RiskBeta = Beta distribution (successes + 1, total number – successes + 1); RiskPert = Pert distribution (minimum, most likely, maximum); 
RiskUniform = Uniform distribution (minimum, maximum) 
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7.2.3.4. Probability of exposure 
7.2.3.4.1. Adjusted risks: The number of wild animals present around the piggeries was the 
only risk node for the probability of exposure considered in these models. Relative risks of 
low, medium and high numbers of wild animals, which have been previously described, 
were adjusted to maintain their relativity while ensuring that the average risk for all the 
piggeries (the population) was one (Martin et al. 2007). The following equation has been 
used: 
 
ii
I
i
i
i
PPrRR
RRAR
×
= 
=1
…… ………………………………………………….Equation 7.1.
        
 
where RRi is the specified relative risk and ARi the adjusted relative risk for the ith branch 
of the node; PrPi is the proportion of the reference population for each branch; and I is the 
number of branches in the risk node.  
 
The adjusted risk was then used to calculate the effective probability of exposure for those 
piggeries with a low, medium and high number of wild animals observed. 
 
7.2.3.4.2. Calculating the scenario tree: For each wild animal species and each pathogen, 
the multiplication rule was used to calculate the probability of exposure for each pathway 
and for each piggery category according to the number of specified wild animals present 
(risk node). Each of these probabilities was then multiplied by the corresponding adjusted 
risk to account for the differential risk between these piggery categories (Martin et al. 
2007). The overall probability of exposure for each pathogen was obtained by adding the 
probabilities for each of the pathways, given these pathways are independent. 
 
 7.2.4 Sensitivity analysis  
The sensitivity of the outputs of the model to all of the input parameters was evaluated 
using the @RISK 5.7 Advanced Sensitivity Analysis (Palisade Corporation, USA). 
Sensitivity analyses were conducted separately for each pathogen from each wild animal 
model to identify which input parameters had the greatest influence on the exposure 
probability outputs. This was evaluated by simulating the outputs for a series of fixed 
values for each input parameter, while keeping the rest of the input parameters to their base 
value. Input parameters that were proportions, probabilities or prevalence were allowed to 
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vary from 0 to 1 in ten steps (0, 0.11, 0.22…) and the simulation was run for 1,000 
iterations. The relative risk of having a medium number of animals in the piggery 
surroundings was fixed to 5, 20 and 50, and for a high number was fixed to 10, 50 and 100. 
The amount by which the median probability of exposure changed when a parameter input 
was varied from its base input value was determined by the following equation: 
 
(║Original median – Changed median║) ……………………………………..Equation 7.2. 
    Original median 
 
7.3. Results 
 
The risk assessment estimated the probability of starlings, rats and feral pigs exposing 
domestic pigs on piggeries in Australia to a number of different pathogens. 
 
 7.3.1. Risk of pathogen transmission from European starlings to domestic 
 pigs 
The median probability of starlings exposing and infecting domestic pigs with Escherichia 
coli, Salmonella spp. and Campylobacter jejuni was estimated to be 0.03, 0.007 and 0.001, 
respectively, as shown in Table 7.5. The probability of exposure of domestic pigs to 
pathogenic Escherichia coli from starlings was 4.3 and 30 times higher than that to 
Salmonella spp. and Campylobacter jejuni, respectively. Similarly, the probability of 
exposure to Salmonella spp. was 7.0 times higher than that to Campylobacter jejuni. 
 
 
Table 7.5. Predicted median (5 and 95 percentiles) probability of exposure of domestic 
pigs to different pathogens from European starlings on piggeries in Australia.a  
Pathogen Probability (median, 5%–95%) 
Escherichia coli 
 
0.03 (0.02–0.04) 
Salmonella spp. 
 
0.007 (0.002–0.02) 
Campylobacter jejuni 
 
0.001 (0.0004–0.003) 
a Output distribution of a simulation stochastic model with 5,000 iterations 
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Results of the sensitivity analysis for the three pathogens are shown in Figures 7.5, 7.6 and 
7.7. The greatest influence on the probability of exposing domestic pigs to Escherichia 
coli, Salmonella spp. and Campylobacter jejuni was the prevalence of infection in 
starlings, followed by the presence of starlings in the piggery. When the prevalence 
estimate for Escherichia coli was set to 1, the probability of exposure to this pathogen 
increased 10-fold. Increasing the starling prevalence estimate for Salmonella spp. and 
Campylobacter jejuni to 1.0 increased the probability of exposure 19- and 25-fold, 
respectively. As expected, removing starlings from a piggery would eliminate any risk of 
pathogen transmission from these animals to domestic pigs. When the probability of 
starlings being present in the piggery was reduced to 0.11, the probability of exposure to 
the different pathogens only decreased slightly, by less than 1-fold. However, if the 
probability of starlings being present was increased to 1, the probability of exposure 
increased 2- to 3-fold for the three pathogens.   
 
Other influential input parameters on the output of the models were the proportion of 
piggeries with infected starlings, the proportion of piggeries with a high number of 
starlings and the pathogen survival in the environment. These varied for each pathogen 
(Figure 7.5, 7.6, 7.7). The proportion of pigs that develop infection was also influential for 
Escherichia coli and Salmonella spp. (Figure 7.5 and 7.6). 
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Figure 7.5. Results of the sensitivity analysis representing the influence of different input variables on the median (red horizontal line) 
probability of exposure of domestic pigs to Escherichia coli from European starlings in piggeries in Australia. Results were obtained from a 
simulation of 1,000 iterations using @Risk’s Advanced Sensitivity Analysis. 
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Figure 7.6. Results of the sensitivity analysis representing the influence of different input variables on the median (red horizontal line) 
probability of exposure of domestic pigs to Salmonella spp. from European starlings in piggeries in Australia. Results were obtained from a 
simulation of 1,000 iterations using @Risk’s Advanced Sensitivity Analysis. 
Note: the median of probability estimate increases to 0.139 when the ‘Prevalence in starlings’ increases to 1.0 (not shown in graph). 
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Figure 7.7. Results of the sensitivity analysis representing the influence of different input variables on the median (red horizontal line) 
probability of exposure of domestic pigs to Campylobacter jejuni from European starlings in piggeries in Australia. Results were obtained 
from a simulation of 1,000 iterations using @Risk’s Advanced Sensitivity Analysis. 
Note: the median of probability estimate increases to 0.026 when the ‘Prevalence in starlings’ increases to 1.0 (not shown in graph). 
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 7.3.2. Risk of pathogen transmission from rats to domestic pigs 
The median probability of rats exposing and infecting domestic pigs with Lawsonia 
intracellularis and Salmonella spp. was estimated to be 0.13 and 0.01, respectively, as 
shown in Table 7.6. The probability of rats exposing pigs to Brachyspira hyodysenteriae 
on a piggery that is not using control measures to mitigate infection was 0.10 (Table 7.6). 
The probability of rats exposing pigs to Brachyspira hyodysenteriae was 33.3 times greater 
on this type of piggery compared to a piggery that had undertaken control measures to 
mitigate infection in pigs (0.003; Table 7.6).  
 
 
Table 7.6. Predicted median (5 and 95 percentiles) probability of exposure of domestic 
pigs to different pathogens from rats on piggeries in Australia.a  
Pathogen Probability (median, 5%–95%) 
Brachyspira hyodysenteriae in a piggery 
using control measures to mitigate 
infection in pigs. 
0.003 (0.0007–0.007) 
Brachyspira hyodysenteriae in a piggery 
NOT using control measures to mitigate 
infection in pigs. 
0.10 (0.05–0.19) 
Lawsonia intracellularis 
 
 
0.13 (0.05–0.23) 
Salmonella spp. 0.01 (0.004–0.04) 
a Output distribution of a simulation stochastic model with 5,000 iterations 
 
 
Results of the sensitivity analysis for the three pathogens are shown in Figures 7.8, 7.9, 
7.10 and 7.11. The prevalence of infection in rats was determined to have the most 
influence on the probability of exposing domestic pigs to Brachyspira hyodysenteriae 
(Figure 7.8 and 7.9) and Salmonella spp. (Figure 7.11). When the median prevalence in 
rats for Brachyspira hyodysenteriae was set to 1.0 for a piggery that had undertaken 
measures to control this infection in pigs (base value of 0.003), the probability of exposure 
to this pathogen increased 265-fold. Increasing the median prevalence estimate for 
Brachyspira hyodysenteriae to 1.0 on a piggery not controlling this infection in pigs (base 
value of 0.13) resulted in a 7-fold increase. 
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The probability of infection in domestic pigs after contacting contaminated material (rat 
faeces, food, water or rat carcasses), the proportion of piggeries with high number of rats, 
and the presence of rats had the most influence on the probability of exposing domestic 
pigs to Lawsonia intracellularis (Figure 7.10). A high number of rats and the presence of 
rats also had an influence on the probability of exposing domestic pigs to Brachyspira 
hyodysenteriae (Figure 7.8 and 7.9) and Salmonella spp. (Figure 7.11). 
 
 
 
 
 180
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.8. Results of the sensitivity analysis representing the influence of different input variables on the median (red horizontal line) 
probability of exposure of domestic pigs to Brachyspira hyodysenteriae from rats in piggeries in Australia that were using control measures to 
mitigate infection of pigs with this pathogen (through either medication, Swiss depopulation or total depopulation). Results were obtained 
from a simulation of 1,000 iterations using @Risk’s Advanced Sensitivity Analysis.  
Prev = Prevalence. 
Note: the median of probability estimate increases to 0.797 when the ‘Prevalence in rats’ increases to 1.0 (not shown in graph). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
0.035
0.040
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
2
0
.
0
4
0
.
0
0
0
.
1
1
0
.
2
2
0
.
3
3
0
.
4
4
0
.
5
6
0
.
6
7
0
.
7
8
0
.
8
9
1
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
1
1
0
.
2
2
0
.
3
3
0
.
4
4
0
.
5
6
0
.
6
7
0
.
7
8
0
.
8
9
1
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
1
1
0
.
2
2
0
.
3
3
0
.
4
4
0
.
5
6
0
.
6
7
0
.
7
8
0
.
8
9
1
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
1
1
0
.
2
2
0
.
3
3
0
.
4
4
0
.
5
6
0
.
6
7
0
.
7
8
0
.
8
9
1
.
0
0
Rat
infection
High density Presence rats Pig infection Rats access housing
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
o
f
 
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
Prev  
in rats 
High number of rats 
 181
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.9. Results of the sensitivity analysis representing the influence of different input variables on the median (red horizontal line) 
probability of exposure of domestic pigs to Brachyspira hyodysenteriae from rats in piggeries in Australia that were not using control 
measures to mitigate infection of pigs with this pathogen. Results were obtained from a simulation of 1,000 iterations using @Risk’s 
Advanced Sensitivity Analysis. 
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Figure 7.10. Results of the sensitivity analysis representing the influence of different input variables on the median (red horizontal line) 
probability of exposure of domestic pigs to Lawsonia intracellularis from rats in piggeries in Australia. Results were obtained from a 
simulation of 1,000 iterations using @Risk’s Advanced Sensitivity Analysis. 
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Figure 7.11. Results of the sensitivity analysis representing the influence of different input variables on the median (red horizontal line) 
probability of exposure of domestic pigs to Salmonella spp. from rats in piggeries in Australia. Results were obtained from a simulation of 
1,000 iterations using @Risk’s Advanced Sensitivity Analysis. 
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 7.3.3. Risk of pathogen transmission from feral pigs to domestic pigs 
The median probability of feral pigs exposing and infecting domestic pigs with 
Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae, Leptospira spp., Brucella suis and Lawsonia intracellularis 
is shown in Table 7.7. Free-range and indoor piggeries had a similar probability of 
exposure of domestic pigs to Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae from feral pigs. However, the 
probability of exposure of domestic pigs to Leptospira spp., Brucella suis and Lawsonia 
intracellularis from feral pigs was 10.0, 10.8 and 8.6 times higher, respectively, on a free-
range piggery compared to an indoor piggery. In addition, the probability of exposure of 
domestic pigs to the different pathogens was higher in piggeries with a high number of 
feral pigs in their surroundings.  
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Table 7.7. Predicted median (5 and 95 percentiles) probability of exposure of domestic pigs to different pathogens from a high and low 
number of feral pigs on free-range and indoor piggeries in Australia.a   
Pathogen Piggery Type Probability (median, 5%–95%) Feral pig 
number 
Probability (median, 5%–95%) 
Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae Free-range 0.005 (0.002–0.01) High 0.01 (0.004–0.02) 
   Low 0.002 (0.0007–0.005) 
 Indoor 0.004 (0.001–0.008) High 0.008 (0.003–0.02) 
   Low 0.002 (0.0005–0.004) 
Leptospira spp.  Free-range 0.004 (0.002–0.008) High 0.009 (0.004–0.02) 
   Low 0.0009 (0.0004–0.002) 
 Indoor 0.0004 (0.0002–0.0008) High 0.001 (0.0004–0.002) 
   Low 9.8 × 10 -5 (7.5 × 10-5–2.3× 10-4)  
Brucella suis  Free-range 0.001 (0.0004–0.003) High 0.002 (0.0006–0.004) 
   Low 0.0003 (0.0001–0.0008) 
 Indoor 9.3 × 10-5 (3.4 × 10-5–2.1 × 10-4) High 1.8 × 10 -4 (6.2 × 10-5–5.0× 10-4) 
   Low 3.5 × 10 -5 (1.2 × 10-5–9.4× 10-5) 
Lawsonia intracellularis  Free-range 0.006 (0.003–0.01) High 0.01 (0.005–0.03) 
   Low 0.002 (0.0008–0.005) 
 Indoor 0.0007 (0.0003–0.001) High 0.001 (0.0005–0.003) 
   Low 0.0002 (9.4× 10-5–0.0006) 
a Output distribution of a simulation stochastic model with 5,000 iterations 
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Results of the sensitivity analysis for the four pathogens are shown in Figures 7.12, 7.13, 
7.14 and 7.15. The presence of feral pigs in the vicinity of a piggery was determined to 
have the most influence on the probability of exposing domestic pigs to Mycoplasma 
hyopneumoniae, followed by the close proximity of feral pigs to the piggery. As expected, 
removing feral pigs from around the piggery reduced the exposure probability to 0.0. 
 
Feral pig access to a piggery was determined to have the most influence on the probability 
of exposing domestic pigs to Leptospira spp., Brucella suis and Lawsonia intracellularis 
from feral pigs on both free-range and indoor piggeries. Increasing the median probability 
of feral pigs accessing a piggery property to 1.0 increased the probability of exposure to 
Leptospira spp., Brucella suis and Lawsonia intracellularis between 17- and 23-fold. 
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Figure 7.12. Results of the sensitivity analysis representing the influence of different input variables on the median (red horizontal line) 
probability of exposure of domestic pigs to Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae from feral pigs in piggeries in Australia. Results were obtained from 
a simulation of 1,000 iterations using @Risk’s Advanced Sensitivity Analysis. 
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Figure 7.13. Results of the sensitivity analysis representing the influence of different input variables on the median (red horizontal line) 
probability of exposure of domestic pigs to Leptospira spp. from feral pigs in piggeries in Australia. Results were obtained from a simulation 
of 1,000 iterations using @Risk’s Advanced Sensitivity Analysis. 
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Figure 7.14. Results of the sensitivity analysis representing the influence of different input variables on the median (red horizontal line) 
probability of exposure of domestic pigs to Brucella suis from feral pigs in piggeries in Australia. Results were obtained from a simulation of 
1,000 iterations using @Risk’s Advanced Sensitivity Analysis. 
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Figure 7.15. Results of the sensitivity analysis representing the influence of different input variables on the median (red horizontal line) 
probability of exposure of domestic pigs to Lawsonia intracellularis from feral pigs in piggeries in Australia. Results were obtained from a 
simulation of 1,000 iterations using @Risk’s Advanced Sensitivity Analysis. 
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7.4. Discussion 
 
This study quantitatively assesses the probability of exposure of domestic pigs to different 
pathogens from wild animals present in and around piggeries. The models presented in this 
study are dynamic, and as such, input parameters can be readily updated when appropriate 
data becomes available. Most input parameters used in the models have been estimated 
from extensive data-gathering exercises, reducing the uncertainty around the estimates and 
supporting the validity of the outputs obtained (Law and Kelton 2000). However, 
probability distributions have been incorporated in the model to account for natural 
variation, as occurs for pathogen prevalence in the wild animals, as well as uncertainty 
around the parameter estimates.  
 
The validity of the models presented was further increased by the modellers understanding 
of the process undertaken to obtain the data used in the assessment (Banks et al. 2001). In 
addition, sensitivity analysis can also verify the models’ validity (Stärk and Pfeiffer 1999), 
which is the case in the current study. The sensitivity analysis conducted has identified that 
the exposure assessment is performing in a logical manner. For example, complete removal 
of wild animals caused a corresponding reduction in risk to zero; increasing and decreasing 
the prevalence of pathogens in wild animals caused a corresponding increase and decrease 
in exposure risk.  
 
For those parameters where data were not available, expert opinion and literature were 
used to obtain the most accurate estimates. Expert opinion is a recognised information 
source within the risk analysis discipline (Vose 2008). However, the validity of a risk 
model can be significantly reduced through the use of expert opinion due to potential bias 
and errors associated with inaccuracy of estimates (Vose 2008). It is recommended that 
one or more experts be consulted to provide parameter estimates (Vose 2008). In the 
current study a single expert with a great deal of experience in the pig industry was 
consulted. For this reason expert opinion has been used sparingly in this study, with 
support from literature provided where possible.   
 
Despite the extensive amount of data gathered for the current study, and the use of 
literature and expert opinion, there are aspects of the exposure assessment where future 
research could be undertaken to strengthen the estimations of risk. The input parameter of 
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most importance for future research is pathogen survival. There is a lack of information in 
literature on the survival of pathogens in the conditions and substrates (including food, 
water, soil and floor material) present on piggeries. Related to this is the lack of 
information on the aerosol transmission potential of Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae. 
Pathogen survival information also has an influence on the probability of infection of 
domestic pigs upon contact with the various substrates. The risk estimate in the current 
study was provided based on an average commercial piggery; this was limited by the 
piggeries involved in the pathogen detection studies. Additional piggeries could be 
assessed to strengthen this. Finally, gathering information via survey of pig producers or 
observation on-farm about the access of wild animals to pig food, water and environment 
would also strengthen the study. 
 
Literature was used to determine the survival of all pathogens studied within a number of 
substrates, although these substrates were not specific to the requirements of this model. 
Survival of pathogens was most frequently studied in faeces, soil and water sources such as 
effluent ponds and rivers (Mitscherlich and Marth 1984; Fedorka-Cray et al. 2000; Guan 
and Holley 2003). However, these substrates were not in piggeries, and thus the conditions 
for these substrates may differ to the average pig environment, food and drinking water. 
Additionally, the likelihood of domestic pigs being infected with Mycoplasma 
hyopneumoniae via the air was uncertain. Though literature has reported the detection of 
contaminated aerosol particles 4.7 km from the infection source (Dee et al. 2005), the 
quantity was not determined, and thus the infection potential remains unknown. As data 
available in literature to support these parameter estimates was limited, further research on 
survival and dose response to Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae from distant sources of 
infection is recommended. Parameter estimates used data from the literature to provide 
base level inputs, and uncertainty was addressed by providing a range of probabilities. 
 
The exposure assessment assumes a simplified model of piggeries, with the accessibility of 
piggeries to starlings and rats being equal irrespective of piggery type. This was based on 
the open nature of most piggeries for ventilation purposes. Nets to restrict entry of birds to 
piggeries were only used in 3.5% of piggeries responding to the survey in Chapter 2. This 
was incorporated into the accessibility estimates. The difference in piggery type was only 
incorporated into the feral pig exposure assessment, due to the difference in accessibility of 
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domestic pigs to feral pigs and their secretions on free-range piggeries compared to 
intensive and ecoshelter piggeries.  
 
As the majority of Australian piggery buildings have open sides for ventilation, exposure 
to aerosols was assumed to be the same regardless of being free-range or indoor. There is a 
possibility that there will be a difference between the exposure of domestic pigs to aerosols 
on free-range compared to indoor piggeries in winter, when windows are closed for 
heating, though this was not considered in the model. More research is needed on the 
shedding frequency, duration, dose, and distance over which transmission is possible, as 
well as the effects of weather on transmission of Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae. 
Additionally, the possibility of domestic pigs being exposed to pathogens on free-range 
piggeries from wild animals, such as feral pigs, through contaminated water run-off 
sourced from outside of the piggery has not been included as a pathway due to the 
extensive lack of information on free-range piggeries with creeks, streams or a geographic 
layout enabling water to run through the piggery. The model could be further developed to 
tailor to individual piggeries with problems with specific pathogens to determine whether 
wild animal transmission to domestic pigs is the likely cause.  
 
The highest risk of exposure of domestic pigs to pathogens was from rats, specifically for 
Lawsonia intracellularis (0.13; 0.05–0.23) and Brachyspira hyodysenteriae (0.10; 0.05–
0.19) on an infected piggery with no control implemented. Potential factors explaining 
these outcomes are the high prevalence of the pathogen in the rat population, the common 
presence of rats in piggeries, the absence of rodent control measures to restrict rodent 
movement, and the rat accessibility to the pig environment, food and water. The sensitivity 
analysis supported this reasoning, as rat infection, rat presence, density of rats and rat 
access to pig housing were identified as the most influential factors in the probability of 
domestic pigs being exposed. 
 
No published studies have investigated the exposure of domestic pigs to endemic 
pathogens from wild animals, with limited studies conducted on other species. A 
quantitative release and exposure assessment conducted by Gallagher (2003) identified that 
badger-to-cattle exposure of Mycobacterium bovis did occur, with a mean of 2.5 cattle in a 
herd size of 74 becoming infected per year in the presence of one badger, or 2.7 cattle in 
the presence of 7 badgers. This equates to a probability of infection on any given day of 
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0.00009 and 0.0001, respectively. The probability of exposure of domestic pigs to 
pathogens from the starlings, rats and feral pigs in the current study was higher. Another 
study (Sutmoller et al. 2000) in Zimbabwe determined a 0.0002 probability of exposure of 
cattle to foot-and-mouth virus from antelopes. Most pathways of exposure in the current 
study were more likely, with only two exposure pathways for feral pigs being of lower 
probability (Leptospira spp. for an indoor piggery with a low number of feral pigs, 0.0001; 
Brucella suis for an indoor piggery, 0.00009)  
  
The sensitivity analysis for all wild animals identified the parameters that had the strongest 
influence on the risk of exposure. Some of these influential parameters, including the 
presence of the wild animal at a piggery; a high number of wild animals; access to 
domestic pig environment; and, in the case of Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae from feral pigs, 
proximity to the piggery; could all be altered through the use of mitigation strategies to 
reduce the risk of pathogen transmission. Additionally the probability of a domestic pig 
becoming infected when exposed to these pathways was also identified as an influential 
parameter, particularly for Lawsonia intracellularis from rats. Domestic pig infection can 
be altered through vaccination protocols. The current study assumes all domestic pigs are 
susceptible to infection. However, for vaccinations that are effective over the lifetime of a 
pig, such as vaccinations to protect against Leptospira pomona, this probability of infection 
will decrease. Any future development of equally effective vaccinations for Lawsonia 
intracellularis and Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae could also play a large part in reducing 
the risk of infection. As such, these are areas where efforts and resources could be focused. 
This will be discussed further in Chapter 8. 
 
The quantitative exposure assessment of the current study is the first assessment to 
evaluate the risk of pathogen transmission from wild animals to domestic pigs, to the 
author’s knowledge. Many of the parameters incorporated into the models to estimate the 
probabilities of exposure are based on field data purposively gathered for this study, and 
when data were not available, literature and expert opinion were used. Results from this 
study highlight the potential risk of pathogen exposure and transmission from starlings, 
rats and feral pigs, and those areas where mitigation strategies could be implemented to 
reduce the identified risk. These findings could support decision-making regarding 
resource allocation to mitigate these risks. 
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8 Discussion/Conclusions 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Wild animals contribute to emerging, transboundary and endemic infection in livestock 
and humans. They also contribute to the introduction, reintroduction and maintenance of 
pathogens. Intensive production systems such as piggeries and cattle feedlots can suffer 
severe consequences from infection with some pathogens transmitted from wild animals. 
This is shown by the high mortality rates caused by specific pathogens, and the culling, 
vaccination and other management practices implemented to control and prevent disease 
spread. International examples demonstrating the costly impact for piggeries include Nipah 
virus (Breed et al. 2006), classical swine fever (Fritzemeier et al. 2000), African swine 
fever (Penrith and Vosloo 2009) and pseudorabies (Hahn et al. 2010). These are cases 
where transmission has been proven to have occurred from wildlife to livestock. However, 
with endemic diseases the source of introduction to a piggery may not be known and the 
extent of wildlife contribution to such local spread is largely unexplored.  
 
A systematic approach to the investigation of this problem would help to identify the level 
of pathogen-related risk presented by wild animals to Australian piggeries, and facilitate 
the development of targeted management strategies to mitigate unacceptably high areas of 
risk. As such, the primary aim of this study was to identify the role wild animals might 
play in the transmission of pathogens to pigs. The prevalence of specific pathogens in 
target wild animal species in and around Australian commercial large-scale piggeries was 
estimated, and the probability of pathogen exposure occurring from these wild animals to 
domestic pigs was determined. This process supplied a quantitative estimation of the level 
of pathogen exposure risk.  
 
Prior to this thesis, the extent to which wild animals were present in and around Australian 
piggeries had not been formally studied. A formal survey among a representative group of 
commercial pig producers provided a valid basis to direct further research on observed 
wild animals. Results from the producer survey indicated that birds, cats and rodents were 
the most common wild animals observed in and around piggeries. This could be related to 
their ability to adapt to domestic urban environments, travel large distances and live in 
predator-prey cycles.  
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Although cats were the most common single animal species observed, this species was not 
included in the present study as there is substantial information available documenting 
their role in the transmission of pathogens, such as Toxoplasma gondii to domestic pigs 
(Lehmann et al. 2003). In contrast, scientific literature detailing the role of other observed 
wild animals in the transmission of endemic pathogens to domestic pigs is lacking. As 
such, the current study provides information on the infection status of European starlings, 
rats and feral pigs for specific pathogens and the probability of pathogen exposure to 
domestic pigs. It was not within the scope of this study to prove transmission of the 
pathogens.  
 
All three targeted wild animals were carrying pig pathogens. These pathogens could be 
transmitted through direct and indirect pathways, via contaminated food, water and air. 
Insect- and fomite-borne transmission were not investigated in this study.  
 
Of the three animals studied, rats were the most likely to expose domestic pigs to 
pathogens, and Lawsonia intracellularis and Brachyspira hyodysenteriae were the most 
likely pathogens to be transmitted. The appropriate level of protection risk allowance for 
imports into Australia and New Zealand is established at Very Low (Biosecurity Australia 
2009), and the probability of exposure obtained in the current study for these two 
pathogens is higher than this level. It is acknowledged that the appropriate level of 
protection relates to the outcome of the overall risk estimation, which includes release, 
exposure and consequences assessments, and thus a direct comparison cannot be made to 
the probability obtained in this current study. However, as the estimated likelihood of 
exposure obtained in the current study was not negligible, the application of mitigation 
strategies should be further investigated to determine their cost-effectiveness.  
 
As the postal survey did not identify rodent association with any particular piggery 
location, type or size, recommendations for strategically-targeted management and 
reduction of this risk can be derived from the exposure assessment and sensitivity analysis. 
Piggeries that were controlling Brachyspira hyodysenteriae in domestic pigs through 
medication, Swiss depopulation or total depopulation of infected piggeries had a 33-fold 
lower probability of exposure of pigs to the pathogen from rats compared to piggeries that 
were known to be infected and not controlling the pathogen. The control strategies for 
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reducing Brachyspira hyodysenteriae infection in domestic pigs limit the pathogen 
transmission cycle by reducing the prevalence in pigs and reducing environmental 
contamination, causing a corresponding reduction of infection and re-infection in rats, 
subsequently reducing the likelihood of exposure.  
 
The sensitivity analysis also identified that having a high number of rats in a piggery, 
irrespective of their infection status, was one of the most influential factors on the 
probability of exposure. The number of rats present in a piggery can be reduced through 
more effective rodent control strategies, such as an integrated pest management approach 
including baiting, trapping and shooting on a region wide basis to prevent reincursion from 
neighbouring areas (Singleton et al. 2002). The majority of pig producers surveyed were 
satisfied with the currently applied rodent control strategies. However, effectiveness of 
these methods could be improved through enhanced knowledge and education. For 
example, traps and bait stations should be used within 17 m of each other to account for the 
minimum habitat range of rats (Leung and Clark 2005). Additionally, piggeries should be 
encouraged to use multiple bait types and toxins. Ideally, rats should not be present in 
piggeries, and control measures should focus on preventing rat access to pig housing, food 
and water. However, there are no available techniques to prevent rodent access to piggeries 
that are not entirely enclosed; therefore, environmental changes to reduce access to feed 
and water should be implemented. Where possible, removal of open cup and trough water 
sources and replacement with nipple or bite drinkers; as well as cleaning spilt feed from 
pens; should be implemented to minimise rodent presence in the piggery and therefore the 
potential contamination of foodstuffs by pathogens carried by rodents. In addition, those 
pig producers that mix their own feed should make every attempt to store feed ingredients 
or feed bags in a manner that reduces the chance of rodents accessing it, such as in silos, 
bins or plastic food containers.  
 
Exposure of domestic pigs to pathogens from European starlings was estimated to be lower 
than the exposure from rats. However, there was a 3% probability of exposure to 
pathogenic Escherichia coli, which was the highest probability among the three pathogens 
studied in starlings. The infection level of the different pathogens in the starlings 
themselves had the greatest influence on the exposure likelihood. However, this input 
parameter could only be modified if a medication strategy was incorporated for wild birds 
on farms. This strategy has not been considered for pest birds on livestock enterprises 
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before, but is a potential option, through in-feed and water medication, if it is demonstrated 
to be a cheaper option than other available approaches to prevent pig exposure. However, 
the feasibility and usefulness of this strategy must be examined, as it will likely improve 
the survival of these invasive pest birds, as shown through medication studies for control 
of blood parasites in wild Blue Tits (Cyanistes caeruleus) (Tomás et al. 2007); further 
increasing their population size and the subsequent impacts would be counter-productive.  
 
The presence and number of starlings on piggeries also had an important influence on the 
likelihood of pathogen exposure. Both of these input parameters could be altered through 
effective control strategies. However, the only population control method available to pig 
producers in Australia is shooting, and this is considered to be ineffective (Fleming 1990; 
Bomford and Sinclair 2002). Alternative means of controlling starling access to piggeries 
include netting, which is generally considered ineffective by pig producers due to net 
damage over time, and use of poison baits for starlings, which are currently not registered 
for use in Australia. Piggeries from Queensland reported fewer observations of starlings 
than piggeries in other states of Australia. Control of starlings should be targeted towards 
regions where this wild animal poses the most significant problem.  
 
The likelihood of pathogen exposure from feral to domestic pigs was found to be very low 
for some pathogens. The highest probability of domestic pig exposure to feral pig 
pathogens was found to be for Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae and Lawsonia intracellularis 
for pigs in free-range piggeries. As expected, this likelihood was higher in piggeries with a 
high number of feral pigs in their proximity. Although the probability of exposure was 
very low, the potential consequences of pathogen exposure and transmission from feral 
pigs could be vast in many instances (Meuwissen et al. 1999; Productivity Commission 
2002). Consequently, mitigation strategies to reduce exposure from feral pigs should be 
seriously considered. In addition, the role of feral pigs internationally as a carrier and 
transmitter of exotic diseases, such as foot-and-mouth disease (Productivity Commission 
2002), classical swine fever (Fritzemeier et al. 2000) and pseudorabies (Hahn et al. 2010), 
which have vast consequences on pig and livestock health, should be considered when 
making decisions about the necessity to mitigate the risk posed by this wild animal.   
 
Free-range piggeries in areas of high density feral pig populations should be the focus for 
risk mitigation strategies; in particular, those piggeries not applying the recommended 
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biosecurity practices in relation to the prevention of wild animals contacting domestic pigs 
are likely to pose the highest risk of exposure (APIQ 2010). To deter feral pig access to 
piggeries, adequate fencing, such as that provided by a fence with steel posts, net-wire and 
an electric outrigged wire, is required (Hone and Atkinson 1983). The input parameter 
describing access of feral pigs to the piggery property had a high influence on the 
likelihood of exposure; thus, some practical strategies could involve compliance with the 
biosecurity fencing recommendation, as well as region-wide feral pig population reduction. 
The latter would reduce by up to 10-fold the likelihood of exposure to the different 
pathogens. This can be accomplished through integrated baiting with 1080 using a number 
of targeted delivery mechanisms such as the PIGOUT® bait and the Hog-Hopper™ 
delivery container (Cowled et al. 2006; Dall 2010), as well as aerial shooting programs, as 
has been occurring in the area through the Queensland Murray-Darling Committee Blue-
print for the Bush project. Undertaking feral pig surveillance through the use of the 
HogHopper™ and remote cameras can also allow for removal of feral pig populations 
prior to their establishment.  
 
Proximity of feral pigs to piggeries is also an important factor to consider for the potential 
aerosol transmission of some pathogens. Having an external property perimeter fence to 
act as a deterrent by reducing ease of access to a property (Reidy et al. 2008), as well as 
having a clear zone around piggeries without crops that may attract feral pigs for food, 
could reduce the exposure risk. These recommendations and practices should not only be 
considered to reduce endemic disease transmission between feral and domestic pigs, but 
also to prevent transmission of exotic diseases.  
 
It is important to keep in mind when determining whether to implement a mitigation 
strategy to reduce risk, that there are inherent problems with predicting risk from imperfect 
data. The probability of exposure was determined based on an average commercial 
piggery; individual piggeries may have higher or lower risk levels than those identified in 
this study. This depends on different factors, such as environmental conditions as well as 
piggery characteristics. Those piggeries that do not adhere to the Australian pork industry 
quality assurance program (APIQ™), generally small-scale producers, will likely have 
lower biosecurity standards enabling greater contact with wild animals and a higher risk of 
exposure to pathogens they may be carrying (Hernandez-Jover et al. 2009; Hernandez-
Jover et al. 2011). In addition, estimation of pathogen presence in wild animals was 
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extrapolated from specific regions in Australia. Alternate regions might have different 
pathogen prevalence. For example, starlings were only sampled for pathogen detection in 
South Australia, though the postal survey results indicated starlings were also frequently 
observed in New South Wales and Victoria. Additionally, piggeries included in this study 
were only sampled once; for rats this only represented an intensive piggery type, and for 
starlings it did not include free-range piggeries. Seasonal variability as well as the effect of 
piggery type on pathogen prevalence has been previously described (Gaulker et al. 2009; 
Collins and Love 2003). Seasonal variability can also affect wild animal numbers observed 
on piggeries which were reported as a weekly average by pig producers on the survey in 
Chapter 2. These differences should be considered before applying any mitigation strategy. 
Finally all pigs were assumed to be susceptible to infection, with the effects of vaccination 
and in-feed medication given to pigs on risk of exposure requiring further investigation. In 
the case of Leptospira pomona vaccinations, pigs are protected for life, though the 
vaccination does not provide protection against other serotypes.  
 
Another limitation of the study was that the wild animal pathogen prevalence used in the 
exposure assessment was estimated from studies aiming to detect pathogen presence 
(rather than measure prevalence). Consequently, the confidence intervals around the true 
prevalence estimate are wider, incorporating greater uncertainty into the exposure 
assessment probability estimates. Further research involving additional sampling to 
measure prevalence could reduce this uncertainty. However, the true prevalence was 
calculated for all pathogens in the three wild animals studied, considering the diagnostic 
tests used for pathogen detection were imperfect (sensitivity and specificity differ from 
100%). This provided more accurate estimates of the point prevalence and allowed for the 
comparison of the results of the current study with other studies using different diagnostic 
techniques (Gardner 2004). It is recommended that all pathogen prevalence studies report 
true prevalence for this reason. Additional to this is the need for laboratories to report the 
sensitivity and specificity of the diagnostic methods they use. The current study had to 
make some assumptions about the sensitivity and specificity of some laboratory techniques 
used from literature due to lack of information directly from the source. 
 
8.1 Future research 
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Further investigation is necessary to determine the impacts of some of the findings of this 
thesis. Leptospira weilii serovar Topaz was detected in both feral and domestic pigs for the 
first time. The impacts of infection with this pathogen have not been previously 
investigated, and as such, the need to control infection with this pathogen in domestic pigs 
cannot be determined. Leptospira pomona, the most common isolate of Leptospira spp. in 
domestic pigs prior to the introduction of vaccination protocols on piggeries, caused a 
variety of symptoms, the main one being reproductive disorders (Faine 1994; Alston and 
Broom 1958). If this relatively new isolate, Leptospira weilii serovar Topaz, causes similar 
symptoms, the prevalence of infection in domestic pigs and other livestock needs to be 
investigated, and a vaccination for control might need to be developed.  
 
The main source of the pathogen, Leptospira weilii serovar Topaz, also needs to be 
investigated. Feral pigs are infected with this serotype at a similar low prevalence to 
domestic pigs. However, a study in the Warragamba catchment area, near Sydney, 
identified that almost half of Eastern grey kangaroos were infected with this serotype 
(Roberts et al. 2010). As such, it is important to determine how widespread this pathogen is 
in marsupials in Australia, particularly in proximity to livestock. Fencing practices for 
piggeries are not designed to restrict entry of marsupials due to their climbing or jumping 
ability. Reported observations of marsupials were higher for piggeries, with greater than 
1000 sows (P<0.05) in the producer survey, likely due to the rural locations of these larger 
piggeries. Targeting piggeries with marsupials in their proximity, with particular emphasis 
on kangaroos on free-range piggeries, and smaller marsupials, such as possums and sugar 
gliders, on indoor piggeries, is a good focus for future pathogen investigations.   
 
Wild canids and sparrows were also frequently observed by piggery producers and are 
additional animals that could be investigated for pathogen presence. Wild canids have been 
identified as the key definitive host of the parasite Neospora caninum, which causes illness 
and abortion in cattle (King et al. 2011), as well as Echinococcus granulosus, which is a 
zoonotic helminth capable of being transmitted between wildlife, domestic animals and 
humans (Jenkins and Morris 2003). Thus, their role in production-limiting pathogen 
transmission to domestic pigs should also be investigated. Piggeries with combined indoor 
and outdoor settings and those with more than 1,000 sows were found to be more likely to 
observe wild canids. The role of starlings, sparrows and rodents in pathogen transmission 
could also be further investigated to determine how their movements may contribute to 
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pathogen transfer between farms. Although a study in the United States has reported 
starling movement between dairy farms (LeJeune et al. 2008), no information from 
Australia is available. It is unknown whether starlings are devoted to a single piggery, or 
alter their feeding location, from day-to-day, or season to season in Australia.  
 
Additional future work is recommended to identify whether there are different levels of 
wariness towards humans in starling populations on different piggeries and agricultural 
enterprises. This information will indicate whether control techniques will differ in their 
effectiveness depending on how cautious a population is. Varying levels of starling 
wariness was observed in the current study by the varying ease of trapping for the different 
piggeries.  
 
Transmission and infection of domestic pigs with pathogens from a wild animal source, 
particularly infection with Lawsonia intracellularis and Brachyspira hyodysenteriae from 
rats, is credible, given the probability of exposure arising from this thesis. As such, 
important future research involves conducting an accurate cost-benefit analysis to 
determine the cost-effectiveness of mitigation strategies. There are numerous studies that 
have investigated the cost of infection of some of these pathogens in piggeries, but there is 
a need to combine this research with a cost analysis of the proposed mitigation strategies 
outlined in this chapter. 
 
8.2 Industry application 
 
Short of complete enclosure of piggeries and air filtration to prevent exposure, there are a 
number of practical recommendations for the pork industry to reduce the risk of exposure 
from wild animals. These recommendations include additional biosecurity practices 
required for quality assurance programs for piggeries, and improvements to pest animal 
control. The quality assurance program currently states that pig feed and water should be 
fresh, palatable and safe (APIQ 2010). APIQ (2010) already recommends storage of pig 
feed in enclosed silos, bins or bags to prevent access by rodents and birds. However, this 
recommendation could be expanded to include methods to protect feed and water, once 
delivered to pigs, to ensure palatability and safety. In indoor piggeries, where possible, 
feed should be distributed to pigs from enclosed bins or overhead cable-operated auger 
systems. Feeder designs should take in to account the behavioural requirements of pigs to 
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feed in groups, while protecting feed as much as possible from birds and rodents. The 
Penguin Rotational Feeder (Stockyard Industries©, Queensland, Australia) releases limited 
amounts of feed when it is nudged by the snout of a pig, thus restricting the amount 
accessible to rodents and birds. An outdoor design restricting wildlife access that may suit 
some free-range piggeries is an ad-libitum feed hopper, with flaps over feed spaces in the 
trough which are easily lifted by pigs (Booth©; West Sussex, United Kingdom). In 
addition to feed delivery, water, where possible, should be delivered in nipple or bite 
drinkers, not troughs. These practical methods will help reduce the transmission risk from 
rats and birds, which pose the highest probability of exposure.  
 
Expansion of the quality assurance recommendations in relation to feral pig pest control 
should indicate the most effective fencing type to deter feral pig entry to piggeries, with 
emphasis on free-range piggeries. A one metre tall fence, with steel posts, net-wire and an 
electric outrigged wire described by Hone and Atkinson (1983) is still considered to be the 
most effective feral pig deterrent over the long term (Seward et al. 2004; Reidy et al. 
2008). There should also be an emphasis on a double layer of fencing, such as that 
provided by pig paddock fencing, as well as a property perimeter fence. The greater the 
distance between the double layers of fencing, the greater the reduction in the risk of 
aerosol transmission. This is particularly important for controlling Mycoplasma 
hyopneumoniae and Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae, or any other aerosol-transmitted 
disease. It is important to reiterate that the risk of non-aerosol pathogen transmission from 
feral pigs is between 9- and 11-fold greater on free-range piggeries compared to indoor 
piggeries. Quality assurance recommendations must be strategically targeted towards 
mitigating risks on this type of piggery. 
 
Pest animal control could also be improved in Australia, particularly in relation to birds. 
Only one out of the ten pig producers implementing bird control on their piggery were 
satisfied with its effectiveness. Further the overwhelming majority of producers reporting 
birds on their piggeries did not use any control technique for reducing bird access to 
piggery housing. Shooting and the use of nets are the main techniques available for control 
of large populations. (Fleming 1990). Netting is effective for agricultural crops when 
applied correctly and maintained, though a high initial investment cost is associated with 
this method (Bomford and Sinclair 2002). The satisfaction of farmers with its effectiveness 
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and required maintenance has not been determined (Casal et al. 2007). Clearly an effective 
and cheap control technique is required for Australian piggeries. 
 
It is recommended that on-farm trials to be undertaken to determine the effectiveness of 
available netting for piggeries. The extent of damage sustained by rodents and strong 
beaked birds, such as sparrows, cockatoos and galahs, and the maintenance requirements 
under these conditions requires formal assessment. Secondly, a lethal population control 
product needs to be introduced and registered for use in Australia. DRC-1339 is a poison 
developed and used extensively since 1967 for starling population control in the United 
States for protection of livestock enterprises, agricultural crops and threatened or 
endangered species (Lapidge et al. 2006). Its use on cattle feedlots in the United States 
reduced starling numbers and resulted in a corresponding reduction in Salmonella spp. 
contamination in cattle feed and water (Carlson et al. 2011b). It is expected that a similar 
positive result would occur on piggeries and feedlots in Australia if it were registered for 
use. Farm trials on a number of different piggeries and agricultural enterprises is 
recommended to assess its effectiveness in Australia, to determine the optimal delivery 
system to encourage starling feeding, to determine whether starlings from different regions 
will move in to replace eradicated starlings requiring region wide implementation, and to 
establish its non-target effects on native animals.  
 
In partnership with the United States Department of Agriculture, the extended Invasive 
Animals Cooperative Research Centre will be investigating water-based poisons for 
starling and rodent control (Lapidge 2012; Personal communication). Water is a more 
limiting factor than food for pest animals in piggeries due to the extensive use of nipple 
and bite drinkers, as well as other intensive agriculture operations, such as feedlots and 
grain storage areas. The Invasive Animals Cooperative Research Centre also has a suite of 
feral pig control tools currently available, such as the previously mentioned PIGOUT® and 
HogHopperTM; and those in development and available in the future, including 
HOGGONE® and HOGGONE® Econobait and nitrite concentrate (Lapidge 2012; Personal 
communication); that can be used by piggeries to minimise risks of pathogen transmission 
from feral to domestic pigs. These could also be used for vaccination or medication 
distribution in the event of an exotic pathogen outbreak in Australia. Although locally 
effective, it is recommended that any such tools are used as part of a community baiting 
program due to the large home range of many feral pigs, the long-distance potential of 
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aerosol transmission of some pathogens and the movement of feral pigs into new areas. All 
of the previously mentioned mitigation strategies in this chapter will not only reduce the 
risk of pathogen transmission, but also have a positive affect on other pest animal impacts 
such as lowering feed costs and lowering building maintenance. 
 
This thesis has identified that there is potential for pathogen transmission from wildlife to 
pigs in piggeries, given that production-limiting pathogens were detected in wild animals 
and that the probability of exposure of domestic pigs to pathogens via these animals was 
not negligible. This finding supports the implementation of mitigation strategies to lower 
the exposure risk, with particular emphasis on the most likely avenues of infection, as well 
as the piggery types and geographic locations posing the highest probability of exposure. If 
the most significant exposure pathways are targeted through wild animal control and 
enhanced biosecurity practices, the probability of exposure to pathogens would be reduced, 
subsequently improving pig health and production. 
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Appendix 1. Questionnaire distributed to the 444 commercial pig producing members of 
Australian Pork Limited in 2007 in Australia. 
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Appendix 2. Questionnaire distributed to four piggery managers in South Australia involved in confidential pathogen sampling of European 
starlings on their piggeries 
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Appendix 3. Questionnaire distributed to three piggery managers in Victoria and South Australia involved in confidential pathogen sampling of 
rats on their piggeries. 
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Appendix 3 continued.  
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Appendix 4. Questionnaire distributed to two piggery managers in Queensland involved in confidential pathogen sampling of feral pigs near 
their piggeries. 
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